Regulatory Process Changes at the Office of Pipeline Safety

Author(s):  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
James von Herrmann ◽  
Paul Wood

Over the past several years the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Research and Special Programs Administration of the US Department of Transportation has begun to develop and implement a different approach to structuring its regulations and to carrying out the inspections it uses to evaluate operator conformance with the provisions of these regulations. Several new Rules have been promulgated incorporating provisions that are a combination of prescriptive, performance-based, and management-based. These rules include the hazardous liquid integrity management rules for large and small operators, the operator qualification rule, and the gas integrity management rule. The new rules have been designed to allow operators flexibility in their approach to addressing the objectives of the regulations. Such flexibility is needed because of the significant differences in the pipeline infrastructure operated by each company, and the corresponding need to acknowledge these differences to assure the objectives of regulation are achieved without imposing a needless and costly burden on the operators. Promulgation of highly prescriptive “one-size-fits-all” regulations is inconsistent with the variations present in the infrastructure operated by the US pipeline industry. One ingredient in the approach OPS has chosen is the imposition of “management-based” requirements. These requirements are so-called because they prescribe implementation of a program that includes the need for several management practices. The new rules allow some flexibility in which management practices are selected and exactly how they are implemented. Inspection against management-based provisions is different from inspection of purely prescriptive requirements. Management-based requirements provide flexibility in how operators evaluate, justify and change their practices to satisfy the intent of the rule within their unique operating environment. While such changes are designed to lead to improved performance, they will not immediately manifest themselves in recognizable changes in performance, so finely tuned measures of performance are needed to help evaluate the effectiveness of the new requirements. OPS has adopted several mechanisms to aid in the consistent inspection of the management-based provisions of the new rules. These mechanisms are discussed in the paper, as is the OPS approach to answering the question of how it will know if the new approach is working.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reto Sterchi ◽  
Pascal Haegeli

Abstract. An in-depth understanding of the nature of the available terrain and its exposure to avalanche hazard is crucial for making informed risk management decisions when travelling in the backcountry. While the Avalanche Terrain Exposure Scale (ATES) is broadly used for providing recreationists with terrain information, this type of terrain classification has so far only seen limited adoption within the professional ski guiding community. We hypothesize that it is the generic nature and small number of terrain classes of ATES and its precursor systems that prevent them from offering professional decision makers meaningful assistance. Working with two mechanized skiing operations in British Columbia, Canada, we present a new approach for deriving terrain classifications from daily terrain assessment records. We used a combination of self-organizing maps and hierarchical clustering to identify groups of ski runs that have been assessed similarly in the past and organized them into operation-specific terrain hierarchies. We then examined the nature of the emerging terrain hierarchies using comprehensive run characterizations from experienced guides. Our approach produces high-resolution terrain hierarchies that offer a more nuanced and meaningful perspective on the available skiing terrain and provide new opportunities for examining professional avalanche risk management practices and developing meaningful decision aids.



2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 269-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reto Sterchi ◽  
Pascal Haegeli

Abstract. An in-depth understanding of the nature of the available terrain and its exposure to avalanche hazard is crucial for making informed risk management decisions when travelling in the backcountry. While the Avalanche Terrain Exposure Scale (ATES) is broadly used for providing recreationists with terrain information, this type of terrain classification has so far only seen limited adoption within the professional ski guiding community. We hypothesize that it is the generic nature and small number of terrain classes of ATES and its precursor systems that prevent them from offering meaningful assistance to professional decision makers. Working with two mechanized skiing operations in British Columbia, Canada, we present a new approach for deriving terrain classifications from daily terrain assessment records. We used a combination of self-organizing maps and hierarchical clustering to identify groups of ski runs that have been assessed similarly in the past and organized them into operation-specific ski run hierarchies. We then examined the nature of the emerging ski run hierarchies using comprehensive run characterizations from experienced guides. Our approach produces high-resolution ski run hierarchies that offer a more nuanced and meaningful perspective on the available skiing terrain and provide new opportunities for examining professional avalanche risk management practices and developing meaningful decision aids.



Animals ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivelisse Robles ◽  
Andreia G. Arruda ◽  
Emma Nixon ◽  
Elizabeth Johnstone ◽  
Brooklyn Wagner ◽  
...  

Producers and veterinarians are considered responsible for improving animal welfare, as they are responsible for implementing practices that directly impact the animal’s well-being. Most husbandry procedures performed in cattle do not include pain mitigation, and understanding challenges faced by these stakeholders to use analgesics is key in improving on-farm pain management strategies. Therefore, the objectives of this study were to explore producer and veterinarian perspectives on pain management practices by (1) exploring inquires received by Food Animal Residue Avoidance Databank (FARAD) regarding analgesic use in cattle and (2) using a survey instrument to identify factors that impact pain management implementation in the US cattle industry. Albeit analgesia use increased in the past ten years for some producers and the majority of veterinarians, administering analgesics for pain management on US cattle farms remains a challenge. From a producer perspective, drug cost, availability and logistics for administration. From a veterinarian perspective, lack of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) products hinders the support of on-farm protocols requiring extra-label drug use. Future steps to improve analgesic use on-farm include identifying and approving drugs that demonstrate efficacy for managing pain in cattle and disseminating educational resources to support stakeholders in both the implementation and drug withdrawal process.



Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
J. Kevin Wison ◽  
Charlie Childs ◽  
Bernie Selig

Interstate natural gas transmission pipelines have performed some standardized integrity management processes since the inception of ASME B3.18 in 1942. These standardized practices have been always preceded by new technology and individual company efforts to improve processes. These standardized practices have improved through the decades through newer consensus standard editions and the adoption of pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR Part 192). The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act which added to the list of these improved practices was passed at the end of 2002 and has been recently reaffirmed in January of 2012. The law applies to natural gas transmission pipeline companies and mandates additional practices that the pipeline operators must conduct to ensure the safety and integrity of natural gas pipelines with specific safety programs. Central to the 2002 Act is the requirement that pipeline operators implement an Integrity Management Program (IMP), which among other things requires operators to identify so-called High Consequence Areas (HCAs) on their systems, conduct risk analyses of these areas, and perform baseline integrity assessments and reassessments of each HCA, according to a prescribed schedule and using prescribed methods. The 2002 Act formalized, expanded and standardized the Integrity Management (IM) practices that individual operators had been conducting on their pipeline systems. The recently passed 2012 Pipeline Safety Act has expanded this effort to include measures to improve the integrity of the total transmission pipeline system. In December 2010, INGAA launched a voluntary initiative to enhance pipeline safety and communicate the results to stakeholders. The efforts are focused on analyzing data that measures the effectiveness of safety and integrity practices, detects successful practices, identifies opportunities for improvement, and further focuses our safety performance by developing an even more effective integrity management process. During 2011, a group chartered under the Integrity Management Continuous Improvement initiative(IMCI) identified information that may be useful in understanding the safety progress of the INGAA membership as they implemented their programs that were composed of the traditional safety practices under DOT Part 192, the PHMSA IMP regulations that were codified in 2004 and the individual operator voluntary programs. The paper provides a snapshot, above and beyond the typical PHMSA mandated reporting, of the results from the data collected and analyzed from this integrity management activity on 185,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines operated by interstate natural gas transmission pipelines. Natural gas transmission pipeline companies have made significant strides to improve their systems and the integrity and safety of their pipelines in and beyond HCAs. Our findings indicate that over the course of the data gathering period, pipeline operators’ efforts are shown to be effective and are resulting in improved pipeline integrity. Since the inception of the IMP and the expanded voluntary IM programs, the probability of leaks in the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline system continues on a downward slope, and the number of critical repairs being made to pipe segments that are being reassessed under integrity programs, both mandated and voluntary, are decreasing dramatically. Even with this progress, INGAA members committed in 2011 to embarking on a multi-year effort to expand the width and depth of integrity management practices on the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline systems. A key component of that extensive effort is to design metrics to measure the effectiveness to achieve the goals of that program. As such, this report documents the performance baseline before the implementation of the future program.



Author(s):  
Michael Porter ◽  
Elisa Scordo ◽  
Pete Barlow ◽  
Daniela Welkner ◽  
Miguel Leach

Abstract Pipeline geohazard management practices and technologies have evolved rapidly over the past 15 years in step with industry’s drive towards zero failures. This paper describes the evolution in geohazard management for pipelines since the early 2000’s and describes how technology and management practices are currently being adapted to accommodate South American site conditions and data sources. It ends by outlining a possible framework for industry, regulatory and academic collaboration within South America that offers the potential for another step-function improvement in pipeline safety.



2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 385-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erwin Krediet ◽  
Tijmen Bostoen ◽  
Joost Breeksema ◽  
Annette van Schagen ◽  
Torsten Passie ◽  
...  

Abstract There are few medications with demonstrated efficacy for the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Treatment guidelines have unequivocally designated psychotherapy as a first line treatment for PTSD. Yet, even after psychotherapy, PTSD often remains a chronic illness, with high rates of psychiatric and medical comorbidity. Meanwhile, the search for and development of drugs with new mechanisms of action has stalled. Therefore, there is an urgent need to explore not just novel compounds but novel approaches for the treatment of PTSD. A promising new approach involves the use of psychedelic drugs. Within the past few years, 2 psychedelics have received breakthrough designations for psychiatric indications from the US Food and Drug Administration, and several psychedelics are currently being investigated for the treatment of PTSD. This review discusses 4 types of compounds: 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, ketamine, classical psychedelics (e.g., psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide), and cannabinoids. We describe the therapeutic rationale, the setting in which they are being administered, and their current state of evidence in the treatment of PTSD. Each compound provides unique qualities for the treatment of PTSD, from their use to rapidly target symptoms to their use as adjuncts to facilitate psychotherapeutic treatments. Several questions are formulated that outline an agenda for future research.



