A game theoretic analysis of resource mining in blockchain

Abstract Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a single “miner” or a “mining pool”, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.

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Headings of UCAV Based on Nash Equilibrium

Journal of Systems Science and Information ◽

10.21078/jssi-2018-269-08 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

pp. 269-276

Author(s):

Li Dai ◽

Zheng Xie

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Linear Equations ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Bounded Curvature ◽

Smooth Path ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Strategy Game ◽

Simulation Results ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Set Up

Abstract Given n vertices in a plane and UCAV going through each vertex once and only once and then coming back, the objective is to find the direction (heading) of motion in each vertex to minimize the smooth path of bounded curvature. This paper studies the headings of UCAV. First, the optimal headings for two vertices were given. On this basis, an n-player two-strategy game theoretic model was established. In addition, in order to obtain the mixed Nash equilibrium efficiently, n linear equations were set up. The simulation results demonstrated that the headings given in this paper are effective.

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Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ◽

10.1073/pnas.1917028117 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 117 (19) ◽

pp. 10210-10217 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Adam Lampert

Keyword(s):

General Theorem ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Multiple Agents ◽

Severe Damage ◽

Global Challenge ◽

Species Population ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Harmful Species

The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations.

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Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

Journal of the American Philosophical Association ◽

10.1017/apa.2015.12 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 1 (3) ◽

pp. 485-508 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

HUN CHUNG

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

The State ◽

The Other ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Bayesian Game ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

State Of Nature ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

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Dynamic Game Theoretic Model of Multi-Layer Infrastructure Networks

Networks and Spatial Economics ◽

10.1007/s11067-005-2627-0 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 5 (2) ◽

pp. 147-178 ◽

Cited By ~ 58

Author(s):

PENGCHENG ZHANG ◽

SRINIVAS PEETA ◽

TERRY FRIESZ

Keyword(s):

Dynamic Game ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Infrastructure Networks ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model

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In-queue priority purchase: a dynamic game approach

Queueing Systems ◽

10.1007/s11134-021-09694-y ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Zhongbin Wang ◽

Luyi Yang ◽

Shiliang Cui ◽

Jinting Wang

Keyword(s):

Pure Strategy ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Purchasing Behavior ◽

Light Traffic ◽

Sequential Rule ◽

Classical Models ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Do So

AbstractPay-for-priority is a common practice in congestion-prone service systems. The extant literature on this topic restricts attention to the case where the only epoch for customers to purchase priority is upon arrival, and if customers choose not to upgrade when they arrive, they cannot do so later during their wait. A natural alternative is to let customers pay and upgrade to priority at any time during their stay in the queue, even if they choose not to do so initially. This paper builds a queueing-game-theoretic model that explicitly captures self-interested customers’ dynamic in-queue priority-purchasing behavior. When all customers (who have not upgraded yet) simultaneously decide whether to upgrade, we find in our model that pure-strategy equilibria do not exist under some intuitive criteria, contrasting the findings in classical models where customers can only purchase priority upon arrival. However, when customers sequentially decide whether to upgrade, threshold-type pure-strategy equilibria may exist. In particular, under sufficiently light traffic, if the number of ordinary customers accumulates to a certain threshold, then it is always the second last customer who upgrades, but in general, it could be a customer from another position, and the queue-length threshold that triggers an upgrade can also vary with the traffic intensity. Finally, we find that in-queue priority purchase subject to the sequential rule yields less revenue than upon-arrival priority purchase in systems with small buffers.

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Game theoretic analysis of ideologically biased clickbait or fake news and real news

Operations Research and Decisions ◽

10.37190/ord200203 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 30 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Kjell Hausken

Keyword(s):

Production Efficiency ◽

Unit Cost ◽

The Other ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Fake News ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Unit Effort ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model

A decision and game theoretic model is developed for how one and two news organisations strike balances between producing clickbait or fake news, and real news. Each news organisation seeks to attract gullible consumers who consume more clickbait or fake news than real news, and non-gullible consumers who conscientiously consume only real news. Increasing a news organisation budget results in obtaining both more clickbait or fake news, and more real news. More clickbait or fake news is produced if the news organisation’s unit cost of effort to produce real news, the production efficiency for clickbait or fake news, and the fraction of consumers consuming clickbait or fake news, increase. In contrast, less clickbait or fake news is produced if a news organisation’s unit cost of effort to produce clickbait or fake news, and the production efficiency for real news, increase, and the gullible consumers consume real news with a higher frequency. Lower unit effort costs and higher budget and production efficiencies cause higher utility for a news organisation and lower utility for the competing news organisation. Higher weight assigned to the contest over clickbait or fake news induces both news organ-isations to exert higher effort to produce clickbait or fake news. When the gullible consumers of a news organisation consume a relatively large amount of real news in comparison to the consumers of another news organisation, then the first news organisation exerts higher effort to produce real news and obtains higher utility than the other news organisation.

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A Game-Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction Using Advertising: Simulating the Evolution of the Cournot Nash Equilibrium under Different Competitive Scenarios

Games ◽

10.3390/g12040085 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (4) ◽

pp. 85

Author(s):

Malcolm Brady

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Analytical Model ◽

Strategic Interaction ◽

Advertising Effectiveness ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Cooperative Advertising ◽

Competitive Disadvantage ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Over Time

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where firms can influence demand through use of advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. The evolution over time of the Nash equilibrium is graphically displayed for a number of different competitive scenarios. The results show that there exist threshold levels of advertising effectiveness at which duopoly behaviour bifurcates, that perfectly cooperative advertising can lead to competitive disadvantage, and that perfectly predatory advertising can lead to stagnation or losses.

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A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market

UKH Journal of Social Sciences ◽

10.25079/ukhjss.v4n1y2020.pp1-20 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 4 (6) ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Younes Brumand ◽

Masoomeh Salary

Keyword(s):

Labor Market ◽

Government Intervention ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Factors Affecting ◽

Static Game ◽

The Status ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

The Government

In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

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