Constitutional Law in 1942–1943: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1942

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
West Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese American ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.

Constitutional Law in 1949–1950

1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-109
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
The United States ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court

There were two changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1949 term. Attorney General Tom C. Clark was sworn in as an Associate Justice to succeed the late Justice Frank Murphy on August 24, 1949, after his nomination by President Truman had been approved on August 19 by a vote of 73 to 8. Judge Sherman Minton of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was nominated to be an Associate Justice on September 15, 1949, to succeed Justice Wiley Rutledge. His nomination was approved by the Senate on October 4 by a vote of 48 to 16, and he was sworn in on October 12. During much of the term Justice Douglas was absent as the result of an accident incurred during the preceding summer recess. The loss of Justices Murphy and Rutledge greatly weakened the liberal alignment of the Court and very positively influenced the decision of a number of doubtful cases contrary to precedents of a recent date.

scholarly journals A First Amendment Right to Corrupt Your Politician

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Temchenko
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Association ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Right To Buy

103 Cornell L. Rev. 465 (2018) Are you dealing with state or federal agencies, to no avail? Do you need someone on top to advocate for you? You may have a right to buy your Governor’s help. It is well-established that the Constitution protects the right of political association, which includes contributions to candidates in return for ingratiation and access. Nonetheless, courts and scholars have generally limited this right to contributions to campaigns for public office. After McDonnell v. United States, that may change. Reading the McDonnell opinion in light of McCutcheon, this Note and other commentators conclude that the Supreme Court may have inadvertently created a First Amendment right to buy a politician’s influence, favor, and advocacy even outside the campaign finance setting. Undoubtedly, to the general public this must appear as nothing other than a First Amendment right to bribery. Yet this right has already been articulated in courts and has the support of at least one U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals judge. These findings suggest that Congress may no longer be able to criminalize certain types of corruption. Some courts have begun to reverse convictions and invalidate parts of existing anti-corruption statutes. While the impact of the First Amendment right remains unclear, the dismantling of the United States’ anti-corruption framework may already have begun.

The Factor Case and Double Criminality in Extradition

1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Factor v. Laubenheimer and Haggard has broken new ground with reference to the interpretation of the extradition treaties between the United States and Great Britain, and it seems to deserve special consideration as a contribution to the law of extradition. Factor's extradition was requested by Great Britain on a charge of receiving certain sums of money, aggregating £458,500, known to have been fraudulently obtained. On the complaint of a British consul, Factor was taken into custody in Illinois, and a United States Commissioner in Illinois issued a warrant for his commitment pending surrender. On a return to a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered his discharge from custody, but this order was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals seem to have regarded extradition as possible only if the offense charged was a crime both by the law of Great Britain and by the law of Illinois; the District Court held that receiving money known to have been fraudulently obtained was not a crime by the law of Illinois, but a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying chiefly on Kelly v. Griffin, took the contrary view. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the offense charged was an extraditable crime even if it is not punishable by the law of Illinois, the opinion being written by Justice Stone. Justice Butler was joined in a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justices Brandeis and Roberts.

Sperry Corp. v. United States

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-90
Author(s):  
Rose Cecile Chan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Fifth Amendment ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Circuit

Plaintiffs, Sperry Corp. and Sperry World Trade Inc. (Sperry), received an award from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal). Upon payment of the award, the United States deducted 2 percent of the total amount pursuant to a directive license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury regarding recovered claims by U.S. nationals against Iran. When plaintiffs challenged the authority of the Treasury to make the deduction and the United States Claims Court announced a preliminary ruling that concurred with plaintiffs’ position, the Executive persuaded Congress to approve legislation authorizing specified percentages to be deducted by the United States from Tribunal awards to U.S. citizens. Responding to the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the newly enacted statute, the United States Claims Court dismissed the suit and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (per Meyer, J.) reversed and held: that the deduction constitutes a taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In September 1988, the United States filed notice of appeal with the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals State Legislatures Have the Courage to Pass Antiabortion Laws and Test the Ideology of the “New” United States Supreme Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Undue Burden ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Reported Data ◽  
The Right

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.

scholarly journals Evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto (II)

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Persano
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Single Case ◽  
The United States ◽  
Planned Parenthood ◽  
Abortion Debate ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

