Neuronal population activity dynamics reveal a low-dimensional signature of operant learning

Learning engages a high-dimensional neuronal population space spanning multiple brain regions. We identified a low-dimensional signature associated with operant conditioning, a ubiquitous form of learning in which animals learn from the consequences of behavior. Using single-neuron resolution voltage imaging, we identified two low-dimensional motor modules in the neuronal population underlying Aplysia feeding. Our findings point to a temporal shift in module recruitment as the primary signature of operant learning.

Anxiety and Depression Related Abnormalities in Socio-affective Learning

High anxiety may be related insufficient sensitivity to changing reinforcement during operant learning. Whether such findings are specific to anxiety is unclear given a wider literature relating negative affect to abnormal learning and the possibility that relationships are not consistent across incentive types (i.e. punishment and reward) and outcomes (i.e., positive or negative). In two separate samples ( = 76; = 49), participants completed an operant learning task with positive, negative, and neutral socio-affective feedback, designed to assess adaptive responses to changing environmental volatility. Contrary to expectations, general affective distress, rather than anxiety or depression specifically, was related to an increase, rather than a decrease, in the rate of learning for negative outcomes in volatile, relative to stable, environments. Our results suggest an important but general role in anxiety and depression of overweighting negative feedback when the value of an action becomes uncertain, as when environmental volatility increases.

Reducing low-value practices A functional-contextual consideration to aid in de-implementation efforts

Through innovation in research and self-correction, it is inevitable that some practices will be replaced or be discredited for one reason or another. De-implementation of discredited and low-value practices is a necessary step for school psychologists’ maintenance of evidence-based practices and to reduce unnecessary costs and risk. However, efforts to clarify de-implementation frameworks and strategies are ongoing. The scope of this paper follows McKay et al. (2018) in considering the potential for de-implementation strategies to be informed by applied behavior analysis and operant learning theory. We conceptualize low-value practice as sets of behaviors evoked by their context and maintained by their consequences, and thus de-implementation as behavior reduction. We discuss the need for future research given this perspective.

Reducing Low-Value Practices a Functional-Contextual Consideration to Aid in De-Implementation Efforts

Through innovation in research and self-correction, it is inevitable that some practices will be replaced or be discredited for one reason or another. De-implementation of discredited and low-value practices is a necessary step for school psychologists’ maintenance of evidence-based practices and to reduce unnecessary costs and risk. However, efforts to clarify de-implementation frameworks and strategies are ongoing. The scope of this paper follows McKay et al. in considering the potential for de-implementation strategies to be informed by applied behavior analysis and operant learning theory. We conceptualize low-value practice as sets of behaviors evoked by their context and maintained by their consequences, and thus de-implementation as behavior reduction. We discuss the need for future research given this perspective.

Debunking a myth: plant consciousness

Claims that plants have conscious experiences have increased in recent years and have received wide coverage, from the popular media to scientific journals. Such claims are misleading and have the potential to misdirect funding and governmental policy decisions. After defining basic, primary consciousness, we provide new arguments against 12 core claims made by the proponents of plant consciousness. Three important new conclusions of our study are (1) plants have not been shown to perform the proactive, anticipatory behaviors associated with consciousness, but only to sense and follow stimulus trails reactively; (2) electrophysiological signaling in plants serves immediate physiological functions rather than integrative-information processing as in nervous systems of animals, giving no indication of plant consciousness; (3) the controversial claim of classical Pavlovian learning in plants, even if correct, is irrelevant because this type of learning does not require consciousness. Finally, we present our own hypothesis, based on two logical assumptions, concerning which organisms possess consciousness. Our first assumption is that affective (emotional) consciousness is marked by an advanced capacity for operant learning about rewards and punishments. Our second assumption is that image-based conscious experience is marked by demonstrably mapped representations of the external environment within the body. Certain animals fit both of these criteria, but plants fit neither. We conclude that claims for plant consciousness are highly speculative and lack sound scientific support.