scholarly journals Asymmetric input contracts under price leadership

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Escrihuela‐Villar ◽  
Walter Ferrarese
Keyword(s):  
Price Leadership

Price leadership in a vertically differentiated market

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 67-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youping Li
Keyword(s):  
Price Leadership

Price Leadership

1940 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
George P. Comer
Keyword(s):  
Price Leadership

scholarly journals A survey on the effects of aggressive marketing, price leadership and product focus on marketing channels in relationship-oriented marketing

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 729-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Ghanbarzad ◽  
Alireza Moghadasi ◽  
Yahya Dadashkarimi
Keyword(s):  
Marketing Channels ◽  
Price Leadership

Lesser Antilles Lines: The Island of San Huberto (A)

2010 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
James V. Gelly ◽  
Phillip E. Pfeifer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Lesser Antilles ◽  
Caribbean Island ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Price War

In this case, the situation is a classic duopoly. Two shipping firms are in a price war over the market for containerized shipping to and from a small Caribbean island. The case presents a table of contributions to both firms as a function of their prices. This table serves as a basis by which the class can explore the concepts of Nash equilibrium, price leadership, and prisoner’s dilemma. It is also available with the case as a student spreadsheet (QA-0355X). See also “Lesser Antilles Lines (B)” (UVA-QA-0641) and “Lesser Antilles Lines (C)” (UVA-QA-0670).

A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty

1992 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Deneckere ◽  
Dan Kovenock ◽  
Robert Lee
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Loyalty ◽  
Price Leadership

scholarly journals Price Determination in the U.S. Shrimp Market

1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles M. Adams ◽  
Fred J. Prochaska ◽  
Thomas H. Spreen
Keyword(s):  
Retail Price ◽  
Economic Factors ◽  
Causal Relationships ◽  
Price Determination ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Size Classes ◽  
Marketing Costs ◽  
The U.S

AbstractThe monthly and quarterly price determination processes for 31–40 and 21–25 size classes of raw-headless shrimp were examined to determine price leadership between market levels. Causal relationships were assessed using Haugh-Pierce, Sims, and Granger methods. Price models at the retail, wholesale, and exvessel market levels were estimated. Economic factors analyzed were income, prices of competing products, landings and imports of raw headless shrimp, total retail supply, beginning stocks, and marketing costs.Monthly prices generally exhibited unidirectional causality from exvessel to retail price. Quarterly prices were determined interdependently among market levels. Price responses between market levels were found to be symmetric with beginning stocks, landings, and imports of own-size shrimp the most important determinants of price.

Price linkages in Pacific tuna markets: implications for the South Pacific Tuna Treaty and the Western and Central Pacific region

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 747-767 ◽  
Author(s):  
DALE SQUIRES ◽  
TAEKWON KIM ◽  
YONGIL JEON ◽  
RAYMOND CLARKE
Keyword(s):  
American Samoa ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Yellowfin Tuna ◽  
Pacific Island ◽  
Skipjack Tuna ◽  
Central Pacific ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Spatial Price

A revenue-sharing arrangement is under consideration between the USA and Western and Central Pacific Island Parties. When the ex-vessel price for cannery-grade skipjack tuna is above a minimum price, Pacific Island Parties would share in the increased revenue. This arrangement would provide economic incentives to these island nations to control fishing capacity and thereby increase revenues and economic rents. This potential arrangement raises the issue of which market and species prices to use as a benchmark, Bangkok or Pago-Pago; American Samoa and skipjack or yellowfin tuna. This paper, through a time series analysis of spatial price linkages, finds price leadership for skipjack in Bangkok. Macroeconomic and regional economic implications of enhanced price stability and higher revenues in the region are also discussed.

scholarly journals On Forchheimer's model of dominant firm price leadership

2004 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Tasnádi
Keyword(s):  
Price Leadership ◽  
Dominant Firm

scholarly journals Game Theoretical Perspectives on Pricing Decisions in Asymmetric Competing Supply Chains

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Qi Tan ◽  
Weirong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Channel Model ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Horizontal Competition ◽  
Product Substitutability ◽  
First Mover

This paper investigates a dual exclusive channel model in which each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, but two goods are substitute. The decision rule between two channels is Nash game in Case 1, while it is Stackelberg game in Case 2. From manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Nash game (VN) theoretic perspectives, nine game models are developed to examine the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions at both horizontal competition and vertical competition levels. The analysis suggests that the type of price leadership scenarios, the level of product substitutability, and the relative channel status play a significant role in decision making. For instance, in case 1, the symmetric leadership (two manufacturers or two retailers are leaders) is always the dominant strategy and equilibrium for either two manufacturers or two retailers regardless of product substitutability and relative channel status. Nevertheless, the asymmetric leadership may lead channel members to encounter a prisoner’s dilemma if the relative channel status is small. By contrast, in Case 2, the symmetric leadership is not the unique dominant strategy for either two manufacturers or two retailers. In contrast to many earlier results, we also show that whether the first-mover and the late-mover advantages exist, depending on the level of related channel status.

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