Complete Information Dynamic Game Analysis in Tacit Knowledge Sharing Process within Modern Companies

2011 ◽  
Vol 421 ◽  
pp. 553-558
Author(s):  
Jing Fu ◽  
Yan Hui Li ◽  
Xue Dong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Individual Interest ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Tacit Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

In an era of knowledge economy, building an internal knowledge baseis is one of basic conditions to improve competitiveness and to develop sustainablely for modern companies . In this paper, we develop a complete information dynamic game model on this problem and analyze the strategic behavior of the risk averse participators to find out the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium from perspective of individual employees. We also offer some managerial recommendations on how to balance individual interest and collective interests in modern companies. At last, a series of corresponding management enlightenments are given out based on the above analysis.

The Energy-Saving Management System Design of Major Projects in Implementation

2014 ◽  
Vol 919-921 ◽  
pp. 1739-1743
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma ◽  
Hong Tu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Management System ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Rational Management ◽  
The Government ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yanqing Jiang ◽  
Jian Yuan ◽  
Mengmeng Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Information Dynamic

There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

Research of Cascade Reservoirs Flood Limit Level Dynamic Control Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 748 ◽  
pp. 1160-1163
Author(s):  
Ying Ji Xuan ◽  
Jiang Song Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Control ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Level Control ◽  
Water Utilization ◽  
Cascade Reservoirs ◽  
Generating Capacity ◽  
Information Dynamic

This paper proposes a cascade reservoir flood limit level control model based on complete information dynamic game. By solving the model, the result shows that under the premise of ensuring flood safety, this equalization scheme will increase generating capacity, guaranteed output, and improve water utilization, effectively solve the conflict between flood protection and conservation.

Multi-UAV Air-Combat Strategy Research Base on the Incomplete Information Dynamic Game in Uncertain Environment

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1755-1759
Author(s):  
Xia Chen ◽  
Ming Ming Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Research ◽  
Uncertain Environment ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Multi Uav

This paper established the multi UAV incomplete information dynamic game model under uncertain environment based on incomplete information dynamic game theory and the problem of multi UAV attack-defend; for the interval information payment matrix under the uncertain environment, solve the incomplete information dynamic game Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution and get the optimal UAV combat strategy sequence. The simulations results show that the model could apply to the problem of UAV attack-defends campaign under uncertain environment reasonably and have better application value.

scholarly journals The Game Analysis of Manufacturers’ Political Connections on Product Safety in Supply Chain: Evidence from China

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Na ◽  
Wang Fusheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
The Political ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Product Protection ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This paper studied the political connections on product safety in supply chain. In market economy, information asymmetry exists throughout the entirety of supply chains that ought to ensure product safety. Due to the existence of game relations between the government and manufacturers in the aspects of product safety and regulation, the formation of market equilibrium depends on political connections between the government and manufacturers. Based on study and analyses of a static game model and a dynamic game model, this paper reveals that governments and manufacturers must use positive political connections to achieve product protection and supervision of safety throughout the supply chain. On the other hand, negative political connections lead to losses of both governmental credibility and social profits. This study indicates that inherent mechanism of political connections exists in the supply chain; it will help to enrich the theory of supply chain.

scholarly journals Centralized and Decentralized Recycle Policy with Transboundary Pollution

Environments ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Chien-Hui Lee ◽  
Po-Sheng Ko ◽  
Yu-Lin Wang ◽  
Jen-Yao Lee ◽  
Jiong-Hung Kwo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Information Dynamic

In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare.

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