Severe Transportation Accidents: Impacts of Severe Fires on Radioactive Material Transportation

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fire Investigation ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
The Us ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Safe Transport ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Loss Of Strength

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred in Oakland, California in what is commonly known as the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580 (I-580). The accident involved a tractor trailer carrying gasoline that impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire burned for over 2 hours and led to the collapse of the overpass due to the loss of strength in the structural steel that supported the overpass. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) studied this accident to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel. This paper will discuss the details of the NRC’s MacArthur Maze fire investigation.

Potential Effects of Recent Road Transportation Accidents on Radioactive Material Shipments

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn ◽  
Robert E. Shewmaker
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Road Transportation ◽  
Concrete Walls ◽  
The Us ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Safe Transport ◽  
Regulatory Commission

In 2007, two severe transportation accidents, involving primarily long-haul tractor trailers, occurred in the State of California. In the first, which occurred in Oakland in the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580, a tractor trailer carrying gasoline impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire, which burned for over 2 hours, led to the collapse of the overpass onto the remains of the tractor trailer, due to the loss of strength in the steel exposed to the fire. The second incident was a chain-reaction accident involving several tractor trailers in the I-5 “Newhall Pass” truck bypass tunnel in Santa Clarita. This accident also involved an intense fire that damaged the tunnel and required the closing of the tunnel for repairs to the concrete walls. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is studying both these accidents to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials and spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will provide a summary of that effort.

Training in the Application of the ASME Code to Transportation Packaging of Radioactive Materials

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. N. Shah ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
R. Fabian ◽  
S. W. Tam ◽  
Y. Y. Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Asme Code ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
High Level

The Department of Energy has established guidelines for the qualifications and training of technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is a working knowledge of, and familiarity with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, referred to hereafter as the ASME Code. DOE is sponsoring a course on the application of the ASME Code to the transportation packaging of radioactive materials. The course addresses both ASME design requirements and the safety requirements in the federal regulations. The main objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, with the focus on the application of Section III, Divisions 1 and 3, and Section VIII of the ASME Code to the design and construction of the containment vessel and other packaging components used for transportation (and storage) of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training course includes the ASME Code-related topics that are needed to satisfy all Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 71 (10 CFR 71). Specifically, the topics include requirements for materials, design, fabrication, examination, testing, and quality assurance for containment vessels, bolted closures, components to maintain subcriticality, and other packaging components. The design addresses thermal and pressure loading, fatigue, nonductile fracture and buckling of these components during both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions described in 10 CFR 71. Various examples are drawn from the review of certificate applications for Type B and fissile material transportation packagings.

The Potential Impacts of Recent Transportation Accidents Involving Severe Fires on the Safe Shipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Concrete Walls ◽  
The Us ◽  
Food Commodities ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Safe Transport ◽  
Regulatory Commission

In 2007, two severe transportation accidents occurred in the state of California. The first occurred in Oakland on a section of Interstate 880 known as the “MacArthur Maze” and involved a tractor trailer carrying gasoline which impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire caused the collapse of a portion of the Interstate 580 overpass onto the remains of the tractor trailer in less than 20 minutes, due to a reduction of strength in the structural steel exposed to the fire. The second incident was a chain-reaction accident involving over thirty tractor trailers in the Interstate 5 “Newhall Pass” truck bypass tunnel in Santa Clarita. This accident also involved an intense fire, fueled mostly by produce and other food commodities, that damaged the concrete walls of the tunnel and required the tunnel to be closed for repairs. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is in the process of studying both of these accidents to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will summarize work recently completed on these severe transportation accidents by the NRC.

Potential Effects of Historic Rail Accidents on the Integrity of Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Packages

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Hazardous Materials ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Material Transport ◽  
Long Duration ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an analysis of historical rail accidents (from 1975 to 2005) involving hazardous materials and long duration fires in the United States. The analysis was initiated to determine what types of accidents had occurred and what impact those types of accidents could have on the rail transport of spent nuclear fuel. The NRC found that almost 21 billion miles of freight rail shipments over a 30 year period had resulted in a small number of accidents involving the release of hazardous materials, eight of which involved long duration fires. All eight of the accidents analyzed resulted in fires that were less severe than the “fully engulfing fire” described as a hypothetical accident condition in the NRC regulations for radioactive material transport found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Section 73. None of the eight accidents involved a release of radioactive material. This paper describes the eight accidents in detail and examines the potential effects on spent nuclear fuel transportation packages exposed to the fires that resulted from these accidents.

