scholarly journals NATO Crisis Management: Cooperation with PfP Partners and Other International Organizations

2004 ◽  
Vol 03 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
John Kriendler
Author(s):  
Heidi Hardt

Chapter 1 introduces the subject of institutional memory of strategic errors, discusses why it matters for international organizations (IOs) that engage in crisis management and reviews the book’s argument, competing explanations and methodological approach. One strategic error in the mandate or planning of an operation can increase the likelihood of casualties on the battlefield. Knowledge of past errors can help prevent future ones. The chapter explores an empirical puzzle; there remain key differences between how one expects IOs to learn and observed behavior. Moreover, scholars have largely treated institutional memory as a given without explaining how it develops. From relevant scholarship, the chapter identifies limitations of three potential explanations. The chapter then introduces a new argument for how IOs develop institutional memory. Subsequent sections describe research design and explain why NATO is selected as the domain of study. Last, the chapter identifies major contributions to literature and describes the book’s structure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232098451
Author(s):  
Steven Van Hecke ◽  
Harald Fuhr ◽  
Wouter Wolfs

Despite new challenges like climate change and digitalization, global and regional organizations recently went through turbulent times due to a lack of support from several of their member states. Next to this crisis of multilateralism, the COVID-19 pandemic now seems to question the added value of international organizations for addressing global governance issues more specifically. This article analyses this double challenge that several organizations are facing and compares their ways of managing the crisis by looking at their institutional and political context, their governance structure, and their behaviour during the pandemic until June 2020. More specifically, it will explain the different and fragmented responses of the World Health Organization, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund/World Bank. With the aim of understanding the old and new problems that these international organizations are trying to solve, this article argues that the level of autonomy vis-a-vis the member states is crucial for understanding the politics of crisis management. Points for practitioners As intergovernmental bodies, international organizations require authorization by their member states. Since they also need funding for their operations, different degrees of autonomy also matter for reacting to emerging challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential for international organizations is limited, though through proactive and bold initiatives, they can seize the opportunity of the crisis and partly overcome institutional and political constraints.


1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Brecher ◽  
Jonathan Wilkenfeld

In examining patterns in international crises, the authors offer one path to a cocerted attack on a central phenomenon in world politics. After surveying the releva literature, including competing definitions, they set forth a conceptual map of int national crisis variables: actor attributes (age, territory, regime, capability, values system characteristics (size, geography, structure, alliance configuration, stability); a the crisis dimensions they wish to explain (trigger, actor behavior, superpower activity, and the role of international organizations—that is, crisis management, of come, and consequences). From this taxonomy they have developed a research frar work on international crisis, and, as an illustration of more narrow explanatory devie a crisis management-outcome model. Three clusters of hypotheses on the substar and form of crisis outcomes, and the duration of crises, are then tested against I evidence from 185 cases for the period from 1945 to 1962. The ultimate aim is illuminate international crises over a 50-year period, 1930–1980, across all continer cultures, and political and economic systems in the contemporary era.


Author(s):  
Baligh Ali Hasan Beshr

The aim of this research us to identify the most important mechanisms and tools used by countries in facing the crisis of Corona Virus Pandemic (case study of the Kingdom of Bahrain) to review the most important aspects of the crisis and the mechanisms to overcome it while this crisis transformed to be economical, social, and environmental crisis impacting the sociality. The research problem summarized in what are the strategies taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain in containing and facing the crisis which it gives back the international organizations praise. The methodology used in this research is the descriptive analytical approach to describe the phenomena, the reasons behind it and the mechanism used to face it. The most important results of this research are, the international economy has suffered huge losses reached 50 billion dollars. Western governments have been unable to manage the crisis and have turned basic rights to health and life into a selective process. The unemployment rate rose to 1.2 points. The number of infected cases in the world has increased to 6, 925, 880 cases to date. As well as Bahrain has a strong infrastructure to cope with crises at all levels. Finally, kingdom of Bahrain has taken careful procedures and measures steps to manage the crisis. The research has given recommendations to increase the attention to scientific research in the field of crisis management and to rely on other sources of income instead of oil so as not to be affected by economic fluctuations and crises, and to conduct more research in the mechanisms of facing the emergencies and crisis and the readiness of after COVID- 19 Corona Virus.


Author(s):  
Joop Voetelink

Today, states routinely deploy elements of their armed forces on the territory of other states within the framework of international military cooperation or international military operations carried out with the receiving state’s consent (crisis management operations). It is in the interest of the states sending their forces abroad (sending states), as well as the states receiving these foreign forces with their consent (host states), that the legal position of the visiting forces is abundantly clear. Absent a universal convention covering the status of visiting forces, states and international organizations regularly enter into specific agreements and arrangements setting out the rights and obligations of these forces. These international agreements are part of the international law on military operations and are typically referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Clearly, SOFAs will not be concluded where armed forces have entered another state’s territory without its consent, e.g., in an armed conflict situation. The legal status of the troops operating on hostile territory is then based on international humanitarian law, in particular the law of belligerent occupation. This specific field of law does not apply between allied states fighting a common enemy. Yet, the presence of a vast number of foreign troops has a marked impact on host states. Not surprisingly, the first set of bilateral agreements that today would qualify as SOFAs were concluded in World War I between a number of Allied states. Drawing from long-standing international practice, the agreements all focused on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the visiting forces and granted the sending states exclusive jurisdiction over their service members operating on the territory of other Allied states. During and after World War II, SOFAs evolved into more elaborate instruments covering a wider array of topics of interest to the states involved, such as claims and taxes. The core element of all these SOFAs, however, continued to be the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by either the host states or the sending states over service members of the visiting forces and over associated civilians, such as family members and contractors. States and international organizations in charge of crisis management operations regard SOFAs as an essential requirement to temporarily station armed forces abroad. Consequently, failure to come to an adequate agreement with host state authorities may hamper deployment of the troops or lead to termination of an ongoing operation, as happened in Iraq in 2011, when the United States and Iraq could not agree on the terms of a new SOFA for the US troops stationed in Iraq.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 524-543
Author(s):  
Hylke Dijkstra ◽  
Petar Petrov ◽  
Ewa Mahr

International organizations continuously deploy civilian capabilities as part of their peacekeeping and crisis management operations. This presents them with significant challenges. Not only are civilian deployments rapidly increasing in quantity, but civilian missions are also very diverse in nature. This article analyses how international organizations have learned to deploy their civilian capabilities to deal with a growing number and fast evolving types of operations. Whereas the previous literature has addressed this question for individual international organizations, this article uniquely compares developments in the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), three of the largest civilian actors. Drawing on the concept of organizational learning, it shows that all three organizations have made significant changes over the last decade in their civilian capabilities. The extent of these changes, however, varies across these organizations. The article highlights that the EU, despite its more homogeneous and wealthier membership, has not been able to better learn to deploy its civilian capabilities than the UN or OSCE. We show that the ability of these organizations to learn is, instead, highly dependent on institutional factors.


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