scholarly journals Moral reasoning, moral decision‐making, and empathy in Korsakoff’s syndrome

Author(s):  
Erik Oudman ◽  
Sioux Stigt Thans ◽  
Estrella R. Montoya ◽  
Albert Postma
2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 1753-1764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahnaz Khatiban ◽  
Seyede Nayereh Falahan ◽  
Roya Amini ◽  
Afshin Farahanchi ◽  
Alireza Soltanian

Background: Moral reasoning is a vital skill in the nursing profession. Teaching moral reasoning to students is necessary toward promoting nursing ethics. Objectives: The aim of this study was to compare the effectiveness of problem-based learning and lecture-based methods in ethics education in improving (1) moral decision-making, (2) moral reasoning, (3) moral development, and (4) practical reasoning among nursing students. Research design: This is a repeated measurement quasi-experimental study. Participants and research context: The participants were nursing students in a University of Medical Sciences in west of Iran who were randomly assigned to the lecture-based (n = 33) or the problem-based learning (n = 33) groups. The subjects were provided nursing ethics education in four 2-h sessions. The educational content was similar, but the training methods were different. The subjects completed the Nursing Dilemma Test before, immediately after, and 1 month after the training. The data were analyzed and compared using the SPSS-16 software. Ethical considerations: The program was explained to the students, all of whom signed an informed consent form at the baseline. Findings: The two groups were similar in personal characteristics (p > 0.05). A significant improvement was observed in the mean scores on moral development in the problem-based learning compared with the lecture-based group (p < 0.05). Although the mean scores on moral reasoning improved in both the problem-based learning and the lecture-based groups immediately after the training and 1 month later, the change was significant only in the problem-based learning group (p < 0.05). The mean scores on moral decision-making, practical considerations, and familiarity with dilemmas were relatively similar for the two groups. Conclusion: The use of the problem-based learning method in ethics education enhances moral development among nursing students. However, further studies are needed to determine whether such method improves moral decision-making, moral reasoning, practical considerations, and familiarity with the ethical issues among nursing students.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Chiasson ◽  
L. Elkaim ◽  
A. G. Weil ◽  
L. Crevier ◽  
M. H. Beauchamp

Neuroscientific evidence indicates that human social functioning is supported by a distributed network of frontal and temporal brain regions that undergoes significant development during childhood and adolescence. Clinical studies of individuals with early brain insults (EBI) to frontotemporal regions suggest that such lesions may interfere with the maturation of sociocognitive skills and lead to increased sociobehavioural problems. However, little attention has focussed on the direct assessment of sociocognitive skills, such as moral reasoning, following focal EBI. In the present study, the performance of 15 patients with focal EBI (8–16 years) was compared to that of 15 demographically matched controls on basic neuropsychological measures (IQ and executive functions), sociocognitive tasks (moral reasoning, moral decision-making and empathy) and parent reports of sociobehavioural problems and social adaptive skills. Patients with focal EBI had significantly lower levels of moral reasoning maturity, moral decision-making, and empathy than their matched controls, but did not differ on more general measures of cognition. Their parents also reported increased sociobehavioural problems. These findings suggest that focal EBI to frontotemporal regions can result in reduced sociocognitive capacities, more specifically moral reasoning, and increased vulnerability to sociobehavioural problems.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristopher M Smith ◽  
Coren Lee Apicella

Researchers hypothesize that social selection resulting from partner choice may have shaped deontological moral reasoning in humans. Indeed, people in Western societies judge deontologists to be more cooperative and trustworthy than utilitarians, and prefer them as partners. We test if the preference for deontologists as social partners generalizes to a small-scale society, specifically the Hadza, who are extant hunter-gatherers residing in Tanzania. We presented 134 Hadza participants with three ecologically-relevant sacrificial dilemmas and asked them to judge whether the actor should sacrifice one person to save five. We then randomly assigned participants to hear that the actor made either a deontological or utilitarian decision and asked them to make moral and partner choice judgments about the actor in the dilemma. Participants were ambivalent about whether the actor should make the utilitarian decision. However, participants who said the actor should make the deontological decision judged the utilitarian option worse, but participants who said the actor should make the utilitarian decision judged both actions to be equally bad. Regardless of whether participants believed the actor should make the utilitarian decision, participants judged the utilitarian actor lower on traits considered important for social partners, compared to the deontological actor. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that utilitarians are perceived worse than deontologists. However, because participants do not show a preference for the deontological option, it raises questions as to whether partner choice shaped deontological moral decision-making in humans.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin L. Blankenship ◽  
Traci Y. Craig ◽  
Marielle G. Machacek

Morality – the subjective sense that humans discern between right and wrong – plays a ubiquitous role in everyday life. Deontological reasoning conceptualizes moral decision-making as rigid, such that many moral choices are forbidden or required. Not surprisingly, the language used in measures of deontological reasoning tends to be rigid, including phrases such as “always” and “never.” Two studies (N = 553) drawn from two different populations used commonly used measures of moral reasoning and measures of morality to examine the link between individual differences in deontological reasoning and language on the endorsement of moral foundations. Participants low on deontological reasoning generally showed less endorsement for moral principles when extreme language was used in the measures (relative to less extreme language).


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred W. Kaszniak ◽  
Cynda H. Rushton ◽  
Joan Halifax

The present paper is the product of collaboration between a neuroscientist, an ethicist, and a contemplative exploring issues around leadership, morality, and ethics. It is an exploration on how people in roles of responsibility can better understand how to engage in discernment processes with more awareness and a deeper sense of responsibility for others and themselves. It draws upon recent research and scholarship in neuroscience, contemplative science, and applied ethics to develop a practical understanding of how moral decision-making works and is essential in this time when there can seem to be an increasing moral vacuum in leadership.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.


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