Operational Readiness of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container for Fissile Materials

Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Kenneth E. Sanders

The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M containers had been the workhorse bulk Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) shipping containers for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and many other shippers for over 20 years. This DOT specification container was terminated for shipment of radioactive material on September 30, 2008. The anticipation of this action prompted DOE to develop and implement the ES-3100 shipping container as a replacement for the 6M. The ES-3100 was first licensed in April 2006. Since then, the license has been revised nine times. The ES-3100 was operationally ready for use at several sites by September 2007, and is now in being used on a regular basis for materials that had been shipped in the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 has also been certified for air transport, in support of foreign research reactor fuel supply and international nonproliferation efforts. This container has a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and a Competent Authority Certificate from the DOT. The utility of the ES-3100 continues to grow. The ES-3100 CoC allows many forms of fissile material to be shipped, and continues to be amended to authorize additional contents for a variety of shippers. This paper will identify the currently certified contents for the ES-3100 and the planned certificate amendments to expand the content basis, as well as the approach to add new contents to the CoC. The path to becoming a user of the ES-3100 will be outlined. Operational requirements for this container, handling tools and non-standard operating tools needed for the use of this container will be covered. Readiness requirements, maintenance issues, training, and lessons learned will also be discussed. This paper will provide the information necessary for organizations to obtain ES-3100 containers, the special tools, adequate training, and any other information that would be helpful for a site to be able to use this fissile, radioactive material shipping container system.

Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
Dennis B. Miller

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping, for disposition purposes, bulk quantities of fissile materials, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU). The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material since the 1980s. However, the 6M does not conform to the packaging requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the DOE secure transportation system by the end of 2006. BWXT Y-12 developed and licensed the ES-3100 container to replace the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 was certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in April 2006. The process of deploying the new package began in June 2005 and is planned to be completed in July 2006. The package will be fully operational and completely replace the DOT 6M at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) by October 2006. This paper reviews the deployment process and the mock loading station that was installed at National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) of Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Specialized equipment, tools, and instrumentation that support the handling and loading operations of the ES-3100 are described in detail. Loading options for other user sites are explored in preparation for deployment of this new state-of-the-art shipping container throughout the DOE complex and the private sector.


Author(s):  
L. Max Scott

As part of a program to visit formerly licensed sites to determine if they meet current uncontrolled release conditions, a United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) inspection was conducted in the fall of 1993 at a site that had possessed a radioactive material license from about 1955 to 1970. While the license was in force, the plant processed magnesium scrap containing up to 4 percent thorium. The source of the scrap is believed to be the aircraft manufacturing industry. The scrap was placed in furnaces and heated to the melting point of magnesium, and the molten magnesium was drawn off, leaving the thorium with the residue (dross). Under the regulation in existence at that time, the thorium dross was buried on site in an approximate 14 acre field. In 1993 the inspector found readings up to 900uR/h. Early in 1994 an informal grid survey of most of the 14 acre site was conducted. Based on that survey, it was concluded that the thorium was widespread and extended beyond the property lines. The preliminary findings were reported to the USNRC, and in 1994 the site was designated as a Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SMPD) site. A remediation team was formed which included the following disciplines: remediation health physics, geology, hydrology, engineering, law, public relations, and project management. This remediation team planned, participated in selecting vendors, and provided project over site for all activities from site characterization through the final status survey. In 2006 the site was released for uncontrolled access. A chronology of activities with lessons learned will be presented.


Author(s):  
Russell Wagner

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Paul T. Mann

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been shipping university reactor fuels and other fissile materials in the 110-gallon Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M container for over 20 years. The DOT 6M container has been the workhorse for many DOE programs. However, packages designed and used according to the Specification 6M (U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR 178.354; 2003) do not conform to the latest package safety requirements in 10 CFR 71, especially performance under hypothetical accident conditions. For that reason, the 6M specification containers are being terminated by the DOT. Packages designed to the 6M specification will no longer be allowed for in-commerce shipments after October 1, 2008. To meet on-going transportation needs, DOE evaluated several different concepts for replacing the 110-gallon 6M. After this evaluation, DOE selected the Y-12 National Security Complex for the project. The new Y-12 container, designated the ES-4100 shipping container, will have a capacity of four times the current 6M and will be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ES-4100 project began in September 2006 and prototypes of the new container are now being fabricated. Details on the design features and the upcoming regulatory testing of this new container are discussed in this paper.


