Democracy through law The Transatlantic Reflection Group and its manifesto in defence of democracy and the rule of law in the age of “artificial intelligence”

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Nemitz
Author(s):  
Stanley Greenstein

AbstractThe study of law and information technology comes with an inherent contradiction in that while technology develops rapidly and embraces notions such as internationalization and globalization, traditional law, for the most part, can be slow to react to technological developments and is also predominantly confined to national borders. However, the notion of the rule of law defies the phenomenon of law being bound to national borders and enjoys global recognition. However, a serious threat to the rule of law is looming in the form of an assault by technological developments within artificial intelligence (AI). As large strides are made in the academic discipline of AI, this technology is starting to make its way into digital decision-making systems and is in effect replacing human decision-makers. A prime example of this development is the use of AI to assist judges in making judicial decisions. However, in many circumstances this technology is a ‘black box’ due mainly to its complexity but also because it is protected by law. This lack of transparency and the diminished ability to understand the operation of these systems increasingly being used by the structures of governance is challenging traditional notions underpinning the rule of law. This is especially so in relation to concepts especially associated with the rule of law, such as transparency, fairness and explainability. This article examines the technology of AI in relation to the rule of law, highlighting the rule of law as a mechanism for human flourishing. It investigates the extent to which the rule of law is being diminished as AI is becoming entrenched within society and questions the extent to which it can survive in the technocratic society.


Author(s):  
Myriam Gicquello

This chapter assesses the introduction of artificial intelligence in international arbitration. The contention is that it would not only reinstate confidence in the arbitral system—from the perspective of the parties and the general public—and participate in the development of the rule of law, but also engage with broader systemic considerations in enhancing its legitimacy, fairness, and efficiency. Yet, before addressing the why, what, and how of this proposition, a definition of artificial intelligence is warranted. It should be noted at the outset that this concept has a variety of meanings. Despite the lack of consensus on its meaning, the chapter will thus treat artificial intelligence as encompassing both semi-autonomous and autonomous computer systems dedicated to assisting or replacing human beings in decision-making tasks. It presents the conclusions of two extensive research programs respectively dealing with the performance of statistical models and naturalistic decision-making. From that behavioural analysis, the introduction of artificial intelligence in international arbitration be discussed against the general considerations of international adjudication and the specific goals pertaining to international arbitration.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Bratko

The monograph deals with methodological problems of embedding artificial intelligence in the legal system taking into account the laws of society. Describes the properties of the rule of law as a Microsystem in subsystems of law and methods of its fixation in the system of law and logic of legal norms. Is proposed and substantiated the idea of creating specifically for artificial intelligence, separate and distinct, unambiguous normative system, parallel to the principal branches of law is built on the logic of the four-membered structure of legal norms. Briefly discusses some of the theory of law as an instrument of methodology of modelling of the legal system and its semantic codes in order to function properly an artificial intelligence. The ways of application of artificial intelligence in the functioning of the state. For students and teachers and all those interested in issues of artificial intelligence from the point of view of law.


Author(s):  
Kiel Brennan-Marquez

This chapter examines the concept of “fair notice,” both in the abstract and as it operates in U.S. constitutional doctrine. Fair notice is paramount to the rule of law. The maxim has ancient roots: people ought to know, in advance, what the law demands of them. As such, fair notice will be among the key concepts for regulating the scope and role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the legal system. AI—like its junior sibling, machine learning—unleashes a historically novel possibility: decision-making tools that are at once powerfully accurate and inscrutable to their human stewards and subjects. To determine when the use of AI-based (or AI-assisted) decision-making tools are consistent with the requirements of fair notice, a sharper account of the principle’s contours is needed. The chapter then develops a tripartite model of fair notice, inspired by the problems and opportunities of AI. It argues that lack of fair notice is used interchangeably to describe three distinct properties: notice of inputs, notice of outputs, and notice of input-output functionality. Disentangling these forms of notice, and deciding which matter in which contexts, will be crucial to the proper governance of AI.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Leslie ◽  
Christopher Burr ◽  
Mhairi Aitken ◽  
Josh Cowls ◽  
Michael Katell ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 244 ◽  
pp. 12029
Author(s):  
Ildar Begishev ◽  
Zarina Khisamova ◽  
Vitaly Vasyukov

The development of digital technologies gradually brings various changes to the life of mankind, related to the improvement of various sectors of the economy and industry. Gradually, the products of the development of these technologies become the tools without which it is impossible to imagine modern life. Relying entirely on technology in various aspects of their activities, human gradually becomes dependent on it. Highly dynamic rates of development of robotics and artificial intelligence lead to the fact that robots gradually take a place alongside humans. The capacity of some robots to self-study is a factor that cannot be ignored in modern legal relations, since the question of legal personality and responsibility for their actions was already involved. Researchers ask the question: how dangerous robotic actions can be against humans, and what legal means can prevent robots from committing crimes against their creator in particular, and the rule of law in general.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-33
Author(s):  
Светлана Горохова

An urgent problem of transforming Russian legal system at the present stage of its development is to find an optimal balance in determining fundamental approaches to the legal regulation of public relations complicated by cyberphysical systems, artificial intelligence, various types of robots and robotics objects, as well as to consider the possibility of giving legal personality to weak and strong artificial intelligence in various branches of law and legislation. Purpose: analysis of the issues related to determining the legal status of artificial intellectual systems, taking into account modern requirements dictated by scientific and technological progress, the development of social relations, and the rule-of-law principles, aimed at ensuring respect for the individual rights and legitimate interests, society and the state Methods: on the basis of dialectical and metaphysical methods, general scientific (analysis, synthesis, comparative law, etc.), and specific scientific (legal-dogmatic, cybernetic, interpretation) methods of scientific knowledge are used. Results: at the present stage of technological development, we should talk about the existence of a weak narrow-purpose AI (Narrow AI) and a strong General-purpose AI (General AI). Super-strong intelligence (Super AI) does not yet exist, although its development is predicted in the future. Narrow AI, of course, can not reach natural intelligence, so, based on its internal properties, it can not be considered a subject in relations under any circumstances. In contrast to narrow AI (Narrow AI), General AI (GAI) has a developed intelligence comparable to that of a human in certain characteristics. The theoretical discussion of giving an artificial intelligence the status of a subject or a “quasi” subject of law makes sense only for technological solutions in the rank of General AI and Super AI. In the case of an AIS, it can only be a question of partial legal capacity. Partial legal capacity is a status that applies to subjects that have legal capacity only in accordance with specific legal norms, but are otherwise not obligated or entitled. Therefore, when choosing the concept of legislative assignment of partial legal capacity to the AIS, it is necessary to determine which specific rights or “right obligations” will be granted to General AI and Super AI.


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