scholarly journals Radioactive Material Transportation Considerations With Respect to DOE 3013 Storage Containers

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Hensel ◽  
T. T. Wu ◽  
B. R. Seward
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Type B ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Regulatory Commission

This paper evaluates sealed hardware that meets the requirements of DOE-STD-3013, “Criteria for Preparing and packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term Storage” [1] with respect to radioactive material (Type B quantity) transportation requirements. The Standard provides criteria for packaging of the plutonium materials for storage periods of at least 50 years. The standard requires the hardware to maintain integrity under both normal storage conditions and under anticipated handling conditions. To accomplish this, the standard requires that the plutonium be loaded in a minimum of two nested stainless steel sealed containers that are both tested for leak-tightness per ANSI N14.5. As such the 3013 hardware is robust. While the 3013 STD may provide appropriate storage criteria, it is not intended to provide criteria for transporting the material under the requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT). In this evaluation, it is assumed that the activity of plutonium exceeds A1 and/or A2 curies as defined in DOT 49 CFR 173.431 and therefore must be shipped as a Type B package meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements of 10 CFR 71. The evaluation considers Type B shipment of plutonium in the 3013 hardware within a certified package for such contents.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

Justification for Elevated Hydrogen Limits in Risk-Based Radioactive Waste Packages

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Elevated Concentration ◽  
Type B ◽  
Hanford Site ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Concentration Limits ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.

Severe Transportation Accidents: Impacts of Severe Fires on Radioactive Material Transportation

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fire Investigation ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
The Us ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Safe Transport ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Loss Of Strength

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred in Oakland, California in what is commonly known as the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580 (I-580). The accident involved a tractor trailer carrying gasoline that impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire burned for over 2 hours and led to the collapse of the overpass due to the loss of strength in the structural steel that supported the overpass. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) studied this accident to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel. This paper will discuss the details of the NRC’s MacArthur Maze fire investigation.

scholarly journals Properties of Fiberboard Overpack Material in the 9975 Shipping Package Following Thermal Aging

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. L. Daugherty
Keyword(s):  
Service Life ◽  
Physical Properties ◽  
Thermal Aging ◽  
Impact Resistance ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Term Storage ◽  
Over Time

Many radioactive material shipping packages incorporate cane fiberboard overpacks for thermal insulation and impact resistance. Mechanical, thermal and physical properties have been measured on cane fiberboard following thermal aging in several temperature/humidity environments. Several of the measured properties change significantly over time in the more severe environments, while other properties are relatively constant. These properties continue to be tracked, with the goal of developing a model for predicting a service life under long-term storage conditions.

A Review Process and a Database for Waste-Package Documents

1990 ◽  
Vol 212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Interrante ◽  
Carla A. Messina ◽  
Anna C. Fraker
Keyword(s):  
Information Needs ◽  
Review Process ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Waste Package ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
High Level Nuclear Waste ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
High Level ◽  
Term Storage

ABSTRACTThe work reported here is part of a program conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the efficacy of proposed plans for radionuclide containment for long-term storage of high-level nuclear waste (HLW). An important element of that program is the review and evaluation of available literature on components of a waste package. A review process and a database have been developed and tailored to provide information quickly to an individual who has a question about a particular material or component of a waste package. The database is uniquely suited to serve as a guide to indicate special areas where data and information needs exist on questions related to radionuclide containment. Additions to the database are made as information becomes available, and this source is as current as the published literature. A description of the review process and the database is given.

An Update on RAMPAC.COM: The Department of Energy’s Website for Information on Radioactive Material Packaging

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Primeau
Keyword(s):  
Safety Evaluation ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Regulatory Guidance ◽  
Shipping Containers ◽  
Scanned Images ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Source Of Information

The Department of Energy’s RAMPAC (Radioactive Material Packaging) website is an all-in-one source of information on shipping containers for radioactive materials. Inaugurated at www.rampac.com in 1997, it has as a major feature a searchable database of packagings certified by DOE or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for domestic shipments, or by the Department of Transportation for international shipments, or by the Department of Transportation for international shipments. Scanned images of all current DOE and NRC Certificates of Compliance and DOT Certificates of Competent Authority are available for viewing or printing. Recent additions to the website include the Safety Evaluation Reports for DOE-certified packagings, a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Completeness Checklist, expanded regulatory guidance information, and a list of current DOT exemptions with DOE as the grantee.