Author(s):  
Zach Barrett ◽  
Mike Israni ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Paul Wood

In December of 2003 the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published a final rule for integrity management of gas transmission pipelines. As in the earlier rule for integrity management of hazardous liquid pipeline, OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection, pressure testing or direct assessment) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. This paper describes the process leading to the rule, the primary features of the rule, and the current thinking regarding OPS expectations for inspecting against provisions of the rule. While the basic structure of the IM rule for gas transmission pipelines is very similar to that of the hazardous liquid rule, the gas rule has several distinctions that are discussed in this paper.



Author(s):  
Cliff Johnson ◽  
Robert W. Smith

Recently the Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the US Department of Transportation signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Pipeline Standards Developing Organizations Coordinating Council (PSDOCC). This MOA is intended to enhance the cooperation and coordination between the Parties to facilitate a more effective and efficient integration of pipeline safety research and development (R&D) results into the development and revision of voluntary consensus technical standards. This effort is the first of its kind in the US for the pipeline industry. This presentation will provide background about the PSDOCC and its role in the development of standards and its role of technology transfer for the pipeline industry — moving knowledge from R&D into industry standards and education into possible regulations.



Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Skip Brown ◽  
David Kuhtenia

The US Department of Transportation’s Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) started the second round of integrity management inspections on hazardous liquid pipeline operators in mid-2005. Since then PHMSA has used the information gained from all of the Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management (HL IM) inspections to continue the development of the HL IM inspection process. In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The fundamental objectives for HL IM have not changed: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. The IM rule is based on a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the previously existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the inspection of management and analytical processes - aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard PHMSA compliance inspections. PHMSA has gained significant experience with the fundamentally different approach to oversight needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the inspections themselves and from basic changes in the management of the HL IM inspection program. PHMSA completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in 2004 and has continued inspecting both small system IM operators and re-inspecting large operators. As of December 2005 PHMSA has completed the inspection of 175 first round interstate hazardous liquid pipeline operators of which 101 are interstate systems and 74 are programs of intrastate hazardous liquid operators. Additionally, 14 second round inspections of hazardous liquid operators have been performed. Since the initial pilot hazardous liquid integrity management (HL IM) inspections in 2002 PHMSA has found that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and have made significant progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas (Figure 1). However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes still requires considerable attention from some operators. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time and management commitment. PHMSA recognizes this situation and continues to develop and implement an inspection and enforcement approach that seeks to assure compliance with the rule requirements and continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. Finally, after several years of integrity management development and associated inspections PHMSA gained additional experience about how to perform this new type of inspection. An important change in the program took place in late 2004 when the PHMSA regions took over the scheduling, inspection program, and other aspects of managing the IM inspections. This paper also addresses what PHMSA learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned by the regions to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.



Author(s):  
Bryce Brown ◽  
David Culbertson ◽  
Bryan Melan ◽  
Jerry Rau ◽  
Bernie Selig ◽  
...  

The U.S. gas and liquid pipeline industry and its regulators have been working to improve pipeline safety and integrity through a pipeline integrity management effort since 1999. The Office of Pipeline Safety of the U.S. Department of Transportation issued integrity management regulations for liquid pipelines in 2001 and issued similar regulations for gas pipelines at the end of 2003. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), also issued regulations for Operator Qualification in 1999 requiring personnel that perform certain tasks to be qualified to perform those tasks. The Integrity Management Programs require extensive inspections of pipelines and the primary method for these inspections is of course In-Line Inspection (ILI). These inspections are critical to the safety and integrity of pipelines and the requriements are reflected in ASME B31.8S Integrity Management for Gas Pipelines. However, neither the inspection systems nor the personnel operating the systems and analyzing and reducing the data have to be qualified under existing standards or regulations. Industry and the Regulators agreed to embark on the development of consensus standards that would address the qualifications of both the ILI Systems and the ILI Personnel that run the systems and evaluate the inspection data. This paper describes the 3 standards that have been developed to obtain “qualified” In-Line Inspection results: API 1163: In-Line Inspection Systems Qualification; ASNT ILI-PQ-2003: In-Line Inspection Personnel Qualification; NACE RP0102-2002: Standard Recommended Practice, In-Line Inspection of Pipelines. The interrelationship of the 3 standards and how to utilize them will be discussed. (See figure 1). The latest changes to the standards and their acceptance by industry will also be described.



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