A dynamic supply chain game with vertical coordination and horizontal competition

Author(s):  
Pietro De Giovanni
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 96-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingjue Zhou ◽  
Tieming Liu ◽  
Gangshu Cai

In this paper, the authors investigate the impact of in-store promotion and its spillover effect on private label introductions. Studying different retail supply chain scenarios in which the retailer carrying a national brand may introduce its own private label product and promote either the national brand or the private label inside the store, they find the in-store promotion on one product has a positive spillover effect on the other product. Without in-store promotion and spillover effect, the conventional wisdom indicates that, in a retail supply chain, the national brand manufacturer will be negatively affected by the introduction of a private label product. With in-store promotion and spillover effect, however, the national brand manufacturer can actually benefit from the private label introduction. When the spillover from national brand to private label is high, the retailer prefers to promote the national brand product. When the spillover from private label to national brand is high, promoting the private label product can also benefit the national brand manufacturer. With a symmetric spillover rate, the national brand manufacturer can still benefit from the private label introduction, as long as the retailer promotes the national brand product, the horizontal competition is not intense, or the private label product quality is sufficiently low.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 628-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehrdad Agha Mohammad Ali Kermani ◽  
Alireza Aliahmadi ◽  
Vahid Reza Salamat ◽  
Farnaz Barzinpour ◽  
Ehsan Hadiyan

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
M'hand Fares

AbstractThe increasing industrialization of the wine supply chain is often associated with a greater vertical coordination. Our paper shows that a spot market institutional arrangement like brokerage can still be a relevant coordination mechanism to mitigate the contractual hazards due to quality problems. Indeed, a broker can be viewed as an expert that can help the merchant to monitor the grower's wine quality process. More precisely, if the merchant cannot credibly monitor the wine making process, it is Pareto improving to delegate this task to a broker. (JEL Classification: D82, L80, M12)


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna P. Timsina ◽  
Ram C. Bastakoti ◽  
Ganesh P. Shivakoti

Purpose The analysis focuses on the perspective of overall strategic fit in the supply chain of onion seed in Nepal. The purpose of this paper is to analyze current status of onion seed sector in Nepal from the perspective of selected functional strategies that fit in supply chain, and also identifies how various actors involved coordinate among each other. Design/methodology/approach The integrated approach has been used. It is an actor-oriented approach used to trace product flows. Supply chains generally include several actors for the onion seeds supply chain in Nepal, all those actors may or may not be applicable. However, initial approach would be to first look for these actors then subsequently identify existing supply and its actors. Some traditional methods of product and market analysis isolate operational costs along various stages of production. But, this paper used more comprehensive methodology that has taken into account an entire spectrum of associated activities and inputs. Findings Result revealed that the market actors of supply chain are taking significant benefit of value addition due to more investment in value creation. Vertical coordination is completely absent and the existence of horizontal coordination is in fragile form. The functional strategies in the upstream as well as the market side are not properly matching with the preference of the downstream actors of supply chain. It is suggested that the supply chain activities should work with different functional strategies such as proper drying and storage of seed and production of preferred varieties to satisfy the need of end consumers. Research limitations/implications It covers a single crop. Originality/value The findings and methodological discussions aim at providing practical guidance for supply chain researchers on how to analyze the strategic fit in supply chain.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi He ◽  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Chunxu Wu ◽  
Xiaohang Yue

Cooperative advertising programs are usually provided by manufacturers to stimulate retailers investing more in local advertising to increase the sales of their products or services. While previous literature on cooperative advertising mainly focuses on a “single-manufacturer single-retailer” framework, the decision-making framework with “multiple-manufacturer single-retailer” becomes more realistic because of the increasing power of retailers as well as the increased competition among the manufacturers. In view of this, in this paper we investigate the cooperative advertising program in a “two-manufacturer single-retailer” supply chain in three different scenarios; that is, (i) each channel member makes decisions independently; (ii) the retailer is vertically integrated with one manufacturer; (iii) two manufacturers are horizontally integrated. Utilizing differential game theory, the open-loop equilibrium-advertising strategies of each channel member are obtained and compared. Also, we investigate the effects of competitive intensity on the firm’s profit in three different scenarios by using the numerical analysis.


Top ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
X. T. Tang ◽  
S. J. Fang ◽  
F. Cheng

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 230-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Ayakwah ◽  
Leandro Sepulveda ◽  
Fergus Lyon

Purpose An efficient policy supporting clustered business operations necessitates an appreciation of the dynamics of rivalry and collaborations among businesses. This paper postulates that variation in competition and cooperation can significantly influence the nature of business relationships among clustered businesses, which is essential for cluster policy particularly (Newlands, 2003) as most research on rivalry and cooperation in clusters have been in developed economies. The purpose of this paper is to seek to fill the gap in the literature in African clusters based on original empirical research. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts a mixed-method research design allowing for data triangulation to study two food processing clusters. The approach comprises a survey and in-depth interview with key actors along the supply chain. Findings The findings show that business clusters with more formal business structures tend to have minimal horizontal competition but higher vertical cooperation. Comparatively, clusters with more socially embedded milieu tend to have higher levels of cooperation and minimal competition in both vertical and horizontal relationships. The research also shows that such variations in inter-business relationships have an effect on cluster operations in terms of business access to finance, formal contract, sharing of innovation and the way they relate to different stakeholders in their supply chain. Originality/value This paper advances a critical case for international business theory on clusters in Africa to incorporate the distinctive business relationships in small and medium enterprises (SME) clusters. It also demonstrates how unique location-specific attributes of developing economies hold the key to sustaining the operations of SME-based clusters.


2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anatoliy Kholodenko

Seven various variants of vertical and horizontal competition and cooperation of supply chain system participants are investigated. Best variants from the point of view of the participants themselves (their profit) ‒ integration of the whole system ‒ and consumers (volumes of products on the market) ‒ full vertically integrated supply chains ‒ by comparison of the characteristics of the optimal and equilibrium states of this system are determined. Moreover, it is easier to resist the competition than to be included in the optimal plan. The worst results ‒ not only in terms of output but also in aggregate profits ‒ are the horizontal integration of transport companies that can negotiate tariffs. At the same time, the corresponding horizontal integration of producers does not save the situation, but on the contrary, makes it stable worst of all possible.


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