Regulation of the Integrity of Gas Transmission Pipelines by the Office of Pipeline Safety

Author(s):  
Zach Barrett ◽  
Mike Israni ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Paul Wood

In December of 2003 the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published a final rule for integrity management of gas transmission pipelines. As in the earlier rule for integrity management of hazardous liquid pipeline, OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection, pressure testing or direct assessment) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. This paper describes the process leading to the rule, the primary features of the rule, and the current thinking regarding OPS expectations for inspecting against provisions of the rule. While the basic structure of the IM rule for gas transmission pipelines is very similar to that of the hazardous liquid rule, the gas rule has several distinctions that are discussed in this paper.


Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Skip Brown ◽  
David Kuhtenia

The US Department of Transportation’s Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) started the second round of integrity management inspections on hazardous liquid pipeline operators in mid-2005. Since then PHMSA has used the information gained from all of the Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management (HL IM) inspections to continue the development of the HL IM inspection process. In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The fundamental objectives for HL IM have not changed: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. The IM rule is based on a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the previously existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the inspection of management and analytical processes - aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard PHMSA compliance inspections. PHMSA has gained significant experience with the fundamentally different approach to oversight needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the inspections themselves and from basic changes in the management of the HL IM inspection program. PHMSA completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in 2004 and has continued inspecting both small system IM operators and re-inspecting large operators. As of December 2005 PHMSA has completed the inspection of 175 first round interstate hazardous liquid pipeline operators of which 101 are interstate systems and 74 are programs of intrastate hazardous liquid operators. Additionally, 14 second round inspections of hazardous liquid operators have been performed. Since the initial pilot hazardous liquid integrity management (HL IM) inspections in 2002 PHMSA has found that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and have made significant progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas (Figure 1). However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes still requires considerable attention from some operators. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time and management commitment. PHMSA recognizes this situation and continues to develop and implement an inspection and enforcement approach that seeks to assure compliance with the rule requirements and continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. Finally, after several years of integrity management development and associated inspections PHMSA gained additional experience about how to perform this new type of inspection. An important change in the program took place in late 2004 when the PHMSA regions took over the scheduling, inspection program, and other aspects of managing the IM inspections. This paper also addresses what PHMSA learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned by the regions to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.



Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Robert Brown

In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. At the core of this new rule is a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the examination of management and analytical processes-aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard OPS compliance inspections. OPS realized a fundamentally different approach to oversight was needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the comprehensive changes to the OPS inspection program that were developed to perform integrity management inspections. OPS completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in early 2004, and is making progress in reviewing the programs of smaller liquid operators. During this initial year OPS gained substantial knowledge about the state of hazardous liquid pipeline operator integrity management programs. At a high level, OPS learned that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and are making the appropriate plans and progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas. However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes takes time. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time. OPS recognizes this situation and has developed an inspection and enforcement approach that not only assures compliance with the rule requirements, but also fosters continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the initial inspections, and OPS expectations for future integrity management program development. Finally, the intial year of integrity management inspections provided some valuable insights about how to perform these new type of inspections and improve external communication. This paper also addresses what OPS learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.



Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
J. Kevin Wison ◽  
Charlie Childs ◽  
Bernie Selig

