The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehiel S. Kaplan

In the State of Israel, Rabbinical courts are granted sole jurisdiction in the adjudication of marriage and divorce of Jews. In these courts, the husband presents the divorce writ of Jews, the get, to his wife on the occasion of their divorce at the end of the adjudication process. When Jews sue for divorce in Rabbinical courts, the courts occasionally determine that the man should grant his wife a get or that the wife should accept the get granted by her husband. Sometimes one spouse disobeys the ruling. Although the Rabbinical courts occasionally impose sanctions in an attempt to enforce divorce judgments, they are generally reluctant to do so. The implementation of inappropriate measures can lead to the conclusion that a given divorce is in fact a legally ineffectual coerced divorce. Consequently, the Jewish courts occasionally delay the imposition of these sanctions out of concern that inappropriate coercive measures invalidate the get, rendering the couple still legally married. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled, though, that the Rabbinical courts in Israel should act in light of the constitutional principles in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. However, the Supreme Court of Israel has not clearly or specifically addressed the balance between the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in the process of enforcing divorce judgments, neither before nor after the enactment of the of the two important constitutional Basic Laws enacted in 1992. A detailed policy analysis of the sanctions against recalcitrant spouses in Rabbinical courts in Israel—in light of the principles of Jewish and constitutional law in the country—has not yet been undertaken. The aim of this essay is therefore to present the appropriate formula pertaining to the imposition of sanctions against recalcitrant spouses given the principles of Jewish and constitutional law. The formula is presented in light of constitutional law in Israel. However, it is also applicable in other countries with similar constitutional legislation, such as Canada, where legislation sometimes allows for the civil enforcement of Jewish divorce.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-437
Author(s):  
Gaurav Mukherjee

The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India is generally celebrated in the academic literature for its creative use of constitutional interpretation to read in certain socioeconomic rights into the ‘right to life’ provision despite their textual absence from the Constitution. However, this line of case law made the obtainment of a judicial remedy highly conditional upon an extant scheme or law, was necessarily piecemeal, deferent to the executive, and incapable of fixing precise accountability upon a violation or addressing issues of systemic material insufficiency. Much of this had to do with the absence of a rights-based legislative framework. The enactment of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (MGNREGA) and the National Food Security Act, 2013 (NFSA) presented major developments in the livelihood and food security regimes in India, and a leap forward for legislated social rights. These legislations consolidated, expanded and entrenched a number of existing rights which had come into being through judicial decisions. In this paper, I examine the antecedents of social rights in India, and show the afterlife of disagreements over appropriateness, practicality and affordability, which resulted in the adoption of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) in the Indian Constituent Assembly, persist in legislative design and judicial reasoning. In this paper, I analyse judicial treatment of these laws and propose a novel theoretical framework for better understanding them. The theoretical framework has discursively antagonistic and discursively catalytic components, and sheds light on the inter-branch institutional dynamic which arises when NFSA and MGNREGA based public interest litigation (PIL) is activated. I suggest that such PIL and the kinds of complex, dialogic remedies which result from them have effects in the political, legal, and social fields. These remedies result in a form of hybridized politico-legal accountability that enables the Supreme Court of India to safeguard its institutional capital, while also being able to better engage with concerns such as polycentricity, democratic legitimacy, lack of expertise, federalism, and the separation of powers.


1974 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn Bregman Kassirer

Perhaps no other area of constitutional law has been expanding as rapidly as that pertaining to the rights of the incarcerated. The right to treatment has received the most judicial attention; one such case has just recently been granted review by the Supreme Court. This important case, and others which have appeared in recent months are presented for discussion in this article.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Gur-Arye ◽  
Thomas Weigend

Criminal laws must conform to each state's constitutional law. In both Israel and Germany, the highest courts have ruled on the compatibility of criminal prohibitions with constitutionally protected rights. One recurrent issue is the relationship between criminal prohibitions and the right to liberty, which is constitutionally guaranteed in both countries. The authors show that there are clear parallels in the case law of Israeli and German courts with regard to liberty. Human dignity is likewise protected in both legal systems, although it plays a different role in each. Under article 1(1) of the German Basic Law, human dignity enjoys “absolute” protection, which leads to problems in defining human dignity and accommodating countervailing interests in individual cases. In Israel, by contrast, human dignity is placed on the same level as liberty in the constitutional hierarchy of rights and is not afforded any “special treatment” by the Supreme Court. The authors suggest an intermediate solution: human dignity should not be granted “absolute” protection but should be treated with the greatest respect when criminal laws are reviewed for their constitutionality.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Kaarel Relve

Section 23 of Estonia’s General Part of the Environmental Code Act sets out a subjective right to environment. The purpose behind the paper is to examine the basis for the right and analyse its scope and contents in order to determine whether it satisfies the criteria outlined by the Supreme Court for an independent material enforceable subjective right to environment. The right has no explicit basis in international, EU, or constitutional law. The GPECA’s §23 was intended to codify and expand the existing court practice surrounding the basic environmental right. However, the provision does not satisfy the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court, on account of ambiguities in the formulation of the right. The elements of the provision are analysed, and several suggestions are made for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguities.


1980 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Wulach

During the 1960's numerous studies demonstrated that the right of defendants to a speedy trial was being abused by indeterminate incarceration in prison hospitals following a competency proceeding. In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Indiana, held that indeterminate commitment without likelihood of recovery was unconstitutional. Many states responded to this decision by changing their laws and practices. Nevertheless, recent commentators have continued to advocate curtailment or abolition of competency laws. Such proposals are criticized and further research is recommended to evaluate the status of competency laws and procedures from state to state.


Author(s):  
Sergey Grachev

The article considers the grounds for the emergence of the procedural status of a suspect in a criminal case. The rights and obligations of the specified person, including the right to protection are analyzed. Subject to the requirements of the criminal procedure code of the Russian Federation, legal positions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation the conclusion about the necessity of legislative consolidation of the procedural status of the person whose rights and lawful interests are affected carried out in relation to proceedings for verification of a crime report in accordance with article 144 of the Criminal procedure code and equating it to the status of a suspect, since during the pre-investigation check he has the right to protection from the criminal prosecution actually carried out against him.


ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Gärner

AbstractThe limitation of nullity appeals to cases of ‘serious concerns regarding the correctness of the facts’ on which the lower court based upon its decision is in conformity with constitutional law. It does not violate the procedural safeguards protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights or the right to equal protection under the law protected by Article 7 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law. Despite the restrictive application in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Austria, the limitation is proportionate und thus constitutional, as such limitations only apply to rulings by a penal of lay judges.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document