Early Experience With Integrity Management Inspections for US Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Robert Brown
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Require Time ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments

In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. At the core of this new rule is a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the examination of management and analytical processes-aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard OPS compliance inspections. OPS realized a fundamentally different approach to oversight was needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the comprehensive changes to the OPS inspection program that were developed to perform integrity management inspections. OPS completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in early 2004, and is making progress in reviewing the programs of smaller liquid operators. During this initial year OPS gained substantial knowledge about the state of hazardous liquid pipeline operator integrity management programs. At a high level, OPS learned that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and are making the appropriate plans and progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas. However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes takes time. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time. OPS recognizes this situation and has developed an inspection and enforcement approach that not only assures compliance with the rule requirements, but also fosters continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the initial inspections, and OPS expectations for future integrity management program development. Finally, the intial year of integrity management inspections provided some valuable insights about how to perform these new type of inspections and improve external communication. This paper also addresses what OPS learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.

Update on Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management Inspections for US Operators

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Skip Brown ◽  
David Kuhtenia
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Require Time ◽  
The Us ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments

The US Department of Transportation’s Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) started the second round of integrity management inspections on hazardous liquid pipeline operators in mid-2005. Since then PHMSA has used the information gained from all of the Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management (HL IM) inspections to continue the development of the HL IM inspection process. In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The fundamental objectives for HL IM have not changed: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. The IM rule is based on a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the previously existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the inspection of management and analytical processes - aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard PHMSA compliance inspections. PHMSA has gained significant experience with the fundamentally different approach to oversight needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the inspections themselves and from basic changes in the management of the HL IM inspection program. PHMSA completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in 2004 and has continued inspecting both small system IM operators and re-inspecting large operators. As of December 2005 PHMSA has completed the inspection of 175 first round interstate hazardous liquid pipeline operators of which 101 are interstate systems and 74 are programs of intrastate hazardous liquid operators. Additionally, 14 second round inspections of hazardous liquid operators have been performed. Since the initial pilot hazardous liquid integrity management (HL IM) inspections in 2002 PHMSA has found that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and have made significant progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas (Figure 1). However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes still requires considerable attention from some operators. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time and management commitment. PHMSA recognizes this situation and continues to develop and implement an inspection and enforcement approach that seeks to assure compliance with the rule requirements and continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. Finally, after several years of integrity management development and associated inspections PHMSA gained additional experience about how to perform this new type of inspection. An important change in the program took place in late 2004 when the PHMSA regions took over the scheduling, inspection program, and other aspects of managing the IM inspections. This paper also addresses what PHMSA learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned by the regions to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.

Advanced Integrity Management Framework for Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Len LeBlanc ◽  
Walter Kresic ◽  
Sean Keane ◽  
John Munro
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

This paper describes the integrity management framework utilized within the Enbridge Liquids Pipelines Integrity Management Program. The role of the framework is to provide the high-level structure used by the company to prepare and demonstrate integrity safety decisions relative to mainline pipelines, and facility piping segments where applicable. The scope is directed to corrosion, cracking, and deformation threats and all variants within those broad categories. The basis for the framework centers on the use of a safety case to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated. A ‘safety case’, for the purposes of this methodology is defined as a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient to show that the system is safe.[1] The decision model brings together the aspects of data integration and determination of maintenance timing; execution of prevention, monitoring, and mitigation; confirmation that the execution has met reliability targets; application of additional steps if targets are not met; and then the collation of the results into an engineering assessment of the program effectiveness (safety case). Once the program is complete, continuous improvement is built into the next program through the incorporation of research and development solutions, lessons learned, and improvements to processes. On the basis of a wide range of experiences, investigations and research, it was concluded that there are combinations of monitoring and mitigation methods required in an integrity program to effectively manage integrity threats. A safety case approach ultimately provides the structure for measuring the effectiveness of integrity monitoring and mitigation efforts, and the methodology to assess whether a pipeline is sufficiently safe with targets for continuous improvement. Hence, the need for the safety case is to provide transparent, quantitative integrity program performance results which are continually improved upon through ongoing revalidations and improvement to the methods utilized. This enables risk reduction, better stakeholder awareness, focused innovation, opportunities for industry information sharing along with other benefits.

IMP 2.0: The Evolution of PHMSA’s Approach for Improving Pipeline Integrity

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wiese ◽  
Linda Daugherty
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Hazardous Material ◽  
The Future ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Future Direction ◽  
Pipeline Safety

This paper discusses the original motivations and objectives of the Integrity Management Program (IMP), the lessons learned from the first decade of implementing IMP, the drivers for improving and expanding IMP (“IMP 2.0”), actions that the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) is already taking under the IMP 2.0 umbrella, as well as the future direction the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) expects IMP 2.0 to take in the next few years.

