EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS ON SPATIAL LOCALITY IN N-PERSON ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Author(s):  
REIJI SUZUKI ◽  
TAKAYA ARITA

The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of spatial locality on the evolution of cooperative behavior in the N-person iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (N-IPD) by focusing on two essentially distinct factors: the scale of interaction (which decides the neighboring members playing the N-person games) and the scale of reproduction (which decides the neighboring candidates for an offspring in each cell). We conducted evolutionary experiments of strategies for one-dimensional N-IPD game with various settings of these two factors. Experimental results revealed that these two factors bring qualitatively different effects to the emergence of cooperative behavior. Furthermore, we investigated the dynamics of the evolution of spatial locality in N-IPD. When we introduced the evolution of the scale of interaction into our model, the dynamic evolution of the scale of interaction through generation facilitated the emergence of global cooperation when the scale of reproduction was relatively small. Experiments with the evolution of the scale of reproduction are also discussed.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.


1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to examine the relationship between the durations of encounters and the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of behavioral strategies represented by finite-state machines is evolved over successive generations, with selection made on the basis of individual fitness. Each finite-state machine is given an additional evolvable parameter corresponding to the maximum number of moves it will execute in any encounter. A series of Monte Carlo trials indicates distinct relationships between encounter length and cooperation; however, no causal relationship can be positively identified.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to investigate the conditions that promote the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of logical stimulus-response devices is maintained over successive generations with selection based on individual fitness. The reward for selfish behavior is varied across a series of trials. Simulations indicate three distinct patterns of behaviors in which mutual cooperation is inevitable, improbable, or apparently random. The ultimate behavior can be reliably predicted by examining the payoff matrix that defines the reward for alternative joint behaviors.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. A. Gutnisky ◽  
B. S. Zanutto

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the leading metaphor for the evolution of cooperative behavior in populations of selfish agents. Although cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) has been studied for over twenty years, most of this research has been focused on strategies that involve nonlearned behavior. Another approach is to suppose that players' selection of the preferred reply might be enforced in the same way as feeding animals track the best way to feed in changing nonstationary environments. Learning mechanisms such as operant conditioning enable animals to acquire relevant characteristics of their environment in order to get reinforcements and to avoid punishments. In this study, the role of operant conditioning in the learning of cooperation was evaluated in the PD. We found that operant mechanisms allow the learning of IPD play against other strategies. When random moves are allowed in the game, the operant learning model showed low sensitivity. On the basis of this evidence, it is suggested that operant learning might be involved in reciprocal altruism.


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