scholarly journals Inventory Financing with Overconfident Supplier Based on Supply Chain Contract

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weifan Jiang ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Supply Chain Contract ◽  
Psychological Behavior ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Inventory Financing

Overconfidence is a universal psychological behavior. Overconfidence on demand awareness will have a significant impact on operation decisions. The supplier estimated the demand with excessive precision which influences the inventory financing decision-making deeply. We built the demand function based on the supplier’s overconfidence. Then we established the retailer, supplier, and the Bank’s profit function, respectively. Through the analysis of the bilevel Stackelberg game, we obtained the order quantity of the retailer with the capital constraint, the wholesale price of overconfident supplier, and the loan-to-value ratio of Bank, and we analyzed the influence of overconfidence on the decision variables. We have several findings as follows. First, the overconfidence makes the decisions of the retailer, supplier, and Bank deviate from the rational decisions. Second, the space of the market profit will affect the decision variables in the joint decision-making. Third, the financing supply chain (including the Bank and supply chain) should have a positive attitude towards the overconfidence of the supplier. Forth, in the joint decision-making, the supplier need determines the buyback price according to the capital demand; and in the decentralized decision-making, the supplier should try to use high buyback price strategy.

scholarly journals Pricing, Green Degree and Coordination Decisions in a Green Supply Chain with Loss Aversion

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

The consumer environmental awareness promotes green manufacturing and the behavioral preferences of members become prevailing in supply chain management. To promote further development of green supply chains, a two-echelon green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is considered, where the manufacturer is loss-averse and the retailer is risk-neutral. We use a Stackelberg game to investigate the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient on retail price, wholesale price, green degree, profits of members, and profit of the green supply chain under the assumption that manufacturer’s reference point of loss aversion is equal to the subgame perfect equilibrium partition. It is shown that, in the centralized decision-making setting (CDS), green degree and profit of the green supply chain are higher than those in the decentralized decision-making setting (DDS), while in the decentralized decision-making setting with a loss-averse manufacturer (DDS-LAM) loss aversion of manufacturer further decreases green degree and profit of green supply chain. It is also found that profits of the manufacturer and the retailer decrease with levels of loss aversion of manufacturer. Furthermore, it is also shown that wholesale price and retail price in the three decision-making settings depend on the green efficiency coefficient. Wholesale price and retail price in DDS-LAM are always the lowest (highest) if the green efficiency coefficient is sufficiently high (low). Finally, executing a greening cost-sharing contract can improve chain members’ profits if the retailer shares an appropriate proportion with the loss-averse manufacturer.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Financing and pricing strategies of construction supply chain under capital constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Internal Financing ◽  
Decision Making Model

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.

scholarly journals The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Total Profit

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.

scholarly journals Emergency Strategies of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Single Retailer Recycling under Demand Disruptions

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Lingyuan Wang ◽  
Xihui Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Emergency Decision

The uncertainty caused by emergencies will influence the normal operation of the supply chain. Considering demand disruptions, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers based on decentralized decision-making is considered. In the supply chain, one retailer recovers end-of-life products while the other does not. Analytic results show that, when the disturbance of demand occurs, the manufacturer and retailers adjust the wholesale price and retail prices of products according to the direction of the market demand disruptions. Under demand disruptions, the retailer who participates in recovering can gain more profits, especially in the case of the positive disruption. Theoretic and pragmatic references for the emergency decision-making of closed-loop supply chain enterprises are provided.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decision Analysis of Community E-Commerce Platform under Different Power Structures: Considering the Influence of Value Cocreation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ziyu Liu ◽  
Yaping Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Value Cocreation ◽  
The Impact

In order to explore the impact of different decision-making methods on the profits of various entities in the supply chain of the community e-commerce platform, this paper adopts the method of the Stackelberg game. For the community e-commerce platform supply chain composed of suppliers, community e-commerce platforms, and grid station service providers, considering the degree of supplier value cocreation efforts, this paper studies the optimal decisions under centralized decision-making, supplier-led decentralized decision-making, and community e-commerce platform-led decentralized decision-making, respectively. The results show that the supply chain obtains the highest profit in centralized decision-making; under decentralized decision-making, the dominant party will get higher profits; and the supplier value cocreation sensitivity coefficient is positively correlated with sales price, value cocreation effort level, and total supply chain value. The results are helpful to improve the competitiveness of the community e-commerce platform supply chain in the market and are of great significance to the long-term development of the community e-commerce industry.

Design of coordination contract for quality control-based supply chain under consumer balking behavior with fuzzy environment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Quality Control ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Fuzzy Environment ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

Considering the ubiquity of consumer balking behavior (CBB) in real-life economics and the importance of product quality control (QC) to supply chain (SC) competitiveness, this paper explores the SC coordination under both the QC and the CBB. Specifically, the consumer’s loss aversion behavior was illustrated at a fixed balking probability, and the SC models were created for centralized and decentralized decision-making modes. After that, the optimal strategies for the retailer and the manufacturer were identified, and the comparative static analysis was adopted to explore the effects of the CBB and QC on the optimal decision-making of the SC. The research results show that the QC-based SC under the CBB cannot be coordinated by wholesale price contract alone, but can be coordinated perfectly by this contract when the retailer shares the quality effort and the manufacturer shares the oversupply cost and analyzed through the fuzzy environment with the formulation. This finding sheds new light on the theory and application of wholesale price contract in SC coordination. Finally, the parameter sensitivity analysis was performed on balking probability and product qualification rate (PQR) through numerical experiments, which further discloses the impacts of the CBB and product QC on the optimal decision-making and profit of the SC.

scholarly journals Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bingquan Liu ◽  
Xuran Chang ◽  
Boyang Nie ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Lingqi Meng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.

Decision-Making on the Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Products with Two-Period Price and Option Contract

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050038
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Gaodi Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Wu ◽  
Jiwen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

The price risk of fresh agricultural products has been a significant topic in recent years. Taking the two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain as the research object, this paper studies the optimal ordering and coordination of supply chain based on two-period price, wholesale price and option contract. The optimal order decision of the retailer at the single period price and the optimal decision corresponding to the supplier are obtained when the output of the supplier is uncertain under decentralized decision-making. The range of penalty cost parameter that avoids supplier default is also obtained. The effect of two-period price on the optimal order decision and supply chain profits is discussed when the production yield of the supplier is fixed. Cost-sharing contract is introduced to increase the order quantity and achieve coordination because the option contract cannot completely make the supply chain coordination with two-period price. This paper provides a low-cost approach that can be applied in fresh agricultural supply chain to solve financing and order problems.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Contract Choice with Different Behavior Preferences of Retailer

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yonglong Wang ◽  
Xinyu Zheng ◽  
Jirong Cai ◽  
Yuelong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Contract ◽  
Contract Choice ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Behavioral Preferences

Retailer may exhibit irrationality when facing the risk of demand uncertainty; therefore, we consider four retailer behavioral preferences: risk neutral (RN), waste aversion (WA), stockout aversion (SA), and stockout-waste aversion (SW). The decision-making and contract choice of upstream and downstream enterprises in cases where demand depends on supplier’s effort are studied. The results show that if the retailer has only SA or RN preferences, then the supplier prefers to choose a wholesale price contract, while the retailer does the opposite, if the retailer has only WA, then the supplier prefers to choose a revenue sharing contract, but the retailer’s contract choice depends on the degree of waste aversion, and if the retailer has SW, then the contract choice of upstream and downstream enterprises is related to the degree of waste aversion and stockout aversion.

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