Price Leadership and Uncertainty About Future Costs*

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-337
Author(s):  
Jorge Lemus ◽  
Fernando Luco
Keyword(s):  
1940 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
George P. Comer
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Escrihuela‐Villar ◽  
Walter Ferrarese
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
James V. Gelly ◽  
Phillip E. Pfeifer

In this case, the situation is a classic duopoly. Two shipping firms are in a price war over the market for containerized shipping to and from a small Caribbean island. The case presents a table of contributions to both firms as a function of their prices. This table serves as a basis by which the class can explore the concepts of Nash equilibrium, price leadership, and prisoner’s dilemma. It is also available with the case as a student spreadsheet (QA-0355X). See also “Lesser Antilles Lines (B)” (UVA-QA-0641) and “Lesser Antilles Lines (C)” (UVA-QA-0670).


1992 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Deneckere ◽  
Dan Kovenock ◽  
Robert Lee

1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles M. Adams ◽  
Fred J. Prochaska ◽  
Thomas H. Spreen

AbstractThe monthly and quarterly price determination processes for 31–40 and 21–25 size classes of raw-headless shrimp were examined to determine price leadership between market levels. Causal relationships were assessed using Haugh-Pierce, Sims, and Granger methods. Price models at the retail, wholesale, and exvessel market levels were estimated. Economic factors analyzed were income, prices of competing products, landings and imports of raw headless shrimp, total retail supply, beginning stocks, and marketing costs.Monthly prices generally exhibited unidirectional causality from exvessel to retail price. Quarterly prices were determined interdependently among market levels. Price responses between market levels were found to be symmetric with beginning stocks, landings, and imports of own-size shrimp the most important determinants of price.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 747-767 ◽  
Author(s):  
DALE SQUIRES ◽  
TAEKWON KIM ◽  
YONGIL JEON ◽  
RAYMOND CLARKE

A revenue-sharing arrangement is under consideration between the USA and Western and Central Pacific Island Parties. When the ex-vessel price for cannery-grade skipjack tuna is above a minimum price, Pacific Island Parties would share in the increased revenue. This arrangement would provide economic incentives to these island nations to control fishing capacity and thereby increase revenues and economic rents. This potential arrangement raises the issue of which market and species prices to use as a benchmark, Bangkok or Pago-Pago; American Samoa and skipjack or yellowfin tuna. This paper, through a time series analysis of spatial price linkages, finds price leadership for skipjack in Bangkok. Macroeconomic and regional economic implications of enhanced price stability and higher revenues in the region are also discussed.


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