scholarly journals Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-21
Author(s):  
David Orentlicher
Keyword(s):  
Informed Consent ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Required Disclosures

As states increasingly impose informed consent mandates on abortion providers, the required disclosures bring two well-established legal doctrines into conflict — the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and the physician’s duty to obtain informed consent.On one hand, the First Amendment provides for a broad freedom of speech, under which government may neither prevent people from voicing their own views, nor compel individuals to voice the government’s views. As the Supreme Court observed in Wooley v. Maynard, the First Amendment protects “both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” When legislatures tell physicians what they must disclose to their patients, the physicians lose their right not to speak.

scholarly journals Principles of IP-Court Activity in Ukraine

2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-123
Author(s):  
S. V. Volovyk
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Document ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
The Right ◽  
Principle Of Legality

The principles of IP-court activity in Ukraine have been studied. It has been emphasized that the urgent issues currently are to review the existing approaches to reforming the judicial system of Ukraine, based on the gained experience of establishing specialized courts, defining principles as guidelines for the functioning of IP-court in Ukraine as the Higher Specialized Judicial System of Ukraine. The concept of “principles” and their classification have been defined. The author has noted the importance of international principles of court activity in Ukraine. The regulatory base of courts activity has been characterized, where the principles of functioning of courts and judges in Ukraine have been defined. The author has singled out such an international legal document as the Basic Principles of Judicial Agencies’ Independence, which enshrines the following principles of IP-court activity in Ukraine: the principle of judicial agencies’ independence; the principle of freedom of speech and associations; the principle of qualification, selection and training; the principle of professional secrecy and immunity. The category of “principles of IP-court activity in Ukraine” has been offered to understand as a set of guiding (fundamental) ideas, grounds, principles of operation and functioning of IP-court in Ukraine that ensure the proper administration of justice, respect for rights and fundamental freedoms during the trial and ensuring the right to a fair trial. The principles of the IP-court activity in Ukraine are as follows: 1) general and legal: the rule of law principle; the principle of observance of human rights and fundamental human and civil freedoms; the principle of legality; the principle of openness and transparency of court proceedings; the principle of political or other impartiality; the principle of reasonable terms; 2) special principles of IP-court activity in Ukraine: the principle of independence of judicial agencies; the principle of freedom of speech and associations; principle of qualification; the principle of professional secrecy. It has been concluded that enshrining the principles of operation and functioning of the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Issues in the Law of Ukraine “On the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Issues” will increase the efficiency of the judicial system of Ukraine and significantly affect the authority and prestige of IP-court in Ukraine.

scholarly journals Erecting a Virtual Schoolhouse Gate

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-89
Author(s):  
Maryam Ahranjani
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Lower Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Interest In Technology

The very first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of speech. While the Supreme Court held in 1969 that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,” since then the Court has limited students' freedom of speech, stopping short of considering the boundaries of off-campus, online speech. Lower court holdings vary, meaning that a student engaging in certain online speech may not be punished at all in one state but would face harsh criminal punishments in another. The lack of a uniform standard leads to dangerously inconsistent punishments and poses the ultimate threat to constitutional knowledge and citizenship exercise: chilling of speech. Recent interest in technology-related cases and the presence of a new justice may reverse the Court's prior unwillingness to address this issue. In the meantime, this chapter argues that school districts should erect a virtual schoolhouse gate by implementing a uniform standard.

Assembly, Press, and Petition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Zick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Speech Clause

Chapter 3 examines the Free Speech Clause’s interactions with its First Amendment cousins—the Assembly Clause, Press Clause, and Petition Clause. It explains how and why the Supreme Court collapsed these distinctive rights into a general “Free Expression Clause” that is governed primarily by free speech doctrines and principles. The chapter examines in detail the events and influences that led each clause to be subordinated to or supplanted by the Free Speech Clause. It explains the negative consequences of free speech expansionism, for the non-speech rights and the freedom of speech. The chapter considers existing proposals for recovering or reviving the Assembly, Press, and Petition Clauses, but argues that we must rethink and expand the project. We need to work toward a First Amendment pluralism that not only disaggregates the elements of the fictional “Free Expression Clause,” but also reconnects once and still “cognate” rights of speech, assembly, press, and petition.

Government and Its Speech Forum

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall P. Bezanson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Religious Group ◽  
Private Speech ◽  
Public Park ◽  
Ten Commandments ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Grove City ◽  
The City

This chapter examines the Supreme Court's decision inPleasant Grove City v. Summum. In the city of Pleasant Grove, Utah, sits Pioneer Park—the site of a local controversy that launched a landmark expansion of the doctrine known as “government speech.” The park's attractions are a hodgepodge of monuments and historical markers, including a privately donated Ten Commandments monument. A small and unconventional local religious group called Summun argued before the Supreme Court for the right to place its own monument next to the Ten Commandments in Pioneer Park. At issue in the Summun case was whether and how the claimed government speech forum would apply to monuments in a public park. Beneath the surface of this issue, however, were some very fundamental First Amendment questions. The chapter focuses on these questions. Is First Amendment immunity for government speech constitutionally justified, and if so, why? Should government's choice of private speech qualify as government speech? Should government's speech power be extended to a government speech forum in which only approved ideas and viewpoints can be expressed?

The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Waiting Lists ◽  
The State ◽  
Waiting List ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

Constitutional Law in 1942–1943: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1942

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
West Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese American ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.

The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Cultural Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Interpretive Strategies ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.

A Note on the Law and Economics of Stolen Valor

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-119
Author(s):  
Dennis L. Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Wage Premium ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Jel Classifications

The issue of stolen valor concerns the act of trading on false claims of being awarded valorous military service medals. The Supreme Court overturned the 2005 Stolen Valor Act, largely on First Amendment grounds, ruling that even false speech deserves some protection. Misrepresentation that devalues the reputation of medals for valor may not violate the revised statute despite reducing the expected wage premium associated with being awarded the medal for valor and discouraging investment in military effort. Hence, the law and economics of stolen valor are in some conflict. JEL Classifications: D82, H1, K23

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