Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion

Noûs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hájek ◽  
Wlodek Rabinowicz
Keyword(s):  
Repugnant Conclusion

scholarly journals Who Cares? ―The COVID-19 Pandemic, Global Heating and the Future of Humanity1

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tännsjö
Keyword(s):  
Great Length ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
The Past ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Total View ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Global Government ◽  
Common Future ◽  
Global Heating

The COVID-19 pandemic has engendered unprecedented drastic and costly measures to obviate the threat. Will something similar happen in relation to global heating? No, this is not likely. Mainly this has to do with a difference in the nature of collective action. Nation states protect their respective populations against the virus. With regard to global heating, we are facing the tragedy of the commons. No global government assumes responsibility for our common future. However, there may be another and further explanation lurking behind political inaction: many people, including our politicians, think that it does not matter if humanity goes extinct. It does matter, however. Strangely enough, the view that it matters is questioned by many important philosophers in the past and in the present, and it is hence controversial. Yet, it should be our common-sense stance to the problem. It is of the utmost importance that there will be sentient happy life on the globe for an indefinite time. Theoretically speaking, in order to recognize this, we need to accept some “total” view, implying what has been called the repugnant conclusion. Practically speaking, we should go to great length to rescue our human civilisation, even if this means that, for a while, we must endure all sorts of hardships such as a global enlightened despotism, or worse—a situation of life boat ethics.

Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion

Utilitas ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torbjorn Tannsjo
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Hedonistic Utilitarianism ◽  
Sentient Beings ◽  
Very High

Derek Parfit has famously pointed out that ‘total’ utilitarian views, such as classical hedonistic utilitarianism, lead to the conclusion that, to each population of quite happy persons there corresponds a more extensive population with people living lives just worth living, which is (on the whole) better. In particular, for any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. This world is better if the sum total of well-being is great enough, and it is great enough if only enough sentient beings inhabit it. This conclusion has been considered by Parfit and others to be ‘repugnant’.

The Repugnant Conclusion and the Non-Transitivity of Value Relations

2017 ◽  
pp. 103-118
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Value Relations

Resolving The Repugnant Conclusion

2007 ◽  
pp. 81-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Cowen
Keyword(s):  
Repugnant Conclusion

TRANSITIVITY AND VAGUENESS

2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
MOZAFFAR QIZILBASH
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Similar Argument ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
John Broome ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Made In

Axiomatic utility theory plays a foundational role in some accounts of normative principles. In this context, it is sometimes argued that transitivity of “better than” is a logical truth. Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels use various examples to argue that “better than” is non–transitive, and that transitivity is not a logical truth. These examples typically involve some sort of “discontinuity.” In his discussion of one of these examples, John Broome suggests that we should reject the claim which involves “discontinuity.” We can, I suggest, make sense of the examples which Temkin uses while sacrificing neither transitivity nor “discontinuity.” This response to Temkin's examples involves developing and modifying James Griffin's account of “discontinuity.” If the account of “discontinuity” seems implausible, that is because of a failure to allow for vagueness. A similar argument can be made in the context of the well-known “repugnant conclusion.”

What Should We Do About Future Generations?

1989 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yew-Kwang Ng
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Total Utility ◽  
Mere Addition ◽  
Theory X

Parfit's requirements for an ideal Theory X cannot be fully met since the Mere Addition Principle and Non-Antiegalitarianism imply the Repugnant Conclusion: Theory X does not exist. However, since the Repugnant Conclusion is really compelling, the Impersonal Total Principle should be adopted for impartial comparisons concerning future generations. Nevertheless, where our own interests are affected, we may yet choose to be partial, trading off our concern for future (or others') goodness with our self-interests. Theory X' (maximization of number-dampened total utility) meets all Parfit's requirements except the Mere Addition Principle in less compelling cases.

Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion

Utilitas ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
The World ◽  
Franz Brentano ◽  
Plausible Answer ◽  
Satisfactory Answer

In Chapter 17 of his magnificent Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit asks what he describes as an ‘awesome question’: ‘How many people should there ever be?’ For a utilitarian like me, the answer seems simple: there should be however many people it takes to make the world best. Unfortunately, if I answer Parfit's awesome question in this way, I may sink myself in a quagmire of axiological confusion. In this paper, I first describe certain aspects of the quagmire. Then I introduce and explain some of the elements of a novel axiological view – ‘justicism’. Justicism is derived from some ideas originally suggested by Franz Brentano. It was developed in an effort to solve certain other problems confronting utilitarianism – problems explicitly about justice. I think, however, that as a sort of happy by-product, justicism also generates a plausible answer to Parfit's awesome question. This may come as a bit of surprise, since justicism is a form of totalism, and it is widely thought that no totalistic theory can provide a satisfactory answer to Parfit's question. After presenting and explaining my proposed solution, I address some objections.

The Reverse Repugnant Conclusion

Utilitas ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 360-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Mulgan
Keyword(s):  
Worth Living ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Vast Number ◽  
Happy People ◽  
Zero Level ◽  
Common Response ◽  
Better Than

Total utilitarianism implies Parfit's repugnant conclusion. For any world (A) containing ten billion very happy people, there is a better world (Z) where a vast number of people have lives barely worth living. One common response is to claim that life in Parfit's Z is better than he suggests, and thus that his conclusion is not repugnant. This paper shows that this strategy cannot succeeed. Total utilitarianism also implies a reverse repugnant conclusion. For any world (A-minus) where ten billion people have lives of excruciating agony, there is a worse world (Z-minus) where a vast number of people have lives almost worth living. This reverse repugnant conclusion is at least as repugnant as Parfit's original. If we avoid the latter by raising the zero level, then the former becomes more repugnant. We cannot save total utilitarianism by tinkering with the zero level.

scholarly journals Perfectionism and the Repugnant Conclusion

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
Simon Beard
Keyword(s):  
Repugnant Conclusion
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