The Department of Energy Replacement for the 110-Gallon Specification 6M Shipping Container for Radioactive Contents

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Paul T. Mann
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Regulatory Testing ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Energy Replacement

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been shipping university reactor fuels and other fissile materials in the 110-gallon Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M container for over 20 years. The DOT 6M container has been the workhorse for many DOE programs. However, packages designed and used according to the Specification 6M (U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR 178.354; 2003) do not conform to the latest package safety requirements in 10 CFR 71, especially performance under hypothetical accident conditions. For that reason, the 6M specification containers are being terminated by the DOT. Packages designed to the 6M specification will no longer be allowed for in-commerce shipments after October 1, 2008. To meet on-going transportation needs, DOE evaluated several different concepts for replacing the 110-gallon 6M. After this evaluation, DOE selected the Y-12 National Security Complex for the project. The new Y-12 container, designated the ES-4100 shipping container, will have a capacity of four times the current 6M and will be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ES-4100 project began in September 2006 and prototypes of the new container are now being fabricated. Details on the design features and the upcoming regulatory testing of this new container are discussed in this paper.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

Training in the Application of the ASME Code to Transportation Packaging of Radioactive Materials

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. N. Shah ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
R. Fabian ◽  
S. W. Tam ◽  
Y. Y. Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Asme Code ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
High Level

The Department of Energy has established guidelines for the qualifications and training of technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is a working knowledge of, and familiarity with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, referred to hereafter as the ASME Code. DOE is sponsoring a course on the application of the ASME Code to the transportation packaging of radioactive materials. The course addresses both ASME design requirements and the safety requirements in the federal regulations. The main objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, with the focus on the application of Section III, Divisions 1 and 3, and Section VIII of the ASME Code to the design and construction of the containment vessel and other packaging components used for transportation (and storage) of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training course includes the ASME Code-related topics that are needed to satisfy all Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 71 (10 CFR 71). Specifically, the topics include requirements for materials, design, fabrication, examination, testing, and quality assurance for containment vessels, bolted closures, components to maintain subcriticality, and other packaging components. The design addresses thermal and pressure loading, fatigue, nonductile fracture and buckling of these components during both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions described in 10 CFR 71. Various examples are drawn from the review of certificate applications for Type B and fissile material transportation packagings.

Operational Readiness of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container for Fissile Materials

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Kenneth E. Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Competent Authority ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Other Information ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M containers had been the workhorse bulk Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) shipping containers for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and many other shippers for over 20 years. This DOT specification container was terminated for shipment of radioactive material on September 30, 2008. The anticipation of this action prompted DOE to develop and implement the ES-3100 shipping container as a replacement for the 6M. The ES-3100 was first licensed in April 2006. Since then, the license has been revised nine times. The ES-3100 was operationally ready for use at several sites by September 2007, and is now in being used on a regular basis for materials that had been shipped in the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 has also been certified for air transport, in support of foreign research reactor fuel supply and international nonproliferation efforts. This container has a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and a Competent Authority Certificate from the DOT. The utility of the ES-3100 continues to grow. The ES-3100 CoC allows many forms of fissile material to be shipped, and continues to be amended to authorize additional contents for a variety of shippers. This paper will identify the currently certified contents for the ES-3100 and the planned certificate amendments to expand the content basis, as well as the approach to add new contents to the CoC. The path to becoming a user of the ES-3100 will be outlined. Operational requirements for this container, handling tools and non-standard operating tools needed for the use of this container will be covered. Readiness requirements, maintenance issues, training, and lessons learned will also be discussed. This paper will provide the information necessary for organizations to obtain ES-3100 containers, the special tools, adequate training, and any other information that would be helpful for a site to be able to use this fissile, radioactive material shipping container system.

Structural Analysis Approach for the Defense Programs Package 3 (DPP-3)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Sakalaukus ◽  
Nathan P. Barrett ◽  
Brian J. Koeppel
Keyword(s):  
Pacific Northwest ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory ◽  
Analytical Techniques ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Design Criteria ◽  
Element Analysis ◽  
Regulatory Testing ◽  
Regulatory Commission

Abstract The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is the design authority for a new Type B hazardous materials transportation package designated as the Defense Programs Package 3 (DPP-3) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DPP-3 has been developed using similar materials and fabrication methods employed in previous U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE, and NNSA certified packages. The DPP-3 design criteria are derived from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), NNSA guidance and NRC regulatory guides in order to safely and securely transport a variety of payloads. Final regulatory approval by the NNSA will require regulatory testing to demonstrate that the containment vessel (CV) remains leaktight after enduring the entire regulatory testing sequence prescribed in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (10 CFR 71). In order to gain confidence that the DPP-3 will remain leaktight after testing, the DPP-3 has been structurally analyzed using the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) software LS-DYNA. The FEA analyses serve two general purposes: first, they aid in design and development of the package, and second, they advise as to which drop orientations are expected to cause the most damage during regulatory testing. This paper will discuss how the design criteria are incorporated into analytical techniques needed to evaluate the FEA structural simulation results for 10 CFR 71 conditions to give confidence the DPP-3 testing campaign will be successful.