Regulation of the Integrity of Gas Transmission Pipelines by the Office of Pipeline Safety

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zach Barrett ◽  
Mike Israni ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Paul Wood
Keyword(s):  
Basic Structure ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Government Oversight ◽  
Current Thinking ◽  
The Us ◽  
Final Rule ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments ◽  
Transmission Pipelines

In December of 2003 the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published a final rule for integrity management of gas transmission pipelines. As in the earlier rule for integrity management of hazardous liquid pipeline, OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection, pressure testing or direct assessment) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. This paper describes the process leading to the rule, the primary features of the rule, and the current thinking regarding OPS expectations for inspecting against provisions of the rule. While the basic structure of the IM rule for gas transmission pipelines is very similar to that of the hazardous liquid rule, the gas rule has several distinctions that are discussed in this paper.

Analysis of Experience in Building Operation Management Systems for the Foreign and Russian Oil and Gas Companies

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
D.A. Nikitina ◽  
◽  
S.N. Petryaev ◽  
I.S. Sivokon ◽  
E.E. Fomina ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Occupational Safety ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Operation Management ◽  
Industrial Safety ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Production Operation ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level

The performed analysis showed that integrity management is required for ensuring stable and reliable operation. Along with many other processes in the field of industrial safety, integrity management is an important process for the prevention of cases of equipment depressurization, and, therefore, for preventing people by storing hydrocarbons inside the pipelines and vessels. High quality integrity management leads to high production operations efficiency and has a positive effect on the entire business. The article presents the results of the implementation of operation management systems (OMS) in various companies. It shows how deeply integrity management, being part of OMS, is integrated into all the areas of production operation activity. To achieve the high level of production operations reliability, all the industrial and occupational safety processes must be interconnected and form a single system. The conducted analysis shows that OMS of different companies have both similarities and differences. OMS is often developed based on the existing industrial and occupational safety management systems, which explains the focus of such systems on safety. The latest statistics show that this is the right approach, however, OMS of different companies differ from each other due to different experiences, the size of the company, the specifics of the country of operation and the presence of current problems. It is fair to note that there is no single correct OMS structure since each company must consider its own needs and its own specifics when developing its system. However, in general, the development and implementation of such systems contribute to improving the reliability, safety and efficiency of production operation activities. However, in general, the development and implementation of such systems facilitate the improvement of the reliability, safety and efficiency of production operation activities.

Implementing a Geohazard Integrity Management Program: Statistics and Lessons Learned Over 15 Years

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Baumgard ◽  
Tara L. Coultish ◽  
Gerry W. Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Proactive Approach ◽  
Oil Pipelines ◽  
Pipeline Networks ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Failures ◽  
Program Challenges

Over the last 15 years, BGC Engineering Inc. has developed and implemented a geohazards Integrity Management Program (IMP) with 12 major pipeline operators (consisting of gas and oil pipelines and of both gathering and transmission systems). Over this time, the program has been applied to the assessment of approximately 13,500 individual hydrotechnical and geotechnical geohazard sites spanning approximately 63,000 km of operating pipelines in Canada and the USA. Hydrotechnical (watercourse) and geotechnical (slope) hazards are the primary types of geohazards that have directly contributed to pipeline failures in Canada. As with all IMPs, the core objectives of a geohazard management system are to ensure a proactive approach that is repeatable and defensible. In order to meet these objectives, the program allows for varying levels of intensity of inspection and a recommended timescale for completion of actions to manage the identified geohazards in accordance with the degree of hazard that the site poses to the pipeline. In this way, the sites are managed in a proactive manner while remaining flexible to accommodate the most current conditions at each site. This paper will provide a background to the key components of the program related specifically to existing operating pipeline systems, present pertinent statistics on the occurrence of various types of geohazards based on the large dataset of inspections, and discuss some of the lessons learned in the form of program results and program challenges from implementing a geohazard integrity management system for a dozen operators with different ages of systems, complexity of pipeline networks, and in varied geographic settings.

