How Do the Probabilities Arise in Quantum Measurement?

A satisfactory resolution of the persistent quantum measurement problem remains stubbornly unresolved in spite of an overabundance of efforts of many prominent scientists over the decades. Among others, one key element is considered yet to be resolved. It comprises of where the probabilities of the measurement outcome stem from. This article attempts to provide a plausible answer to this enigma, thus eventually making progress toward a cogent solution of the longstanding measurement problem.Quanta 2021; 10: 65–74.

The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’s Theaetetus (188c10–189b9)

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement.

Why Did Paul Skip Alexandria? Paul's Missionary Strategy and the Rise of Christianity in Alexandria

Why did Paul skip Alexandria? Why is there a blank spot on his missionary map? What prompted him to make plans to travel west rather than south? The lack of scholarly interest in this question is almost as conspicuous as the lack of sources for earliest Christianity in Alexandria. This article surveys and categorises the rather random hypotheses offered in scholarship. They relate to Paul's self-understanding as a missionary, to his theologicalraison d’être, to religious and cultural aspects, and to political circumstances. The most plausible answer concerns early Christian mission strategy: Paul skipped Alexandria because it was a Jewish city and as such part of the Jewish-Christian mission.

La noción de ego trascendental en "Ideas I" e "Ideas II"

“Pero la cuestión que quiero plantear es la siguiente: ¿no es suficiente con tener este yo psíquico y psicofísico? ¿Necesitamos añadirle un yo trascendental, como una estructura de la conciencia absoluta?” Sartre planteó esta cuestión en su célebre ensayo La trascendencia del ego (2004: p.3). Ella enuncia la concepción básica de la fenomenología no-egológica, la cual no niega la existencia misma del ego o del sujeto, sino más bien lo concibe como un ser constituido y mundano, como trascendente respecto del ámbito de la conciencia. En la presente ponencia me gustaría mostrar por qué la fenomenología no puede prescindir de la noción del ego trascendental. Con tal propósito, consideraré de cerca la noción husserliana del “yo puro” del primer y del segundo libro de Ideas (1913) y, a grandes rasgos, el concepto general que Husserl se hace sobre el yo “fenomenológico” y “yo trascendental”. Tal concepto se puede encontrar en los manuscritos de este periodo, así como en algunos textos más tardíos. Intentaré demostrar que la noción husserliana del ego trascendental propia de este periodo podría articularse como una respuesta satisfactoria o al menos plausible, al desafío no-egológico con el que se ve confrontada la fenomenología egológica de Husserl.“But the question I would like to raise is the following: is this psychical and psycho-physical me not sufficient? Do we need to add to it a transcendental I, as a structure of absolute consciousness?” – Sartre raised this question in his famous essay, The transcen-dence of the ego (2004: 3). This is the basic conception of non-egological phenomenology, which latter does not deny the very existence of ego or subject, but regards it as a constituted, worldly being, something which is transcendent concerning the domain of consciousness. In this lecture I would like to demonstrate the thesis, why phenomenology cannot get along without the concept of a transcendental ego. I will have a closer look on Husserl’s notion of “pure I” in the first and second book of Ideas (1913), and more generally on Husserl’s overall concept of “phenomenological” or “transcendental I” that could be found in the manuscripts of this period and little after. I will try to show that Husserl’s conception of transcendental ego that one could find in this period could be articulated as successful or at least plausible answer to the non-egological challenge of Husserl’s egological phenomenology.

Struktur und Exegese. Über Eigentümlichkeiten in der Arie »Des Vaters Stimme ließ sich hören« (BWV 7/4)

This study deals with a characteristic of the tenor aria “Des Vaters Stimme ließ sich hören” (BWV 7/4). Why does Bach use two imitating violins? So far unconsidered exegetical and hymnological sources can give a plausible answer to that question. Based on a detailed observation of these sources, the study aims to encourage us to think again about the various hermeneutical approaches to Bach’s sacred vocal music and how Bach can be located in the field of tension between individuality and ‘Zeitgeist’.

Short Supply Conditions and the Law of International Trade: Economic Lessons from the Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by shortages and potential shortages of products critical to the public health response. Many nations have responded with export restrictions on these products, restrictions that are permitted under international trade law as a temporary response to short supply conditions generally and to public health emergencies in particular. This Essay argues that such export restrictions are economically counterproductive from a global efficiency perspective, and that governments acting unilaterally will nevertheless employ them due to international externalities that propagate through the “terms of trade.” This observation raises a puzzle as to why international law should facilitate rather than curtail them. The most plausible answer is that legal authority for such measures is a politically necessary “escape clause” in trade agreements, akin to safeguard measures.

The “Whence” of Evil and How the Demiurge Can Alleviate Our Suffering

Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper—the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato’s approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedānta-sūtra II.1.32–36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.

The sentience argument for experientialism about welfare

Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these two issues should have a certain coherence with each other. I argue that if we accept a particular plausible answer to the second question—namely that all and only sentient beings are welfare subjects—extra-experientialist theories face a problem of coherence. While this problem can typically be solved, doing so will involve steps that are unattractive. On experientialist theories, on the other hand, the answer to these questions cohere perfectly.

How Ramanujan may have discovered the mock theta functions

Mock theta functions appeared out of the blue in Ramanujan's last letter to Hardy. What would lead Ramanujan to consider the possibility of such functions in the first place? This paper seeks to provide a plausible answer to this question. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘Srinivasa Ramanujan: in celebration of the centenary of his election as FRS’.

The Silent Researcher Critique: A New Method for Obtaining a Critical Response to a Holographic Artwork

The purpose of this article is to provide a plausible answer as to whether the Z-axis of holographic space can be used to depict a chronological narrative with an affective impact. This article describes a practice-based holographic arts study in which the author created interactive artworks with family photographs taken from the late 1800s to the present day, and stacked them in chronological order within the Z-axis of holographic space. The artworks were evaluated by different audiences to determine whether the viewer could perceive the new application of holographic space, and whether the artwork had an affective impact. An art critique method used both in Higher Education settings in the UK and in professional art practice, was adapted as a research tool for use in this study and termed ‘the silent researcher critique’. The findings of the project were that audiences had a new experience when interacting with the works and were impacted emotionally by them, however only a group of experts in art and holography were able to identify and comprehend the new conceptual use of the Z-axis of holographic space. This study’s value can be measured by its offering practice-based arts researchers a novel method of obtaining valuable critical feedback from peers and by its contribution to the aesthetic development of the medium of art holography.