scholarly journals Interdisciplinary Gap Filling: Game Theory and the Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1055-1085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Talley
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Gap Filling ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals The Limits of Interpretation in the Law of Contract

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
Andrew Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Risk Allocation ◽  
Gap Filling ◽  
The Law ◽  
Interpretative Approach ◽  
Do So

In the law of contract questions of risk allocation properly turn, where possible, on interpretation of the agreement. This article will explore the limits of that approach. It will do so by considering two doctrines that lie at the boundaries of contract interpretation: the implication of terms in fact and the remoteness principle. Both doctrines have been commonly understood as gap-filling rules, but in two influential judgments Lord Hoffmann sought to recast them as interpretative principles. It will be argued in this article that the implication of terms in fact can properly be regarded as an interpretative exercise, but the same cannot be said of the application of the remoteness doctrine. The implication of terms in fact can helpfully be understood as interpretative, provided care is taken to explain the paths of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a contractual instrument must be understood to include a particular unexpressed term. Because no common paths of interpretative reasoning can be identified for the determination of remoteness questions, it is unsettling and counterproductive to attempt to take an interpretative approach to these questions.

3. Agreement problems

2019 ◽  
pp. 83-122
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier
Keyword(s):  
Gap Filling ◽  
Difficult Question ◽  
The Law

Course-focused and comprehensive, the Textbook on series provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. This chapter examines principles that determine when an agreement can be enforced with sufficient certainty and whether liability will arise in the absence of agreement. An apparent contract will be void if the terms are considered too uncertain or where there is no context for gap filling. But this must be balanced with the need to prevent the parties from using allegations of uncertainty to escape from bad bargains. This chapter therefore considers how the courts deal with the difficult question over agreements to agree. This chapter also considers mistakes that prevent agreement (mutual or cross-purposes mistakes and unilateral mistake as to terms, particularly identity mistakes). It also examines the availability of the remedy of rectification when the contract that does not accurately reflect what the parties agreed. The chapter also considers the defence of non est factum (this is not my deed).

Possession is Nine-Tenths of the Law: possession, property, and coordination in a Hawk–Dove Experiment

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Marco Fabbri ◽  
Matteo Rizzolli ◽  
Antonello Maruotti
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Lab Experiment ◽  
Game Players ◽  
The Law

Abstract In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).

On Game Theory and the Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt ◽  
Eric Rasmusen ◽  
Jeffrey Evans Stake ◽  
Robert H. Heidt ◽  
Michael Alexeev ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?

1996 ◽  
Vol 94 (6) ◽  
pp. 1839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen W. Salant ◽  
Theodore S. Sims ◽  
Douglas G. Baird ◽  
Robert H. Gertner ◽  
Randal C. Picker
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prime Time ◽  
The Law

Game theory and the law and policy of outer space

Space Policy ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan F. Galloway
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Outer Space ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals The Law Enforcement Of The Employees Social Security System In Indonesia: A Game Theory Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-174
Author(s):  
Randy Amsyari ◽  
Fajrin Satria Dwi Kesumah
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Social Security System ◽  
Security System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Subgame Perfection ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government

Insurance for the workers means a guarantee of safety for their works on the workplaces. It is necessarily crucial as workers need such a policy that can protect them from the loss. Indonesian government declare a policy that enact the act about National Social Security System (SJSN). The companies are the subject of this regulation, despite the fact at the initial implementation of this law enforcement brought to the pros and cons. Hence, the regulation also regulates for those who betray the policy will have to pay some certain amount of fine which in turn can harden them. The companies on the other side have a choice either to register or not their workers to SJSN as they still consider the premium they have to pay. This study aims to analyze the payoffs for both government and companies to be better off from the law enforcement. Game theory perspective is applied for the methodology of the study, particularly Subgame Perfection Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). The results present that in condition of an effective law enforcement at p, the firms will be beneficial from the SJSN policy by registering their workers and pay the premium, because if they do not pay the premium they have to pay additional amount of fine. On the other hand, if the policy is not effective with 1-p, the firms will have an advantage by not registering their employees to the SJSN as the law enforcement is not effective. Also, the government does not necessarily conduct an investigation as the cost is higher than the return that they will get.

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