Negli Stati Uniti il dibattito sull’aborto è sempre un tema molto caldo. Questo saggio, diviso in due parti (la prima parte è stata pubblicata sul precedente numero della rivista) prova a ripercorrere l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto, evidenziando i cambiamenti che ciascuna decisione ha apportato al quadro giuridico precedente. In questa seconda parte, la dissertazione sui singoli casi giurisprudenziali decisi dalla Suprema Corte prosegue con il caso Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Esso è stato una vera occasione mancata nella storia dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, perchè venne sfiorata la overrule di Roe v. Wade. Ciononostante, venne sostanzialmente confermato l’impianto delle decisioni precedenti, in considerazione del fatto che una decisione contraria all’aborto avrebbe spiazzato un popolo che per decenni aveva organizzato la propria vita in funzione anche della possibilità di abortire. Con questa decisione si distinse la gravidanza in due periodi: quello della pre-viabilità, in cui la donna era completamente libera di abortire in accordo col medico; quello della post-viabilità, in cui gli Stati avrebbero potuto legiferare, pur dovendo consentire l’aborto nel caso di pericolo per la vita o la salute della madre. Inoltre il diritto d’aborto venne radicato nella libertà riconosciuta nel XIV Emendamento della Costituzione. Nel successivo caso Stenberg v. Carhart fu oggetto di giudizio l’aborto a nascita parziale: una legge del Nebraska aveva bandito questa pratica, ma la legge fu annullata dalla Corte Suprema, nonostante il duro dissenso di ben quattro giudici, fra cui Anthony Kennedy. Successivamente a questa decisione, il Congresso prese l’iniziativa di emanare il Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. Questa legge fu impugnata in via d’azione davanti alla Corte Suprema e ne scaturì la sentenza Gonzalez v. Carhart. In questa decisione la Corte fece un passo indietro rispetto a Stenberg, affermò la legittimità del bando, sostenne che l’aborto a nascita parziale non è mai necessario per tutelare la vita della donna e che Stenberg era fondato su convinzioni erronee sul punto. Il saggio si conclude con delle interessanti considerazioni in merito ai possibili sviluppi futuri circa il tema dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, auspica la “liberalizzazione del diritto alla vita” ed avanza una originale proposta, valida per tutti i Paesi in cui l’aborto è legalizzato. ---------- Abortion debate is always a hot subject in the United States. This essay, divided into two parts (the first part has been published on the previous issue of this review) tries to go along the development of U.S. constitutional caselaw about abortion, pointing out the change that each judgement caused to the previous law framework. In this second part, the dissertation about U.S. Supreme Court single case-law goes on by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It was a real missed occasion in the abortion affair in the United States, because it was on the verge of overruling Roe v. Wade. However, the framework of the previous cases was substantially confirmed, considering that a decision against abortion would place out people who for a long time organized their own life in connection to the right of abortion. By this judgement, pregnancy was divided into two periods: pre-viability, when woman was completely free to have an abortion in agreement with her doctor; post-viability, when States could restrict abortion, except for woman life or health risks. Moreover, abortion right was founded on liberty, acknowledged by XIV Amendement. In the following case Gonzalez v. Carhart, partial-birth abortion was judged: a statute of Nebraska banned this activity, but it was stroked down by Supreme Court, despite of the dissenting opinion of four judges (Anthony Kennedy was one of them). After this judgement, the Congress wanted to issue Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. This statute was pre-enforcement challenged to the Supreme Court, and Gonzalez v. Carhart was poured. In this judgment, the Court drew back Stenberg, it stated the ban was legitimate, partial-birth abortion never is necessary to safeguard woman health, and Stenberg was founded on wrong beliefs on this matter. This essay concludes with interesting considerations about possible developments about abortion affair in the United States, wishes “liberty of right to life” and proposes a solution for all the countries where abortion is legal.

scholarly journals RESPONSABILIDADE EM FACE DE PIQUETE NA JURISPRUDÊNCIA NORTE-AMERICANA

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Edilton MEIRELES
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Deductive Method ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right

RESUMONeste trabalho tratamos do direito de manifestação em piquetes e da responsabilidade que possa advir desses atos em face da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América. A partir da análise das principais decisões da Suprema Corte se pode concluir que, de modo geral, os participantes do piquete não respondem quando agem de forma não ilegal. Está sedimentado, no entanto, o entendimento de que o organizador do piquete responde pelos atos dos participantes. A pesquisa desenvolvida se justifica enquanto estudo comparativo e diante do pouco debate existente no Brasil a respeito do tema. Na pesquisa foi utilizado o método dedutivo, limitada à ciência dogmática do direito, com estudo de casos apreciados pelo judiciário. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Responsabilidade; Piquete; Estados Unidos; Suprema Corte; Liberdade De Expressão. ABSTRACTIn this work we deal with the right of demonstration in pickets and the responsibility that may arise from these acts in the face of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. From the analysis of the Supreme Court's main decisions it can be concluded that, in general, the picket participants do not respond when they act in a non-illegal way. It is settled, however, the understanding that the picket organizer responds by the acts of the participants. The research developed is justified as a comparative study and in view of the little debate that exists in Brazil regarding the subject. In the research was used the deductive method, limited to the dogmatic science of law, with study of cases appreciated by the judiciary.KEYWORDS: Responsibility; Picket; United States; Supreme Court; Freedom Of Expression.

BG Group Plc v. Republic of Argentina (Sup. Ct. U.S.)

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-151
Author(s):  
Christina Trahanas
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The United States ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
First Time ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States (the Court or Supreme Court) rendered its decision in BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina (BG Group). Applying principles from judicial review of commercial arbitration awards to the investment treaty context, the Court overturned a decision of the United States Court of Appeals that vacated an investment treaty arbitral award. BG Group is significant because it is the first time that the Supreme Court has reviewed an investment treaty arbitration.

Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-708
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
To Receive

In 1968 the United States Supreme Court decided Zschernig v. Miller, a foreign relations case that has been characterized as unique. An Oregon probate statute provided for escheat of a decedent’s property in preference to a nonresident alien’s claim to inherit it unless the alien’s country (1) allowed United States citizens to inherit under similar circumstances, (2) allowed U.S. citizens to receive payment here of funds inherited there, and (3) gave foreign heirs the right to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without confiscation. Residents of then East Germany, who were the heirs of an Oregon decedent, challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, finding that Oregon probate and appellate judges were basing their decisions on “foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war.’”

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