scholarly journals A Tripartite Game Analysis of Environmental Pollution Control Based on Complicated Intergovernmental Relations

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Ling Li ◽  
Yao Song ◽  
Zhiqiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Intergovernmental Relations ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Control Level ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Model

An excellent ecological environment is conducive for improving economic benefits and social benefits. The environmental pollution control requires the cooperation of governments at all levels and a large amount of capital investment. However, under the system with Chinese characteristics, the intergovernmental relations present complex and dynamic characteristics: the central government is authoritative, the local governments are obedient and self-interested, and the environmental pollution control usually involves multiple government departments, while it has strong externality, which makes it easy to breed “free rider” behavior in the process of environmental pollution control. Therefore, the cross-regional environmental pollution control cooperation model of governments at all levels is a complex and worthwhile research problem. Based on this, the paper studies a tripartite game problem of environmental pollution control from both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation was used to obtain the optimal effort strategy, environmental pollution control level, and environmental pollution losses under the Nash game model, the Stackelberg game model, and the Cooperative game model. The results show the following: firstly, the governments’ environmental pollution control efforts are positively related to their own execution ability and influence ability and negatively related to the cost coefficient; secondly, from the perspectives of environmental pollution control level and environmental pollution losses, the Cooperative game model is superior to the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game; thirdly, this paper analyzes the relationship between the loss-bearing ratio, the special financial funds, the effort level of government, and the environmental pollution control level; finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis, which proves the validity of the models.

scholarly journals A stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises under uncertain environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Technology Level

AbstractConsidering the fact that the development of low carbon economy calls for the low carbon technology sharing between interested enterprises, this paper study a stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises. In the paper, we consider the random interference factors that include the uncertain external environment and the internal understanding limitations of decision maker. In the model, superior enterprises and inferior enterprises are separated entities, and they play Stacklberg master-slave game, Nash non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, respectively. We discuss the feedback equilibrium strategies of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises, and it is found that some random interference factors in sharing system can make the variance of improvement degree of low carbon technology level in the cooperation game higher than the variance in the Stackelberg game, and the result of Stackelberg game is similar to the result of Nash game. Additionally, a government subsidy incentive and a special subsidy that inferior enterprises give to superior enterprises are proposed.

Two-Stage Non-Cooperative Game Model for Vertical Handoffs in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks

2021 ◽  
pp. 90-114
Author(s):  
Pramod Kumar Goyal ◽  
Pawan Singh
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Wireless Networks ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Heterogeneous Wireless Networks ◽  
Substantial Reduction ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Vertical Handoffs ◽  
Cooperative Game Model ◽  
Selection Of

In a heterogeneous wireless network (HWN) environment, performing an efficient vertical handoff requires the efficient qualitative evaluation of all stakeholders like wireless networks (WN) and mobile users (MU) and mutual selection of best WN-MU. In the literature, most of the work deals with both these requirements jointly in the techniques proposed by them for the vertical handoffs (VHO) in HWNs, leaving very little scope to manipulate the above requirements independently. This may result in inefficient vertical handoffs. Hence, this chapter proposed a generalized two-stage two players, iterative non-cooperative game model. This model presents a modular framework that separates the quantitative evaluation of WNs and MUs (at Stage 1) from the game formulation and solution (at Stage 2) for mutual selection of best WN-MU pair for VHO. The simulation results show a substantial reduction in the number of vertical handoffs with the proposed game theory-based two-stage model as compared to a single-stage non-game theory method like multiple attribute decision making.

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