Author(s):  
V. N. Shah ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
R. Fabian ◽  
S. W. Tam ◽  
Y. Y. Liu ◽  
...  

The Department of Energy has established guidelines for the qualifications and training of technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is a working knowledge of, and familiarity with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, referred to hereafter as the ASME Code. DOE is sponsoring a course on the application of the ASME Code to the transportation packaging of radioactive materials. The course addresses both ASME design requirements and the safety requirements in the federal regulations. The main objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, with the focus on the application of Section III, Divisions 1 and 3, and Section VIII of the ASME Code to the design and construction of the containment vessel and other packaging components used for transportation (and storage) of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training course includes the ASME Code-related topics that are needed to satisfy all Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 71 (10 CFR 71). Specifically, the topics include requirements for materials, design, fabrication, examination, testing, and quality assurance for containment vessels, bolted closures, components to maintain subcriticality, and other packaging components. The design addresses thermal and pressure loading, fatigue, nonductile fracture and buckling of these components during both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions described in 10 CFR 71. Various examples are drawn from the review of certificate applications for Type B and fissile material transportation packagings.


Author(s):  
Evelyn M. Ryan ◽  
Edward W. Russell

Many differences exist in Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Quality Assurance (QA) requirements documents, work scope, organizational structures, and graded application and assessment approaches. These differences must be understood and reconciled to ensure consistent and effective implementation and cost effective assessments of QA Programs for DOE organizations participating in the design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, use and/or modification of the radioactive material packaging. This paper discusses those differences and provides practical recommendations that can serve as stepping stones to more effective and efficient QA programs and value added assessments at DOE sites participating in radioactive material packaging activities.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Holbrook ◽  
Jim C. Kinsey ◽  
Wayne L. Moe

This paper describes key aspects of the risk-informed, performance-based licensing methodology as developed by the Department of Energy (DOE) for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project. The discussion focuses on an event selection process using modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) design attributes and identifies how top-level regulatory criteria can be placed on a frequency-consequence curve. Preliminary Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff evaluations concluded that the proposed approach is generally reasonable and responsive to the Commission’s Policy Statement on advanced reactors. However, the NRC deferred issuing any final assessments of the proposed approach due to other agency actions that were under consideration in response to the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi. In addition, important lessons learned during the NGNP prelicensing effort and their potential applications to alternative advanced reactor designs are presented.


Author(s):  
Stephen J. Primeau

The Department of Energy’s RAMPAC (Radioactive Material Packaging) website is an all-in-one source of information on shipping containers for radioactive materials. Inaugurated at www.rampac.com in 1997, it has as a major feature a searchable database of packagings certified by DOE or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for domestic shipments, or by the Department of Transportation for international shipments, or by the Department of Transportation for international shipments. Scanned images of all current DOE and NRC Certificates of Compliance and DOT Certificates of Competent Authority are available for viewing or printing. Recent additions to the website include the Safety Evaluation Reports for DOE-certified packagings, a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Completeness Checklist, expanded regulatory guidance information, and a list of current DOT exemptions with DOE as the grantee.


Author(s):  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

In a series of Commission papers, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) described its policy for inservice testing (IST) programs to be developed and implemented at nuclear power plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52. This paper discusses the expectations for IST programs based on those Commission policy papers as applied in the NRC staff review of combined license (COL) applications for new reactors. For example, the design and qualification of pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints through implementation of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard QME-1-2007, “Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” as accepted in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Revision 3), “Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,” will enable IST activities to assess the operational readiness of those components to perform their intended functions. ASME has updated the Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) to improve the IST provisions for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that are incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations with applicable conditions. In addition, lessons learned from performance experience and testing of motor-operated valves (MOVs) will be implemented as part of the IST programs together with application of those lessons learned to other power-operated valves (POVs). Licensee programs for the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) will be implemented for components in active nonsafety-related systems that are the first line of defense in new reactors that rely on passive systems to provide reactor core and containment cooling in the event of a plant transient. This paper also discusses the overlapping testing provisions specified in ASME Standard QME-1-2007; plant-specific inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria; the applicable ASME OM Code as incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations; specific license conditions; and Initial Test Programs as described in the final safety analysis report and applicable RGs. Paper published with permission.


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