The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism

Background In recent years, the average abundance function has attracted much attention as it reflects the degree of cooperation in the population. Then it is significant to analyse how average abundance functions can be increased to promote the proliferation of cooperative behaviour. However, further theoretical analysis for average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism is still lacking. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the corresponding numerical simulation is not sufficiently understood. Results We have deduced the approximate expressions of average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism on the basis of different levels of selection intensity $$\omega$$ ω (sufficiently small and large enough). In addition, we have analysed the influence of the size of group d, multiplication factor r, cost c, aspiration level $$\alpha$$ α on average abundance function from both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Conclusions (1) The approximate expression will become the linear equation related to selection intensity when $$\omega$$ ω is sufficiently small. (2) On one hand, approximation expression when $$\omega$$ ω is large enough is not available when r is small and m is large. On the other hand, this approximation expression will become more reliable when $$\omega$$ ω is larger. (3) On the basis of the expected payoff function $$\pi \left( \centerdot \right)$$ π ⋅ and function $$h(i,\omega )$$ h ( i , ω ) , the corresponding results for the effects of parameters (d,r,c,$$\alpha$$ α ) on average abundance function $$X_{A}(\omega )$$ X A ( ω ) have been explained.

Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games

An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (NE). The two players may have either common or conflicting interests over the two NE. This paper studies a redistribution scheme which allows the players to voluntarily transfer their payoffs after the play of an inequality game. We find that the redistribution scheme induces positive transfer from player 1 to player 2 in both common- and conflicting- interest games, and is particularly effective in increasing efficient coordination and reducing coordination failures in conflicting-interest games. We explain these findings by considering reciprocity by player 1 in response to the sacrifice made by player 2 in achieving efficient coordination in conflicting-interest games.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERACTION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL AND CREDIT SYSTEMS OF THE EAEU COUNTRIES

The EAEU countries attach great importance to the integration interaction of financial and credit systems, since this can be considered as the creation of an accelerator for the development of financial relations between countries at a new economic level, when an effective redistribution mechanism of cash flows is formed, ensuring an increase in the investment development of countries. At the same time, a number of contradictions have developed in the formation of conditions for the integration of financial and credit systems, which is caused by differences in the system of institutional foundations for the functioning of national markets, as well as different levels of development of the markets themselves. The research carried out was based on a systematic approach to the problem under study. In the process of work, dialectical, abstract-logical, monographic, economic-mathematical, economic-statistical and other methods of economic research were used. Based on the methods of comparative analysis, the assessment of the development trends of the financial and credit systems of the EAEU countries was carried out, an assessment of the degree of their compatibility in the formation of a single financial market of the EAEU was given. To determine the factors influencing the process of integrating the financial markets of the EAEU countries, the study used a SWOT analysis, which made it possible not only to identify and evaluate the factors, but also to project their impact on the ongoing integration processes.

Internalizing the externalities of overfunding: an agent-based model approach for analyzing the market dynamics on crowdfunding platforms

Crowdfunding platforms offer project initiators the opportunity to acquire funds from the Internet crowd and, therefore, have become a valuable alternative to traditional sources of funding. However, some processes on crowdfunding platforms cause undesirable external effects that influence the funding success of projects. In this context, we focus on the phenomenon of project overfunding. Massively overfunded projects have been discussed to overshadow other crowdfunding projects which in turn receive less funding. We propose a funding redistribution mechanism to internalize these overfunding externalities and to improve overall funding results. To evaluate this concept, we develop and deploy an agent-based model (ABM). This ABM is based on a multi-attribute decision-making approach and is suitable to simulate the dynamic funding processes on a crowdfunding platform. Our evaluation provides evidence that possible modifications of the crowdfunding mechanisms bear the chance to optimize funding results and to alleviate existing flaws.

Mechanism on Redistribution Synthesis of Dichlorodimethylsilane by AlCl3/ZSM-5(3T)@γ-Al2O3 Core-shell Catalyst

The redistribution method plays an important role in addressing the issue of organosilicon by-product in the direct synthesis of dichlorodimethylsilane, and the redistribution mechanism is still a topic of debate. The redistribution by ZSM-5(3T)@γ-Al2O3 core-shell catalyst and post-modified AlCl3/ZSM-5(3T)@γ-Al2O3 catalyst was technically performed using the Density Functional Theory (DFT) at the level of B3LYP/6-311++G(3df,2pd). The result shows that No.1 active site of ZSM-5(3T)@γ-Al2O3 core-shell structure has a significant effect on the activity of the catalyst. Indicating that the active center involved in the reaction is H provided by Al-O-H bond, which is an obvious catalytic active center of Bronsted acid. Furthermore, post-modified AlCl3/ZSM-5(3T)@γ-Al2O3 catalyst is in more favor of redistribution reaction comparing with ZSM-5(3T)@γ-Al2O3 core-shell catalyst. It ascribes to the robust Lewis site of aluminum chloride favorable modification.

Redistribution of China’s Green Credit Policy among Environment-Friendly Manufacturing Firms of Various Sizes: Do Banks Value Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises?

According to previous studies, China’s green credit policy, which was launched in 2012, increases environment-friendly manufacturing enterprises’ loan amounts. In this paper, we focus on a redistribution mechanism among environment-friendly manufacturing firms, namely, we determine whether the effects of the green credit policy differ between small and medium-sized environment-friendly manufacturing enterprises (SMEMEs) and large environment-friendly manufacturing enterprises (LEMEs). Using a difference in difference model (DID) and a difference in difference in difference model (DDD), we find that SMEMEs obtain more loans than LEMEs due to the green credit policy. We further analyze three potential foundations of this redistribution mechanism: information asymmetry, financial development, and government environmental investment. The results demonstrate that the redistribution effect occurs in both low and high information asymmetry conditions but only in regions with satisfactory financial development and with lower government environmental investment. Our findings enrich the literature on green credit, sustainable finance, and small finance, and they provide references for enterprises, banks, and governments.