Extending Periodic Leakage Rate Testing of 9977 Packages With Elastomeric O-Rings

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zenghu Han ◽  
Vikram N. Shah ◽  
Yung Y. Liu
Keyword(s):  
Leakage Rate ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Ring Test ◽  
Type B ◽  
Testing Interval ◽  
Rate Testing ◽  
Arrhenius Function ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Interim Storage

According to ANSI N14.5, the periodic leakage rate testing of Type B radioactive material transportation packages is performed within 12 months prior to each shipment. The purpose of performing periodic leakage rate testing is to confirm that packages built to an approved design can perform their containment function as required after a period of use. However, certain transportation packages, e.g., Model 9975 and 9977 Type B packages, have been used for interim storage for a period > 12 months, and it is desirable to extend the periodic leakage rate testing interval to reduce personnel radiation exposure and cost. Long-term leak performance tests on O-ring test fixtures have been conducted at 200°F (366K) and higher temperatures since 2004 for the purpose of interim storage of 9975 packages. The test data are adopted and evaluated in this paper by using the Arrhenius function and the Weibull statistics to establish the basis for extending the periodic leakage rate testing interval. The results show that the testing interval can be extended to 5 and 2 years for Model 9977 packages with Viton® GLT and GLT-S elastomeric O-rings (Parker Seals V0835-75 and VM835-75), respectively, if the O-ring service temperature is kept below 200°F (366K) and verified with continuous temperature monitoring.

scholarly journals Co-encapsulation of vegetable oils with phenolic antioxidants and evaluation of their oxidative stability under long-term storage conditions

LWT ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 111033
Author(s):  
Lorine Le Priol ◽  
Justine Gmur ◽  
Aurélien Dagmey ◽  
Sandrine Morandat ◽  
Karim El Kirat ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Oxidative Stability ◽  
Vegetable Oils ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Phenolic Antioxidants ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Term Storage

A Review of a Radioactive Material Shipping Container Including Design, Testing, Upgrading Compliance Program and Shipping Logistics

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Celovsky ◽  
Randy Lesco ◽  
Brian Gale ◽  
Jeffrey Sypes
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Global Transport ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
Compliance Program ◽  
Integrity Tests ◽  
Key Aspects

Ten years ago Atomic Energy of Canada developed a Type B(U)-85 shipping container for the global transport of highly radioactive materials. This paper reviews the development of the container, including a summary of the design requirements, a review of the selected materials and key design elements, and the results of the major qualification tests (drop testing, fire test, leak tightness testing, and shielding integrity tests). As a result of the testing, improvements to the structural, thermal and containment design were made. Such improvements, and reasons thereof, are noted. Also provided is a summary of the additional analysis work required to upgrade the package from a Type B(U) to a Type B(F), i.e. essentially upgrading the container to include fissile radioisotopes to the authorized radioactive contents list. Having a certified shipping container is only one aspect governing the global shipments of radioactive material. By necessity the shipment of radioactive material is a highly regulated environment. This paper also explores the experiences with other key aspects of radioactive shipments, including the service procedures used to maintain the container certification, the associated compliance program for radioactive material shipments, and the shipping logistics involved in the transport.

scholarly journals Effects of Long-Term Storage on the Detection of Proteins, DNA, and mRNA in Tissue Microarray Slides

2011 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 1113-1121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Karlsson ◽  
Mats G. Karlsson
Keyword(s):  
Gene Copy Number ◽  
Tissue Microarrays ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Gene Copy ◽  
Histological Techniques ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Term Storage ◽  
Formalin Fixed

Storage of tissue slides has been claimed to induce dramatically reduced antigen detection particularly for immunohistochemistry (IHC). With tissue microarrays, the necessity to serially cut blocks in order to obtain as much material as possible is obvious. The presumed adverse effect of storage might hamper such an approach. The authors designed an experimental setting consisting of four different storage conditions with storage time of tissue slides of up to 1 year. Detection of proteins, DNA, and mRNA was performed using IHC and in situ hybridization techniques. Slight but significant changes in IHC occurred over time. The most important factor is the primary antibody used: four showed no significant changes, whereas limited decreases in 8 antibodies could be detected by image analysis. Whether the antigen was nuclear or cytoplasmic/membranous did not matter. No major differences between different storage conditions could be shown, but storage at 4C was overall the best procedure. Furthermore, gene copy number aberrations, chromosomal translocations, and the presence of mRNA could be detected on slides stored up to 1 year. In conclusion, in tissues optimally formalin fixed and using modern histological techniques, only minute changes in tissue antigenicity are induced by long-term storage.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document