Lesser Antilles Lines: The Island of San Huberto (A)

2010 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
James V. Gelly ◽  
Phillip E. Pfeifer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Lesser Antilles ◽  
Caribbean Island ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Price War

In this case, the situation is a classic duopoly. Two shipping firms are in a price war over the market for containerized shipping to and from a small Caribbean island. The case presents a table of contributions to both firms as a function of their prices. This table serves as a basis by which the class can explore the concepts of Nash equilibrium, price leadership, and prisoner’s dilemma. It is also available with the case as a student spreadsheet (QA-0355X). See also “Lesser Antilles Lines (B)” (UVA-QA-0641) and “Lesser Antilles Lines (C)” (UVA-QA-0670).

scholarly journals Punishment Effect of Prisoner Dilemma Game Based on a New Evolution Strategy Rule

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Dehui Sun ◽  
Xiaoliang Kou
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
External Factor ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Strategy ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Evolution Game ◽  
Stability Of Structure ◽  
Cooperation Structure

We discuss the effect of the punishment in the prisoner’s dilemma game. We propose a new evolution strategy rule which can reflect the external factor for both players in the evolution game. In general, if the punishment exists, the D (defection-defection) structure (i.e., both of the two players choose D-D strategy) which is the Nash equilibrium for the game can keep stable and never let the cooperation emerge. However, if a new evolution strategy rule is adopted, we can find that the D-D structure can not keep stable and it will decrease during the game from the simulations. In fact, the punishment mainly affects the C-D (cooperation-defection) structure in the network. After the fraction of the C-D structure achieved some levels, the punishment can keep the C-D structure stable and prevent it from transforming into C-C (cooperation-cooperation) structure. Moreover, in light of the stability of structure and the payoff of the individual gains, it can be found that the probability which is related to the payoff can affect the result of the evolution game.

Universalizing and the we: endogenous game theoretic deontology

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Paul Studtmann ◽  
Shyam Gouri Suresh
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium.

scholarly journals Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

2016 ◽  
Vol 472 (2186) ◽  
pp. 20150280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angsheng Li ◽  
Xi Yong
Keyword(s):  
Phase Transition ◽  
Phase Transitions ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Natural Extension ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Many Body ◽  
The Many ◽  
First Time

The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems.

scholarly journals Strong and Safe Nash Equilibrium in Some Repeated 3-Player Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Kufel ◽  
Sławomir Plaskacz ◽  
Joanna Zwierzchowska
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Strong Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Stage Game

The paper examines an infinitely repeated 3-player extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We consider a 3-player game in the normal form with incomplete information, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage, players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from previous stages of all the players. A strategy of a player in the repeated game is a function defined on the convex hull of the set of payoffs. Our aim is to construct a strong Nash equilibrium in the repeated game, i.e. a strategy profile being resistant to deviations by coalitions. Constructed equilibrium strategies are safe, i.e. the non-deviating player payoff is not smaller than the equilibrium payoff in the stage game, and deviating players’ payoffs do not exceed the nondeviating player payoff more than by a positive constant which can be arbitrary small and chosen by the non-deviating player. Our construction is inspired by Smale’s good strategies described in Smale’s paper (1980), where the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma was considered. In proofs we use arguments based on approachability and strong approachability type results.

scholarly journals Sensitivity to Context in Human Interactions

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (21) ◽  
pp. 2784
Author(s):  
Oliver Waddup ◽  
Pawel Blasiak ◽  
James M. Yearsley ◽  
Bartosz W. Wojciechowski ◽  
Emmanuel M. Pothos
Keyword(s):  
Probability Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Quantum Model ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
Human Interactions ◽  
State Of Affairs

Considering two agents responding to two (binary) questions each, we define sensitivity to context as a state of affairs such that responses to a question depend on the other agent’s questions, with the implication that it is not possible to represent the corresponding probabilities with a four-way probability distribution. We report two experiments with a variant of a prisoner’s dilemma task (but without a Nash equilibrium), which examine the sensitivity of participants to context. The empirical results indicate sensitivity to context and add to the body of evidence that prisoner’s dilemma tasks can be constructed so that behavior appears inconsistent with baseline classical probability theory (and the assumption that decisions are described by random variables revealing pre-existing values). We fitted two closely matched models to the results, a classical one and a quantum one, and observed superior fits for the latter. Thus, in this case, sensitivity to context goes hand in hand with (epiphenomenal) entanglement, the key characteristic of the quantum model.

scholarly journals Research on Price Wars in Supply Chain Networks Based on Multistage Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xiangbin Xu ◽  
Ermin Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Supply Chain Networks ◽  
Price Wars ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Price War

In this paper, we extend price wars to supply chain networks (SCNs), focusing on how price wars affect the performance of SCNs and how to contain a price war. We propose a computational model in which the price competition is modelled as a multistage evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game between business-related neighbors in each stage of the SCN, and the temptation to defect of the prisoner’s dilemma game is modelled as a function of the quotation price, which couples the price competition and the dynamic of the SCN. It is found that the price defectors’ exposure rate is the key factor causing price war of the SCN, and only a large proportion of firms in a closely related industry join the price alliance, and the price war in the SCN can be contained effectively.

scholarly journals Cooperación en los dilemas sociales / Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Aguado Franco ◽  
David De las Heras Camino
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Relative Value ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
Assurance Game

ABSTRACTSocial dilemmas are situations in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. Prisoner's Dilemma is the best-known game depicting situations of this sort, but there are other such games. Two other games can be created by switching the relative value of the outcomes: the Assurance Game and the Chicken Game. Whereas mutual cooperation is the goal for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Assurance Game, that is not necessarily the case for the Chicken Game; if one person can provide a joint benefit, then it may make no sense for the second person to duplicate the effort. In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome. If the game result is infinitely repeated, cooperation may be a Nash equilibrium although both players defecting always remains an equilibrium. Multiple-person social dilemmas are examined.RESUMENLos dilemas sociales, esas situaciones en las que la racionalidad individual lleva a una irracionalidad colectiva, se han planteado generalmente en la literatura económica, de una manera comprensible e intuitiva, a través del “dilema del prisionero”, si bien existen otros juegos que presentan también la forma de dilemas sociales. En efecto, partiendo de un dilema del prisionero, y modificando ligeramente los valores relativos de los pagos, podemos encontrar dos tipos de juegos diferentes: el de coordinación o seguro y el juego del “gallina”. Los distintos modelos dependerán de los supuestos que se realicen acerca de la situación analizada, lo que conducirá a extraer, lógicamente, conclusiones muy diferentes. Además, aunque la mutua cooperación es la meta clara tanto para el “dilema del prisionero” como para el juego de coordinación, esto no necesariamente se cumple para el “juego del gallina”; si una persona puede producir ese beneficio común, no tiene sentido que el otro duplique los esfuerzos. En efecto, en este tipo de juegos, los equilibrios de Nash en estrategias puras se producen en aquellas situaciones en las que uno coopera y el otro no lo hace. Aunque el análisis de los dilemas sociales, a través del dilema del prisionero bipersonal ayuda a arrojar luz sobre el asunto, parece oportuno profundizar la investigación en dos aspectos: la consideración de un horizonte temporal superior a una única partida, y la incorporación de un número de participantes en el juego mayor que dos, lo que presenta interesantes dificultades conceptuales.

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