scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yanqing Jiang ◽  
Jian Yuan ◽  
Mengmeng Zeng

There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1755-1759
Author(s):  
Xia Chen ◽  
Ming Ming Zhao

This paper established the multi UAV incomplete information dynamic game model under uncertain environment based on incomplete information dynamic game theory and the problem of multi UAV attack-defend; for the interval information payment matrix under the uncertain environment, solve the incomplete information dynamic game Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution and get the optimal UAV combat strategy sequence. The simulations results show that the model could apply to the problem of UAV attack-defends campaign under uncertain environment reasonably and have better application value.


2011 ◽  
Vol 421 ◽  
pp. 553-558
Author(s):  
Jing Fu ◽  
Yan Hui Li ◽  
Xue Dong Wang

In an era of knowledge economy, building an internal knowledge baseis is one of basic conditions to improve competitiveness and to develop sustainablely for modern companies . In this paper, we develop a complete information dynamic game model on this problem and analyze the strategic behavior of the risk averse participators to find out the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium from perspective of individual employees. We also offer some managerial recommendations on how to balance individual interest and collective interests in modern companies. At last, a series of corresponding management enlightenments are given out based on the above analysis.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent P. Crawford

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 2035-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajani Singh ◽  
Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi ◽  
Gautam Srivastava ◽  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel ◽  
Xiaochun Cheng

Abstract Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a single “miner” or a “mining pool”, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.


2014 ◽  
Vol 919-921 ◽  
pp. 1739-1743
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma ◽  
Hong Tu Zhang

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.


Author(s):  
KC Lalropuia ◽  
Vandana Khaitan (nee Gupta)

Abstract In this paper, we develop a novel game theoretic model of the interactions between an EDoS attacker and the defender based on a signaling game that is a dynamic game of incomplete information. We then derive the best defense strategies for the network defender to respond to the EDoS attacks. That is, we compute the perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE) of the proposed game model such as the pooling PBE, separating PBE and mixed strategy PBE. In the pooling equilibrium, each type of the attacker takes the same action and the attacker's type is not revealed to the defender, whereas in the separating equilibrium, each type of the attacker uses different actions and hence the attacker's type is completely revealed to the defender. On the other hand, in the mixed strategy PBE, both the attacker and the defender randomize their strategies to optimize their payoffs. Numerical illustration is also presented to show the efficacy of the proposed model.


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