An investigation of performance problems with msync() system calls on filesystem DAX

Author(s):  
Satoshi Iwata
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-74
Author(s):  
Klaus Moser ◽  
Hans-Georg Wolff ◽  
Roman Soucek

Abstract. Escalation of commitment occurs when a course of action is continued despite repeated drawbacks (e.g., maintaining an employment relationship despite severe performance problems). We analyze process accountability (PA) as a de-escalation technique that helps to discontinue a failing course of action and show how time moderates both the behavioral and cognitive processes involved: (1) Because sound decisions should be based on (hopefully unbiased) information search, which requires time to gather, the effect of PA on de-escalation increases over time. (2) Because continuing information search creates behavioral commitment, the debiasing effect of PA on information search diminishes over time. (3) Consistent with the tunnel vision notion, the effects of less biased information search on de-escalation decrease over time.


2021 ◽  
Vol 122 ◽  
pp. 117-129
Author(s):  
Jesper Simonsson ◽  
Long Zhang ◽  
Brice Morin ◽  
Benoit Baudry ◽  
Martin Monperrus
Keyword(s):  

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (14) ◽  
pp. 1694
Author(s):  
Mathew Ashik ◽  
A. Jyothish ◽  
S. Anandaram ◽  
P. Vinod ◽  
Francesco Mercaldo ◽  
...  

Malware is one of the most significant threats in today’s computing world since the number of websites distributing malware is increasing at a rapid rate. Malware analysis and prevention methods are increasingly becoming necessary for computer systems connected to the Internet. This software exploits the system’s vulnerabilities to steal valuable information without the user’s knowledge, and stealthily send it to remote servers controlled by attackers. Traditionally, anti-malware products use signatures for detecting known malware. However, the signature-based method does not scale in detecting obfuscated and packed malware. Considering that the cause of a problem is often best understood by studying the structural aspects of a program like the mnemonics, instruction opcode, API Call, etc. In this paper, we investigate the relevance of the features of unpacked malicious and benign executables like mnemonics, instruction opcodes, and API to identify a feature that classifies the executable. Prominent features are extracted using Minimum Redundancy and Maximum Relevance (mRMR) and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Experiments were conducted on four datasets using machine learning and deep learning approaches such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naïve Bayes, J48, Random Forest (RF), and XGBoost. In addition, we also evaluate the performance of the collection of deep neural networks like Deep Dense network, One-Dimensional Convolutional Neural Network (1D-CNN), and CNN-LSTM in classifying unknown samples, and we observed promising results using APIs and system calls. On combining APIs/system calls with static features, a marginal performance improvement was attained comparing models trained only on dynamic features. Moreover, to improve accuracy, we implemented our solution using distinct deep learning methods and demonstrated a fine-tuned deep neural network that resulted in an F1-score of 99.1% and 98.48% on Dataset-2 and Dataset-3, respectively.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 395
Author(s):  
Héctor D. Menéndez ◽  
David Clark ◽  
Earl T. Barr

Malware detection is in a coevolutionary arms race where the attackers and defenders are constantly seeking advantage. This arms race is asymmetric: detection is harder and more expensive than evasion. White hats must be conservative to avoid false positives when searching for malicious behaviour. We seek to redress this imbalance. Most of the time, black hats need only make incremental changes to evade them. On occasion, white hats make a disruptive move and find a new technique that forces black hats to work harder. Examples include system calls, signatures and machine learning. We present a method, called Hothouse, that combines simulation and search to accelerate the white hat’s ability to counter the black hat’s incremental moves, thereby forcing black hats to perform disruptive moves more often. To realise Hothouse, we evolve EEE, an entropy-based polymorphic packer for Windows executables. Playing the role of a black hat, EEE uses evolutionary computation to disrupt the creation of malware signatures. We enter EEE into the detection arms race with VirusTotal, the most prominent cloud service for running anti-virus tools on software. During our 6 month study, we continually improved EEE in response to VirusTotal, eventually learning a packer that produces packed malware whose evasiveness goes from an initial 51.8% median to 19.6%. We report both how well VirusTotal learns to detect EEE-packed binaries and how well VirusTotal forgets in order to reduce false positives. VirusTotal’s tools learn and forget fast, actually in about 3 days. We also show where VirusTotal focuses its detection efforts, by analysing EEE’s variants.


2021 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 111067
Author(s):  
John Balfour ◽  
Roger Hill ◽  
Andy Walker ◽  
Gerald Robinson ◽  
Thushara Gunda ◽  
...  

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