scholarly journals Deployment and Operation of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
Dennis B. Miller
Keyword(s):  
National Laboratory ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Oak Ridge ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Transportation Research ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping, for disposition purposes, bulk quantities of fissile materials, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU). The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material since the 1980s. However, the 6M does not conform to the packaging requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the DOE secure transportation system by the end of 2006. BWXT Y-12 developed and licensed the ES-3100 container to replace the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 was certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in April 2006. The process of deploying the new package began in June 2005 and is planned to be completed in July 2006. The package will be fully operational and completely replace the DOT 6M at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) by October 2006. This paper reviews the deployment process and the mock loading station that was installed at National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) of Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Specialized equipment, tools, and instrumentation that support the handling and loading operations of the ES-3100 are described in detail. Loading options for other user sites are explored in preparation for deployment of this new state-of-the-art shipping container throughout the DOE complex and the private sector.

A Method for the Coupled Thermal-Structural Analysis of Radioactive Material Shipping Packages in Hypothetical Accident Conditions: Part 1—NCT Thermal Load and Some HAC Mechanical Loads

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsu-te Wu ◽  
Narendra K. Gupta ◽  
Allen C. Smith ◽  
Paul S. Blanton
Keyword(s):  
Thermal Stresses ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Foot Drop ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Mechanical Loads ◽  
Structural Responses ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Free Drop

The design of radioactive material (RAM) shipping packages are designed to withstand the mechanical and thermal loads specified in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (10CFR71). The Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) specified in 10CFR71 include a 30-foot free drop, a crush by an 1100-pound plate, a 40-inch free drop onto a round bar and a 30-minite fire. Furthermore, in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guide 7.8, these loads should be applied sequentially. The current common practice is to base the thermal modeling on the un-deformed (or un-damaged) packaging configuration and thermal stresses are neglected in structural analyses. This paper presents a methodology to simulate the coupled thermal and structural responses and to evaluate the accumulated damages caused by both sequentially applied thermal and mechanical loads of the Hypothetical Accident Conditions. Part 1 of the paper discusses the thermal analysis for the Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) to establish the initial temperatures of the shipping package. It also discusses the subsequent analyses of closure-bolt tightening preload analysis and 30-foot drop analysis.

An Experimental Study on Head Loss of Prototypical Fibrous Debris Beds During Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Ali ◽  
Edward D. Blandford
Keyword(s):  
Safety Issue ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Head Loss ◽  
Pressurized Water Reactor ◽  
Pressurized Water ◽  
Debris Accumulation ◽  
Loss Of Coolant Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated a generic safety issue (GSI-191) assessing debris accumulation and resultant chemical effects on pressurized water reactor (PWR) sump performance. GSI-191 has been investigated using reduced-scale separate-effects testing and integral-effects testing facilities. These experiments focused on developing a procedure to generate prototypical debris beds that provide stable and reproducible conventional head loss (CHL). These beds also have the ability to filter out chemical precipitates resulting in chemical head loss. The newly developed procedure presented in this paper is used to generate debris beds with different particulate to fiber ratios (η). Results from this experimental investigation show that the prepared beds can provide reproducible CHL for different η in a single and multivertical loops facility within ±7% under the same flow conditions. The measured CHL values are consistent with the predicted values using the NUREG-6224 correlation. Also, the results showed that the prepared debris beds following the proposed procedure are capable of detecting standard aluminum and calcium precipitates, and the head loss increase (chemical head loss) was measured and reported in this paper.

Design and Analysis of Shipping Container for Big Rock Decommissioned Reactor Vessel

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce (Bart) Slimp ◽  
Mick Papp ◽  
Phuong H. Hoang
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Base Material ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Analysis Methodology ◽  
Maximum Wall Thickness ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions

A major milestone in 2003 on the Big Rock Point (BRP) decommissioning project involved shipping the Reactor Vessel (RV) in a steel cask for burial. The Reactor Vessel Transport System (RVTS) cask was a sealed integral container, which provided necessary radiological shielding and containment of radioactive waste for shipping and disposal. The RVTS, using the provisions of the ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NB, was designed as a Type B package in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. This included meeting Normal Condition of Transport (NCT) and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) loading per 10 CFR 71, Regulatory Guide 7.6, “Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels,” Regulatory Guide 7.8, “Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material” and Regulatory Guide 7.11, “Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches.” The RVTS was designed to withstand accelerations and shocks postulated during highway and rail transit using guidelines from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and ANSI N14.2. The design analysis methodology, fabrication process and transportation planning for the Big Rock RVTS Cask are presented in this paper.

Justification for Elevated Hydrogen Limits in Risk-Based Radioactive Waste Packages

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Elevated Concentration ◽  
Type B ◽  
Hanford Site ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Concentration Limits ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.

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