scholarly journals New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent P. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
Future Developments ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Game Theoretic

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

Dilemmas of Interaction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Mathematical Theory ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Problems of interaction, which give rise to justice, are structurally problems of game theory, the mathematical theory of interactive decisions. Five problems of interaction are introduced that are all intrinsically important and that help motivate important parts of the discussions in subsequent chapters: the Farmer’s Dilemma, impure coordination, the Stag Hunt, the free-rider problem, and the choice for a powerless party to acquiesce or resist. Elements of noncooperative game theory essential to analyzing problems of justice are reviewed, including especially games in the strategic and extensive forms, the Nash equilibrium, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and games of incomplete information. Each of the five motivating problems is reformulated game-theoretically. These game-theoretic reformulations reveal precisely why the agents involved would have difficulty arriving at mutually satisfactory resolutions, and why “solutions” for these problems call for principles of justice to guide the agents’ conduct.

scholarly journals Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Brandenburger
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Real World ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
New Directions

This paper describes an approach to noncooperative game theory that aims to capture considerations that exercise the minds of real-world strategists. The most commonly used tool of noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium. This raises the question: Are there assumptions on what the players in a game think—including what they think other players think, and so on—that lead to consideration of Nash equilibrium? The paper provides answers to this, and related, questions. The approach of this paper involves analyzing the decision problem facing each player in a strategic (“interactive”) situation. In addition to grounding game theory in considerations that are of the essence in actual strategic situations, the approach has a number of other objectives: 1) to make game theory more immediately accessible to people who are trained in decision theory but who are not “game theorists” and 2) to make game theory easier to teach to students. Finally, the approach suggests new directions for research into the nature of strategic situations.

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

scholarly journals Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory

1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1067-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B Myerson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
History Of Social Science ◽  
History Of

John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory.

scholarly journals Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory

2010 ◽  
pp. 26-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Myerson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
History Of Social Science ◽  
Material Goods ◽  
History Of

John Nashs formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nashs work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory have been developed and how they have changed the course of economic theory. It is shown in particular how the scope of economics has changed from production and allocation of material goods to the study of rational competitive behavior in any institution of society.

scholarly journals A Cooperative Dual to the Nash Equilibrium for Two-Person Prescriptive Games

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. W. Corley ◽  
Phantipa Kwain
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Fundamental Solution ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Alternative Solution ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Best Interest

An alternative to the Nash equilibrium (NE) is presented for two-person, one-shot prescriptive games in normal form, where the outcome is determined by an arbiter. The NE is the fundamental solution concept in noncooperative game theory. It is based on the assumption that players are completely selfish. However, NEs are often not played in practice, so we present a cooperative dual as an alternative solution concept by which an arbiter can assign the players' actions. In this dual equilibrium (DE), each player acts in the other's best interest. We formally define prescriptive games and the DE, then summarize the duality relationships between the NE and DE for two players. We also apply the DE to some prescriptive games and compare it to other outcomes.

New Game Paradigm for IoT Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 101-147 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Markov Game ◽  
Inspection Game ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact

Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions, in which each player's choice affects the payoff of other players. The impact of game theory in psychology has been limited by the lack of cognitive mechanisms underlying game theoretic predictions. Behavioral game, inference game, inspection game and Markov game are recent approaches linking game theory to cognitive science by adding cognitive details, theories of limits on iterated thinking, and statistical theories of how players learn and influence others. These new directions include the effects of game descriptions on choice, strategic heuristics, and mental representation. These ideas will help root game theory more deeply in cognitive science and extend the scope of both enterprises.

Common Knowledge and Cheap Talk in Democratic Discourse and Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-164
Author(s):  
Richard R. W. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Communication ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
The Public ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Key Aspects

This commentary illuminates key aspects of Shiffrin’s view by appeal to concrete examples and notions from game theory. It underscores the role of law as a means for the public communication of moral commitments by invoking the idea of common knowledge. Our commitments must be known to be shared, that knowledge itself must be known to be shared, and so on ad infinitum. This offers a perspective on the importance of common law from a democratic framework: common law can be seen as a mechanism for generating common knowledge about disputes and their resolution. The commentary invokes another game-theoretic notion, that of the contrast between cheap talk and costly signaling, to illuminate Shiffrin’s discussion of constitutional balancing. Where the interests of speaker and addressee are not aligned, cheap talk lacks credibility, and this is something to which courts need to be sensitive in balancing state and constitutional interests.

scholarly journals Game-theory models of binary collective behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-19
Author(s):  
Владимир Валетинович Бреер ◽  
Vladimir Breer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Collective Behavior ◽  
General Model ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Algebraic Equations ◽  
Game Theoretic

Game-theoretic models were investigated not from the point of view of the maxima of the players' utility functions, as is usually done, but by solving algebraic equations that characterize the Nash equilibrium. This characterization is obtained for models of binary collective behavior, in which players choose one of two possible strategies. Based on the results for the general model, game-theoretic models of conformal threshold Binary Collective Behavior (BCB) are studied, provided the collective is divided into L groups. The conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria is proved. For each Nash equilibrium, its structure is defined. The results obtained are illustrated by two examples of conformal threshold BCB when the group coincides with the whole team and when the latter is divided into two groups. It is shown that the Nash equilibria in the first and second examples are analogues of the equilibria in the dynamic models of M. Granovetter and T. Schelling, respectively.

scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis

2019 ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Cuban Missile Crisis ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Thomas Schelling

This chapter surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard, and Steven Brams. All of these explanations are judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling’s explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard’s metagame theory is at odds with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams’s theory of moves explanation is inconsistent with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. As game theory has evolved, so have the explanations fashioned by its practitioners. An additional purpose of this chapter is to trace these explanatory refinements, using the Cuban crisis as a mooring.

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