Trade Policy and Global Uncertainties: How to Promote an Open Trade Agenda

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-461
Author(s):  
Lucian Cernat
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Amitendu Palit

Abstract India's ambition of playing a prominent role in regional and global affairs has been particularly visible since the assumption of office by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014. The ambition has resulted in India's external engagement, abandoning the posturing of non-alignment for a more proactive multi-alignment strategy. Its efforts to engage with major powers such as the US and China, as well as other global middle powers such as Japan, the UK, and Australia, have been positioned on rapid economic progress, enabled by one of the fastest rates of growth among major economies. Attempts to expand global strategic influence, a natural outcome of robust economic expansion, should have seen India pursuing an aggressive outward-oriented external trade policy for increasing its share in global trade. India, though, has shown a marked resistance to open trade, including being reluctant to engage in regional and bilateral trade negotiations. This paper examines the dichotomy between India's desire to play a prominent global role and its aversion to open trade policies. Attributing the inward-looking approach to lack of competitiveness of Indian industry, absence of domestic pro-trade constituencies, and discomfort in negotiating new-generation trade issues, the paper argues India's quest for greater global strategic influence might be adversely affected by its restrictive trade policies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 126-165
Author(s):  
Kent Jones

This chapter uses a regression study to attempt to identify the link between populist governments and the country’s degree of trade openness, based on data from 1995 to 2018. The degree of protectionism associated with populism depends in part on its left-wing, right-wing, or anti-establishment orientation. Left-wing populist regimes tend to be more protectionist, and anti-establishment regimes more favorable to open trade, for example, but the results are often inconsistent and insignificant. Trade policy in populist regimes appears to depend in large part on the national context, export profile, and populist leader. A review of trade policy in several recent populist regimes reveals that Latin American populist governments tend to be the most protectionist. Smaller open economies, or those either participating in or seeking integration trade agreements with larger countries, tend to have more open trade policies.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner ◽  
B. Peter Rosendorff

Relatively little research has focused on whether countries' political institutions affect their international trade relations. We address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy. In a formal model of commercial policy, we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country-pairs (composed of an autocracy and a democracy). We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990. The results of this analysis accord with our argument: Democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs.


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