A New Perspective on Ownership Identities in China's Listed Companies

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Delios ◽  
Zhi Jian Wu ◽  
Nan Zhou

We introduce a new perspective on the conceptualization and measurement of ownership identities of China's listed companies. Previous work analyzing the strategy and performance implications of the ownership structure in Chinese firms has used the official categorization provided by state bodies in China. In this categorization, state shareholding, legal person shareholding and A-shares dominate. This official categorization, however, obscures the ultimate identity of a shareholder; this can confound conceptual and empirical work on die strategy and performance implications of ownership identity. We refine the existing classification by recategorizing shareholders into 16 types, which can then be regrouped into relevant categories of shareholders, such as government or private, to enable analysis of ownership identity and ownership concentration issues in China's listed companies. Our new classification can help provide consistency in the burgeoning research on the strategy and performance implications of the concentration and identity aspects of ownership structure in China's listed companies.

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Surya Bahadur G. C. ◽  
Ravindra Prasad Baral

The paper attempts to analyze relationships among corporate governance, ownership structure and firm performance in Nepal. The study comprises of panel data set of 25 firms listed at Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) covering a period of five years from 2012 to 2016. The econometric methodology for the study consists primarily of least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, fixed and random effects panel data models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. The study finds bi-directional relationship between corporate governance and performance. Among corporate governance internal mechanisms; smaller board size, higher proportion of independent directors, reducing ownership concentration, improving standards of transparency and disclosure, and designing appropriate director compensation package are important dimensions that listed firms and regulators in Nepal should focus on. Ownership concentration is found to have positive effect on performance; however, it affects corporate governance negatively. This study raises understanding and provides empirical evidence for endogenous relationship between corporate governance and performance and offers support for principal-principal agency relationship. The results of this study lead to several practical implications for listed firms as well as policymakers of Nepal in promoting sound corporate governance practices and codes. For listed companies, the improvement in compliance with a code of corporate governance or voluntary adoption of best practices can provide a means of achieving improved performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Alice Medioli ◽  
Gianluca Gabrielli

Ever since major accounting scandals and corporate collapses of the early 2000’s, the improved risk taking and the lax approach to risk management procedures, which are viewed as contributing factors to the market breakdown that occurred in the international market and, in particular, in the U.S. in 2007, have led to an increased awareness of the importance of managing risk on the part of listed companies. Risk management has gained importance in the definition of what it means to be the best and most efficient corporate governance structure and mechanism, as it can play a fundamental role in helping to achieve the company’s target. Also disclosure related to risk management is fundamental for the efficient functioning of capital markets since it helps to improve corporate transparency and to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking behavior and disclosure, as a tool for protecting shareholders, among Italian listed companies. The analysis is devoted to the Italian stock market because it is strongly characterized by a high ownership concentration and by the presence of a family ownership model; and this scenario makes the Italian one an interesting case to study. Based on a sample of 233 Italian listed companies, through a multivariate regression, we find that a high level of ownership concentration is positively related to a firms' low level of risk taking by the board of directors, so giving interesting insights to regulators and practitioners, as well as for further research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Federico Alvino ◽  
Luigi Lepore ◽  
Sabrina Pisano ◽  
Gabriella D'Amore

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and the degree of comply-or-explain disclosure regarding the composition and functioning of boards of directors, also considering the moderating role played by family ownership. The study is conducted on a sample of 227 Italian non-financial listed companies. The results reveal a negative relationship between ownership concentration and the degree of comply-or-explain disclosure. Moreover, this relationship is stronger in companies having a family firm as a dominant shareholder. The paper contributes to previous studies on the degree of adherence to corporate governance code by investigating both the comply aspect and the explanations provided in cases of non-compliance. Moreover, the study contributes to previous research on the relationship between ownership structure and disclosure by considering the moderating role played by shareholder identity.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 76-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto de Miguel Hidalgo ◽  
Julio Pindado ◽  
Chabela de la Torre

This paper analyses how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Our analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and performance is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and performance.


2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren ◽  
Helena Bohman

The relationship between ownership, control and firm value is the subject matter studied. The study is essentially empirical. Data about the most actively traded non-financial companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is used. A comparison is made between the years 1999 and 2001. What do the relationships between firm value and different ownership characteristics like ownership concentration, foreign ownership and inside ownership look like? Do these characteristics differ between the booming year of 1999 and the recession year of 2001? Is there a relation between stock price and ownership structure? These are the three main questions addressed in the study.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santanu K. Ganguli

The paper investigates the characteristics and performance of the persistent high liquidity firms in India in the backdrop of ownership concentration. Empirical evidence reveals that the persistent high liquidity firms consistently post superior performance, have better growth prospect and resort to less debt financing. Ownership structure has no influence on the performance of such firms. Consistent with trade off theory we find that persistent cash holding as a policy beyond a certain period may hinder performance. Industry-and- size matched comparison firms with non-persistent liquidity tend to overinvest having a negative impact on performance. Ownership concentration adversely impacts performance of such firms.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amina Hamdouni

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board structure on performance in VC-backed firms. Using 106 French VC-backed firms, our methodology in this paper is to estimate four equations. A regression analysis is then used to study the impact of ownership structure and board structure on performance and also to analyze whether ownership structure (ownership concentration, director ownership, venture capital ownership and employee ownership) and board variables (size, outside directors, COE-chairman duality, proportion of VC directors, proportion of employee directors and board meeting frequency) are significant determinants of VC-backed firm performance. Results indicate a strong positive relation between ownership concentration and performance and between director ownership and performance measured by ROE. And strong negative relation between ownership concentration and performance and between director ownership and performance measured by ROA. No strong relation was found between venture-capital ownership, employee ownership and firm performance. Results show also a strong negative relation between board size and performance measured by ROE and positive relation between board size and performance measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q and MVA. The proportion of independent outside directors on the board was positively associated with ROE and negatively associated with ROA. The presence of a dual leadership structure is negatively associated with ROE and positively associated with ROA. No strong relation was found between the proportion of venture-capital in board, the presence of employee in board, or board meeting frequency and firm performance.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Chi ◽  
Guang Zeng

In this paper, we investigate how ownership structure affects the market performance of the Chinese publicly listed companies. The sample consists of all firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1998 to 2001. We find that a firm’s market performance is positively related to the proportion of legal person shares but negatively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. Using cross-sectional regressions, we further find that corporate value decreases with a firm’s increasing leverage and size, while surprisingly foreign ownership does not increase a firm’s market performance. Moreover, ST (Special Treatment) firms are used to test the effectiveness of corporate governance in China, and our results show that the change of ownership structure cannot improve the firm performance of Chinese listed companies


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