Management System Audits: A Path Towards Safer Pipelines

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ator ◽  
Minh Ho
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
System Approach ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Pipeline Systems ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Audit Program

The National Energy Board of Canada (NEB), a federal energy regulator, has implemented a management system audit program as a tool to verify compliance with its predominantly goal-oriented Onshore Pipeline Regulations, 1999 (OPR) [1]. The OPR allow individual companies to choose the most effective way to manage their pipeline systems. The audit program is based on expected elements that the NEB believes are necessary to meet the goals of the OPR. This paper will explain why these audits and expected elements are necessary and describe how goal-oriented regulations will enhance pipeline safety. The audits conducted to date have identified several challenges that the NEB and pipeline companies face in pursuit of the goal of safe pipelines; these will be described and possible solutions will be proposed. The overall objective of the paper is to explain the benefits of using a management system approach to direct a company’s pipeline integrity management program and what is required of companies to meet the expectations of the NEB.

Pre-Assessment is Key to Success for Direct Assessment in Integrity Management Programs

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Valdes ◽  
Richard McNealy
Keyword(s):  
Assessment Method ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Gas Pipeline ◽  
Assessment Process ◽  
Practical Consideration ◽  
Direct Examination ◽  
Effective Utilization ◽  
Direct Assessment ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Safety

Direct Assessment is allowed under the new Gas Pipeline Integrity Management Rules published by the Office of Pipeline Safety as an assessment method subject to specific applicability restrictions, direct examination criteria and restrictions to re-inspection intervals. The final developed costs for implementing direct assessment is largely dependent upon the extent of direct examination that in turn is a function of the pipeline condition and actual threats discovered and validated. Effective utilization of Direct Assessment within an Integrity Management Program is dependent upon the recognition of the value inherent in the Pre-Assessment Stage of the Direct Assessment Process as defined by the Rule, in which, threats are predicted, applicability confirmed and as a result of data and risk analysis, it is possible to estimate the condition of the pipeline to determine if the use of Direct Assessment is a practical consideration as well as permitted under the Gas Pipeline Integrity Management Rule.

Are Integrity Management Programs Making a Difference?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Paviglianiti ◽  
Alan Murray ◽  
Tijani (TJ) Elabor
Keyword(s):  
Stress Corrosion ◽  
Failure Mechanism ◽  
Stress Corrosion Cracking ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Future Improvement ◽  
Making A Difference ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Incident Rates

As a result of numerous stress corrosion cracking incidents in the 1980s and early 1990 the National Energy Board (NEB) held an Inquiry1 in 1995 on the SCC failure mechanism and how to prevent failures. One of the recommendations of the Inquiry was Companies were to develop a SCC management program to proactively identify and mitigate SCC. Based on the apparent success of the SCC programs in significantly reducing SCC failures, the NEB revised its Onshore Pipeline Regulations in 1999 (OPR-99)2 to require companies to develop an integrity management program (IMP) for all hazards. This paper discusses the evolution of integrity management program (IMP) requirements and evaluates incident rates and other performance metrics to determine if there is evidence that IMPs have contributed to the improvement of safety of pipelines. The paper highlights the challenges associated with gathering incident and IMP performance metrics and evaluating the data to determine if there is a correlation between the implementation of IMP and pipeline safety. In addition, the analysis discusses the challenges associated with comparing data between different countries and regulatory jurisdictions. Suggestions for future improvement are identified.

scholarly journals The Art of Introducing Mindfulness into Medical and Allied Health Curricula

Mindfulness ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Hassed
Keyword(s):  
Medical Students ◽  
Core Curriculum ◽  
Allied Health ◽  
Medical Curriculum ◽  
Teaching Style ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Personal Perspective ◽  
Perspective Drawing ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level

Abstract Objectives Mindfulness is now widely used therapeutically in health settings, but for a range of reasons, it is not commonly integrated into the education of health professionals. This article aims to share practical insights and lessons learned from teaching mindfulness as core curriculum to the whole cohorts of medical students at Monash University. Methods This reflective article will provide a personal perspective drawing on many years’ experience since the early 1990s of integrating mindfulness into the core medical curriculum including outlining the mindfulness-based lifestyle program delivered to the medical students. This will provide a backdrop to sharing important lessons relating to preparation, integration, delivery and review of mindfulness curriculum. A range of practical issues will be explored including making the case for it to faculty, finding the right language, giving it a context and rationale, using the most conducive teaching style, having the right tutors, carefully dealing with resistance, finding appropriate methods of assessment and the importance of review. Results Evaluations and feedback on the program over a number of years have shown a high level of acceptance and utilisation of mindfulness-based skills by students. Since its inception, mindfulness training has now become integral in the training of many other health professional students at Monash. Conclusions If done effectively, mindfulness can be successfully introduced and integrated into core curriculum of medical and allied health students using it as a meta-skill to support the development of student wellbeing a range of important clinical competencies.

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