A Comparison of 10 CFR 71 and the IAEA TS-R-1 Radioactive Material Transportation Regulations

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Nancy L. Osgood ◽  
Ronald B. Pope
Keyword(s):  
International Atomic Energy Agency ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
The Us ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Safe Transport

The US regulations for certification of Type B packages are based in large part on those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the US has chosen to differ (or deviate) in some respects, from the IAEA regulations based on its national legislation, its technical experience, and efforts to minimize burden on shippers of radioactive materials in the US. This paper will provide a brief overview of some of the differences between 10 CFR Part 71 “Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”, as implemented January 2008, and IAEA TS-R-1 “Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material”, 2005 edition, discuss some of the differences between the two sets of regulations, and the reasons for those differences.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

Practical Considerations of Site Clearance

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas S. LaGuardia
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Site Specific ◽  
Exposed Individual ◽  
The Us ◽  
Pathways Analysis ◽  
Residual Radioactivity ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established criteria for acceptable residual radioactivity related to decommissioning nuclear power plants in the US [1]. A level of 25 mRem per year to the maximum exposed individual by site-specific pathways analysis, with ALARA is acceptable to the NRC. Systems and structures containing very low levels of radioactivity that meet this criteria are deemed acceptable to abandon in place as part of the decommissioning process and termination of the license. Upon license termination by the NRC, the owner may then demolish and remove remaining structures. In practice, site-specific criteria imposed by local state mandates, company management decisions, real estate value, and long-term liability potential have driven nuclear plant licensees to adopt an alternative disposition for these materials. Although the reasons are different at each site, the NRC’s criteria of 25 mRem per year are not the controlling factor. This paper will describe the regulatory process for termination of the license, and the other factors that drive the decision to remove radioactive and non-radioactive material for decommissioning. Several case histories are presented to illustrate that the NRC’s criteria for license termination are not the only consideration.

scholarly journals Radioactive Material Transportation Considerations With Respect to DOE 3013 Storage Containers

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Hensel ◽  
T. T. Wu ◽  
B. R. Seward
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Type B ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Regulatory Commission

This paper evaluates sealed hardware that meets the requirements of DOE-STD-3013, “Criteria for Preparing and packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term Storage” [1] with respect to radioactive material (Type B quantity) transportation requirements. The Standard provides criteria for packaging of the plutonium materials for storage periods of at least 50 years. The standard requires the hardware to maintain integrity under both normal storage conditions and under anticipated handling conditions. To accomplish this, the standard requires that the plutonium be loaded in a minimum of two nested stainless steel sealed containers that are both tested for leak-tightness per ANSI N14.5. As such the 3013 hardware is robust. While the 3013 STD may provide appropriate storage criteria, it is not intended to provide criteria for transporting the material under the requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT). In this evaluation, it is assumed that the activity of plutonium exceeds A1 and/or A2 curies as defined in DOT 49 CFR 173.431 and therefore must be shipped as a Type B package meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements of 10 CFR 71. The evaluation considers Type B shipment of plutonium in the 3013 hardware within a certified package for such contents.

An Analysis of a Spent Fuel Transportation Cask Under Severe Fire Accident Conditions

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Severe Fire ◽  
Tunnel Fire ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Fire Accident

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 section 73(c)(4), (10 CFR 71.73(c)(4)) requires that transportation packages used to ship radioactive material must be designed to resist an engulfing fire of a 30 minute duration and prevent release of radioactive material to the environment. In July, 2001, a derailed train carrying hazardous materials caught fire in a railroad tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland, and burned for several days. Although the occurrence of a fire of such duration during the shipment of spent nuclear fuel is unlikely, questions were raised about the performance of spent nuclear fuel casks under conditions similar to those experienced in the Baltimore tunnel fire incident. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission evaluates the performance of spent fuel transportation casks under accident conditions. The National Transportation Safety Board is responsible for investigating railroad accidents and identifying the probable cause(s) and offers recommendations for safety improvements. They are currently investigating the Baltimore tunnel fire accident. This paper assesses the performance of a spent fuel transportation cask with a welded canister under severe fire conditions. The paper describes the analytic model used for the assessment and presents a discussion of the preliminary results.

The MacArthur Maze Fire and Roadway Collapse: A “Worst Case Scenario” for Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Harold Adkins ◽  
Judith Cuta ◽  
Nicholas Klymyshyn ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Steel Structure ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Severe Accident ◽  
Case Scenario ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Work Related ◽  
Regulatory Commission

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, at the interchange known as the “MacArthur Maze.” The accident involved a double tanker truck of gasoline overturning and bursting into flames. The subsequent fire reduced the strength of the supporting steel structure of an overhead interstate roadway causing the collapse of portions of that overpass onto the lower roadway in less than 20 minutes. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has analyzed what might have happened had a spent nuclear fuel transportation package been involved in this accident, to determine if there are any potential regulatory implications of this accident to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper provides a summary of this effort, presents preliminary results and conclusions, and discusses future work related to the NRC’s analysis of the consequences of this type of severe accident.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document