Interstate natural gas transmission pipelines have performed some standardized integrity management processes since the inception of ASME B3.18 in 1942. These standardized practices have been always preceded by new technology and individual company efforts to improve processes. These standardized practices have improved through the decades through newer consensus standard editions and the adoption of pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR Part 192). The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act which added to the list of these improved practices was passed at the end of 2002 and has been recently reaffirmed in January of 2012. The law applies to natural gas transmission pipeline companies and mandates additional practices that the pipeline operators must conduct to ensure the safety and integrity of natural gas pipelines with specific safety programs. Central to the 2002 Act is the requirement that pipeline operators implement an Integrity Management Program (IMP), which among other things requires operators to identify so-called High Consequence Areas (HCAs) on their systems, conduct risk analyses of these areas, and perform baseline integrity assessments and reassessments of each HCA, according to a prescribed schedule and using prescribed methods. The 2002 Act formalized, expanded and standardized the Integrity Management (IM) practices that individual operators had been conducting on their pipeline systems. The recently passed 2012 Pipeline Safety Act has expanded this effort to include measures to improve the integrity of the total transmission pipeline system. In December 2010, INGAA launched a voluntary initiative to enhance pipeline safety and communicate the results to stakeholders. The efforts are focused on analyzing data that measures the effectiveness of safety and integrity practices, detects successful practices, identifies opportunities for improvement, and further focuses our safety performance by developing an even more effective integrity management process. During 2011, a group chartered under the Integrity Management Continuous Improvement initiative(IMCI) identified information that may be useful in understanding the safety progress of the INGAA membership as they implemented their programs that were composed of the traditional safety practices under DOT Part 192, the PHMSA IMP regulations that were codified in 2004 and the individual operator voluntary programs. The paper provides a snapshot, above and beyond the typical PHMSA mandated reporting, of the results from the data collected and analyzed from this integrity management activity on 185,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines operated by interstate natural gas transmission pipelines. Natural gas transmission pipeline companies have made significant strides to improve their systems and the integrity and safety of their pipelines in and beyond HCAs. Our findings indicate that over the course of the data gathering period, pipeline operators’ efforts are shown to be effective and are resulting in improved pipeline integrity. Since the inception of the IMP and the expanded voluntary IM programs, the probability of leaks in the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline system continues on a downward slope, and the number of critical repairs being made to pipe segments that are being reassessed under integrity programs, both mandated and voluntary, are decreasing dramatically. Even with this progress, INGAA members committed in 2011 to embarking on a multi-year effort to expand the width and depth of integrity management practices on the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline systems. A key component of that extensive effort is to design metrics to measure the effectiveness to achieve the goals of that program. As such, this report documents the performance baseline before the implementation of the future program.



Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
Andy Drake ◽  
Keith Leewis ◽  
Bernie Selig ◽  
John Zurcher

The pipeline industry has implemented a process for acquiring data and information necessary to support technically-based standards and regulations through techical studies and research and development (R&D). This process enabled the development of ASME B31.8S based on the technical facts gathered, drawing upon all stakeholders including Federal and State regulators, pipeline operators, manufacturers and suppliers and members of the public. This paper describes the process being used by the gas pipeline industry to develop standards such as B31.8S and provides examples of the benefits derived from standards. It examines in detail the benefits that the pipeline industry and regulators derived from the timely development of ASME B31.8S - Integrity Management of Gas Pipelines and the process used to support the standards’ development. The Office of Pipeline Safety developed a cost/benefit analysis to support the final rule on Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas. The OPS analysis indicates that the net cost for the gas pipeline industry to implement this program is now $4.7 B over the next 20 years as compared with the proposed rule based on the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 which they estimated to cost $10.9B over the same period. OPS has incorporated B31.8S into its regulations, which has significantly simplified them, yet through prescriptive requirements, has provided an equal or better level of safety as envisioned by Congress. While the timely development played a major role in the distillation of the regulations, B31.8S cannot take credit for the full $6.2B savings to the industry. The estimated savings provided by B31.8S to the industry will be described. Industry management and the regulators are encouraged to fully support the continuing development of standards for the pipeline industry utilizing the model developed by the gas pipeline industry.



Author(s):  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
James von Herrmann ◽  
Paul Wood

Over the past several years the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Research and Special Programs Administration of the US Department of Transportation has begun to develop and implement a different approach to structuring its regulations and to carrying out the inspections it uses to evaluate operator conformance with the provisions of these regulations. Several new Rules have been promulgated incorporating provisions that are a combination of prescriptive, performance-based, and management-based. These rules include the hazardous liquid integrity management rules for large and small operators, the operator qualification rule, and the gas integrity management rule. The new rules have been designed to allow operators flexibility in their approach to addressing the objectives of the regulations. Such flexibility is needed because of the significant differences in the pipeline infrastructure operated by each company, and the corresponding need to acknowledge these differences to assure the objectives of regulation are achieved without imposing a needless and costly burden on the operators. Promulgation of highly prescriptive “one-size-fits-all” regulations is inconsistent with the variations present in the infrastructure operated by the US pipeline industry. One ingredient in the approach OPS has chosen is the imposition of “management-based” requirements. These requirements are so-called because they prescribe implementation of a program that includes the need for several management practices. The new rules allow some flexibility in which management practices are selected and exactly how they are implemented. Inspection against management-based provisions is different from inspection of purely prescriptive requirements. Management-based requirements provide flexibility in how operators evaluate, justify and change their practices to satisfy the intent of the rule within their unique operating environment. While such changes are designed to lead to improved performance, they will not immediately manifest themselves in recognizable changes in performance, so finely tuned measures of performance are needed to help evaluate the effectiveness of the new requirements. OPS has adopted several mechanisms to aid in the consistent inspection of the management-based provisions of the new rules. These mechanisms are discussed in the paper, as is the OPS approach to answering the question of how it will know if the new approach is working.



