Spies and Boats and Planes: An Examination of U.S. Decision-Making during the Pueblo Hostage Crisis of 1968

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-40
Author(s):  
David Patrick Houghton

Hostage crises almost always involve a tradeoff between the “national honor”—bound up with national identity and a sense of self-esteem—and the desire to get hostages back safely and without loss of life. This was certainly the case in 1968, as President Lyndon Johnson and his advisers agonized over the crew of the USS Pueblo, which had been seized by North Korea while on an intelligence-gathering mission at the height of the Cold War. Such episodes also commonly lead to a frantic search for historical analogies and policy options that will attain one objective or another. Various historical analogies influenced the deliberations of U.S. policymakers as they looked beyond cases involving the seizure of intelligence-gathering ships to other types of hostage incident involving U.S. helicopters and spy planes. They gradually pieced together a solution to the problem at hand, much as one would a jigsaw puzzle.

2000 ◽  
Vol 74 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 281-285
Author(s):  
David J. Carroll

[First paragraph]Cuba: Confronting the U.S. Embargo. PETER SCHWAB. New York: St. Martin's, 1999. xiii + 226 pp. (Cloth US$ 29.95)Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift. DAVID W. ENGSTROM. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. x + 239 pp. (Paper US$25.95)Fleeing Castro: Operation Pedro Pan and the Cuban Children's Program. VICTOR ANDRES TRIAY. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. xiv + 126 pp. (Cloth US$ 49.95, Paper US$ 14.95)Some forty years after it was first imposed in 1960 in the midst of the cold war, the U.S. embargo against Cuba remains the defining feature of U.S.-Cuban relations. Like the Berlin Wall, the embargo is both a symbolic and a physical barrier keeping apart two neighbors destined to move closer. Unlike the Berlin Wall which feil at the end of the cold war, the U.S. embargo against Cuba still stands.


1983 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Vasquez ◽  
Richard W. Mansbach

A conceptual framework for the analysis of global political change is presented and illustrated with examples drawn from the Cold War. The most important issues on an agenda, the critical issues, go through identifiable stages: genesis, crisis, ritualization, dormancy, decision making, and authoritative allocation. The effects of the different stages on behavior of international actors is examined in a preliminary fashion, and a theoretical rationale is offered. Each stage, treated in detail, relates to the others in terms of differences in behavior associated with each stage, the evolving of relationships among actors, and the resolution of issues. The concluding section elaborates the research implications.


Author(s):  
S.G. Malkin ◽  
◽  
D.A. Nesterov ◽  

Turn to the historical cases has not only academic, but also political significance. And their interpretations within the framework of expert support of foreign policy activities encourage the analysis of this decision-making aspect to be more attentive and cautious than methodological constraints, disciplinary filters, intellectual climate and relations with the customer of analytical products. In this regard the article focuses on the characteristics of the expert support of the decision-making process in the United States at the beginning of the Cold War in the context of the activities of the RAND Corporation, which worked closely with the Ministry of Defence and practically monopolized the analytical support of American policy in the South-East Asia in the organization of counterinsurgency during the 1960-s. The focus of research is on methodological approaches and principles of analysis of the perspectives of the transfer of the Chinese model of the people’s war by the RAND experts – typical discussions about the export of the democratic and socialist models of development during the Cold War often leave this issue of the history of international relations after 1945 on the periphery of scientific discussion.


Author(s):  
Dale C. Copeland

This chapter considers the relative causal importance of economic interdependence and changes in commercial expectations which led to the ups and downs of Cold War history. It seeks to rectify the lacuna in the international relations field by showing the truly powerful impact of commercial factors on the dynamics of US–Soviet relations after 1941. The problems with realist and liberal thinking about economic interdependence are starkly revealed by the Cold War case. The theoretical logics for both camps are based on the actual present trade between great power spheres. But in situations where current trade is low or nonexistent, leaders' expectations of future trade and commerce can be still critical to their decision-making processes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 76-107
Author(s):  
Paul Maddrell

This article uses new evidence from the former archive of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi) of the German Democratic Republic to show that important intelligence was gathered by Western intelligence agencies, above all those of the United States, from well-placed human sources in the GDR's economy during the first twenty years of the Cold War. This intelligence influenced policymakers' understanding of the GDR's economy and informed debates about weapons procurement and the best trade, credit, information, and aid policies to pursue vis-à-vis the GDR and the Soviet bloc. The intelligence obtained from spies in the GDR's economic bureaucracy and industrial enterprises declined in quality from the 1960s on because of effective counterintelligence measures adopted by the Stasi. The loss of this information contributed to Western policymakers' failure in the 1980s to grasp the full extent of the economic crisis in the GDR that helped to precipitate the Communist regime's collapse.


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