Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game

One of the key advantages of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. When the communication is interrupted or the centralized control manner is lost, the cooperative operation can still be carried out orderly. This work proposed a cooperative evolution mechanism within the framework of multiplayer public goods game to solve the problem of autonomous collaboration of unmanned swarm in case of failure of centralized control. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous cooperation in unmanned swarm, and then, the evolutionary game model of multiplayer public goods based on aspiration-driven dynamics is established. On this basis, the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation, and furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor, and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via case study, and deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

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Study on Cooperative Evolution Behaviors in Spatial Public Goods Game Based on Self-Questioning Mechanism

Applied Mechanics and Materials ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.380-384.1783 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 380-384 ◽

pp. 1783-1787

Author(s):

Rui Xue Feng ◽

Juan Ge

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Public Goods ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Cooperative Behavior ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

The Self ◽

Square Lattice ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Intensity Parameter ◽

Cooperative Evolution

We introduce a self-questioning mechanism under spatial public goods game in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory where players are located on a square lattice and realize it by a intensity parameter a. By stimulation and analysis, we find that compared with the original Fermi updating (a=0), the introduction of the self-questioning (a>0) can be better promote cooperative behavior at the smaller r. Subsequently, we stimulate in self-questioning mechanism (a=1), the cooperator frequency fc as a function of the factor r for different values of noise K. Results show that at the larger and smaller noise K, the system presents a considerably different cooperation phenomenon. Whats more, fc as a function of r has center symmetry nature about point (5.0, 0.5) whatever the noise K is. Further analysis indicates the reasons for the formation of these phenomena. Finally, we report the agents average payoff in the steady state and its reasons for it.

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Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/s41598-021-91532-5 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Attila Szolnoki ◽

Xiaojie Chen

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Pair Interaction ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Point Interactions ◽

Social Games ◽

The Public ◽

Specific Parameter ◽

Group Members

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.

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Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

International Journal of Modern Physics C ◽

10.1142/s0129183114500624 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 25 (11) ◽

pp. 1450062 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Hong-Bin Zhang ◽

Hong Wang

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Role Model ◽

Evolution Of Cooperation ◽

Square Lattice ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Learning Mechanism ◽

Preferential Selection ◽

Cooperative Evolution ◽

Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

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