Author(s):  
Michael Porter ◽  
Gerald Ferris ◽  
Mark Leir ◽  
Miguel Leach ◽  
Mario Haderspock

This paper provides an updated compilation of geohazard-related pipeline failure frequencies for onshore hydrocarbon gathering and transmission pipelines, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of data from Western Europe, Western Canada, the US, and South America. The results will be of interest to owners, operators, regulators and insurers who wish to calibrate estimates of geohazard failure frequency and risk on planned and operating pipelines, particularly for pipelines traversing mountainous terrain. It concludes with an estimate of the global annual frequency of failures caused by geohazards on hydrocarbon gathering and transmission pipelines, and postulates that this failure frequency should continue to decline when measured on a per kilometer basis due to ongoing improvements in geohazard recognition, routing and design of new pipelines, and improvements to integrity management practices for operating pipelines.



2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Alireza Sassani ◽  
Omar Smadi ◽  
Neal Hawkins

Pavement markings are essential elements of transportation infrastructure with critical impacts on safety and mobility. They provide road users with the necessary information to adjust driving behavior or make calculated decisions about commuting. The visibility of pavement markings for drivers can be the boundary between a safe trip and a disastrous accident. Consequently, transportation agencies at the local or national levels allocate sizeable budgets to upkeep the pavement markings under their jurisdiction. Infrastructure asset management systems (IAMS) are often biased toward high-capital-cost assets such as pavements and bridges, not providing structured asset management (AM) plans for low-cost assets such as pavement markings. However, recent advances in transportation asset management (TAM) have promoted an integrated approach involving the pavement marking management system (PMMS). A PMMS brings all data items and processes under a comprehensive AM plan and enables managing pavement markings more efficiently. Pavement marking operations depend on location, conditions, and AM policies, highly diversifying the pavement marking management practices among agencies and making it difficult to create a holistic image of the system. Most of the available resources for pavement marking management focus on practices instead of strategies. Therefore, there is a lack of comprehensive guidelines and model frameworks for developing PMMS. This study utilizes the existing body of knowledge to build a guideline for developing and implementing PMMS. First, by adapting the core AM concepts to pavement marking management, a model framework for PMMS is created, and the building blocks and elements of the framework are introduced. Then, the caveats and practical points in PMMS implementation are discussed based on the US transportation agencies’ experiences and the relevant literature. This guideline is aspired to facilitate PMMS development for the agencies and pave the way for future pavement marking management tools and databases.



Author(s):  
Aaron Duke ◽  
Dave Murk ◽  
Bill Byrd ◽  
Stuart Saulters

Since the publication of API Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety Management Systems, in July 2015, the energy pipeline trade groups in North America (API, AOPL, AGA, INGAA, APGA and CEPA) have worked collaboratively to develop tools and programs to assist energy pipeline operators with the development and implementation of appropriate programs and processes. These resources include a Planning Tool, Implementation Tool and Evaluation Tool, as well as a Maturity Model that describes a continuum of implementation levels. The Planning Tool is used to compare an operator’s existing management system to the RP requirements and develop action plans and assign responsibilities to close gaps. It is intended to help operators achieve Level 1 maturity (develop a plan and begin work). The Implementation Tool is used to evaluate and summarize implementation status by question, element and overall, and helps track development of program implementation to Level 3 maturity. The Evaluation Tool plays two key roles addressing the conformity and effectiveness of the system. This tool is used to assess and report the level of conformity to the requirements, the “shall” statements, of the RP and possible Level 4 maturity. The Evaluation Tool also provides the means to appraise the effectiveness of an operator’s programs in achieving the objectives of the RP, asking the key question, “Is the system helping and driving improvement?” These resources can be supplemented by the voluntary third-party audit program developed by API and the Peer-to-Peer sharing process.



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