INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN BASEBALL'S FREE AGENT MARKET

1984 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH LEHN
2019 ◽  
pp. 181-229
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Friedman

The premier technocrats of our age, neoclassical economists, are poorly equipped to balance homogenizing forces against heterogeneous ideas, as economists altogether ignore agents’ ideas. They do so by attributing to agents the automatic ability to act optimally, effacing the agents’ need to interpret their circumstances and thus the possibility that the ideas on which their interpretations are based will be mistaken. An error-free agent—meaning, for practical purposes, one whose interpretation of her circumstances matches that of the economist—is an agent whose actions the economist can conveniently predict. Similarly, attempts by economists of information and behavioral economists to render economics more realistic overlook ideational heterogeneity and the fact that ideas must form interpretations before they can guide actions. Thus, the agent depicted by these types of economist remains predictable despite the information asymmetries and putative irrationality identified in these literature. Even the recent shift toward empiricism in economics relies on an undertheorized positivism that, again, ignores the causal force of ideational heterogeneity. Nontechnocratic research in social psychology, however, suggests that the neglect of people’s ideas is not unique to economists, posing a wider cultural problem for technocracy—but also the hope that ideational changes might lead to a judicious form of technocratic governance.


2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret A. Abernethy ◽  
Jan Bouwens ◽  
Laurence van Lent

We investigate two determinants of two choices in the control system of divisionalized firms, namely decentralization and use of performance measures. The two determinants are those identified in the literature as important to control system design: (1) information asymmetries between corporate and divisional managers and (2) division interdependencies. We treat decentralization and performance measurement choices as endogenous variables and examine the interrelation among these choices using a simultaneous equation model. Using data from 78 divisions, our results indicate that decentralization is positively related to the level of information asymmetries and negatively to intrafirm interdependencies, while the use of performance measures is affected by the level of interdependencies among divisions within the firm, but not by information asymmetries. We find some evidence that decentralization choice and use of performance measures are complementary.


Author(s):  
Solomon Y. Deku ◽  
Alper Kara ◽  
Nodirbek Karimov

AbstractWe assess the value of frequent issuers to investors in securitization markets by examining the initial yield spread of 6132 European mortgage-backed securities (MBS), covering a 20-year period between 1999 and 2018. We find that frequent issuers have certification value, and it increases as the credit cycle approaches its peak, as lending standards loosen, and information asymmetries in securitization markets increase. Investors value frequent issuers more favourably on riskier, difficult to evaluate MBS. We find that after the great financial crisis (GFC), investors began to attribute more value to frequent issuers, regardless of MBS credit quality. We also find that in the pre-crisis period, investors required higher yields to compensate for perceived rating shopping, which is not observed after the GFC. Finally, we show that investors expect higher yields on deals closed by subsidiaries of foreign banks.


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