Which Factors Affect Bond Underwriting Fees? The Role of Banking Relationships

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 944-961 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuliano Iannotta ◽  
Marco Navone
2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (7) ◽  
pp. 724-733
Author(s):  
Anand Jha ◽  
Siddharth Shankar ◽  
Leonard Arvi

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use a unique hand-collected data set from India to investigate whether firms with multiple banking relationships that are in bankruptcy get additional loans more easily than those with a single banking relationship. The authors find that firms that have a single banking relationship increase their bank borrowing by 5 percent every year compared to those with multiple banking relationships. The results are in contrast to the hypothesis that firms choose to have multiple banking relationships to increase the probability of getting additional loans in cases of financial distress. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that a larger number of banks increases the coordination and bargaining costs during bankruptcy and decreases the liquidation value of the assets, and that the banks take that into consideration before making loans. Design/methodology/approach – Regression and control. Findings – The choice of single vs multiple banking relationships is a widely studied topic in the banking literature. A large strand of theoretical and empirical literature argues that multiple banking relationships make it easier for a firm to get additional loans in case of financial distress. The study shows that such may not be the case in instances where bargaining and co-ordination costs due to poor bankruptcy procedures are severe. Originality/value – The authors use a unique hand collected data set from India to investigate if it is easier to get additional loans in bankruptcy for firms with multiple banking relationships compared to those with a single banking relationship.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Chen ◽  
Xinrong Wang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the reputation of underwriters and sponsoring representatives on initial public offering (IPO) underwriting fees, and further investigates the role of ownership and political connection. Design/methodology/approach The methodology includes three models. Model 1 empirically investigates the effect of underwriter’s reputation on underwriting fee. Model 2 studies the effect of sponsoring representative’s reputation on underwriting fee. Model 3 further examines the effect of underwriter’s reputation and sponsoring representative reputation on the underwriting fee controlling for the impact of ultimate controlling ownership and political connection. Findings The study documents that underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation can result in reputational premiums. In the IPO of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the reputation of underwriters and sponsoring representatives does not significantly affect the underwriting fees. In the IPO of non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), there is a significantly positive correlation between underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation and underwriting fees. Further research results show that, on the one hand, the effect of underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation on underwriting fees is not significant in the IPO of NSOEs with political connection. On the other hand, underwriting fees are positively associated with underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation in the IPO of NSOEs without political connection. Research limitations/implications The sponsoring representative’s fee is not disclosed separately, which makes it difficult to distinguish the incremental effect from underwriter’s services and reputation. Practical implications NSOEs relative to SOEs are more likely to pay higher underwriting fees for hiring underwriter and sponsoring representative with better reputation during the process of IPO. Social implications The reputation of underwriter and sponsoring representative does not matter to SOEs but does matter to NSOEs. However, NSOEs’ political connection affects underwriter fees. Originality/value This paper provides new evidence of sponsoring representatives’ reputation and political connection on the underwriting fees in the IPO in Chinese SOEs and NSOEs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 291
Author(s):  
Armando Mendes Jorge Nogueira da Silva ◽  
Silvia Maria Graça Braga

Taking, as starting point, a sample of small and medium-sized (SME) Portuguese companies customers of credit of a given bank branch, we examine empirically the role of both banking relationships and the economic and financial situation of the firms in the determination of the funding conditions obtained. Based on multiple regression analysis, it was found that, for the explanatory model of the level of the risk premium, the variables that showed significance for such explanation were the firm reputation, the amount of credit granted and also the overall liquidity of the customer. Regarding the explanatory model of the amount of credit granted, the variable duration has a significant impact, indicating that relationships are valuable in such issue. In both models, the variables that have shown to have a greater impact on the amount and price of the granted credit available were variables related to the economic and financial performance of the firms


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document