scholarly journals Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 6-9

Phronesis ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell E. Jones
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
De Interpretatione ◽  
Excluded Middle

AbstractIn De Interpretatione 6-9, Aristotle considers three logical principles: the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the rule of contradictory pairs (according to which of any contradictory pair of statements, exactly one is true and the other false). Surprisingly, Aristotle accepts none of these without qualification. I offer a coherent interpretation of these chapters as a whole, while focusing special attention on two sorts of statements that are of particular interest to Aristotle: universal statements not made universally and future particular statements. With respect to the former, I argue that Aristotle takes them to be indeterminate and so to violate the rule of contradictory pairs. With respect to the latter, the subject of the much discussed ninth chapter, I argue that the rule of contradictory pairs, and not the principle of bivalence, is the focus of Aristotle’s refutation. Nevertheless, Aristotle rejects bivalence for future particular statements.

The Logical Function of ‘That’, or Truth, Propositions and Sentences

Philosophy ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-96
Author(s):  
Jonathan Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Logical Function ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Excluded Middle

(i) It is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false. It is true ‘Dogs bark’ does not make sense. It is true that dogs bark does. (ii) and (iii) Davidson wrong about ‘that’. (iv) The difference between ‘implies’ and ‘if ... then ...’. (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) Russell, not Quine, right about the subject matter of logic. (ix) The objectual and substitutional interpretations of quantifiers compatible. (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) Implications for well-known theories of truth; truth correspondence. (xvii), (xviii) and (xix) and (xx) Implications for the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the principle of non-contradiction. (xxi) Recapitulation. (xxii) ‘That’ and entailment. (xxiii) Propositions not entities, subsistent or otherwise.

The Mathematical Antinomies Resolved

2021 ◽  
pp. 245-276
Author(s):  
Ian Proops
Keyword(s):  
Singular Term ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Indirect Argument

This chapter identifies two lines of resolution in the mathematical antinomies, which lines, it argues, correspond to two traditional ways of attempting to generate counter-examples to the law of excluded middle. One line involves positing an instance of category clash, the other the suggestion that ‘the world’ is a non-referring singular term. The upshot, in either case, is that the thesis and antithesis are not contradictories but merely contraries (and both are false). The chapter criticizes, and then charitably reformulates, Kant’s indirect argument for Transcendental Idealism. It considers why Kant did not seek to resolve the antinomies by arguing that thesis or antithesis are nonsense. Also discussed are: reductio proofs in philosophy (and Kant’s attitude toward them, which is argued to be more sympathetic than is often supposed), regresses ad infinitum and ad indefinitum; the cosmological syllogism; the sceptical representation; the Lambert analogy, the indifferentists; and the comparison with Zeno.

Reconsidering Kant’s Rejection of Indirect Arguments in Transcendental Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Marcel Buß
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Transcendental Arguments ◽  
Mathematical Proofs ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Insight Into

Abstract Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1975)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. Alexandrowicz
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
International Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
International Economic Relations ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Un General Assembly

This chapter focuses on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1974. The Charter consists of a preamble and four chapters, the most important of which are Chapter I relating to the fundamentals of international economic relations, and Chapter II on the detailed economic rights and duties of States. Chapter I contains general principles such as the sovereignty and equality of states and other principles, the adoption of which presented few difficulties to members of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). On the other hand, the provisions of Chapter II, particularly article 2, were the subject of hard bargaining in which the negotiating states had to face some of the most controversial problems of international law in the economic field.

On Weakening the Law of Excluded Middle

Dialogue ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-236
Author(s):  
Douglas Odegard
Keyword(s):  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Excluded Middle

Let us use ‘false’ and ‘not true’ (and cognates) in such a way that the latter expression covers the broader territory of the two; in other words, a statement's falsity implies its non-truth but not vice versa. For example, ‘John is ill’ cannot be false without being nontrue; but it can be non-true without being false, since it may not be true when ‘John is not ill’ is also not true, a situation we could describe by saying ‘It is neither the case that John is ill nor the case that John is not ill.’

The Law of Excluded Middle

Mind ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol LXXXVII (2) ◽  
pp. 161-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEIL COOPER
Keyword(s):  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Excluded Middle

Misrepresentation and the Act of 1967

1967 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-250
Author(s):  
P. B. Fairest
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Lord Chancellor

The law concerning misrepresentations inducing contracts has been the subject of criticism for some years, and in 1959, the then Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, referred the matter to the Law Reform Committee. Their Report, published in 1962, had a mixed reception. A learned commentator, writing in this journal, gave it a rather chilly welcome, on the ground that it went too far; on the other hand, Mr. Diamond, writing in the pages ofLaw Reform Now, complained that the Report did not go far enough, and suggested that the subtle distinction between a mere representation and a term of the contract should be abolished. In 1967 the Misrepresentation Act was passed, to give effect, with certain modifications, to such of the recommendations of the Law Reform Committee as had not yet been implemented.

Do Easterners and Westerners Treat Contradiction Differently?

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 45-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Mercier ◽  
Jiehai Zhang ◽  
Yuping Qu ◽  
Peng Lu ◽  
Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Differences ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
Middle Way ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Influential Theory

Peng and Nisbett (1999) put forward an influential theory of the influence of culture on the resolution of contradiction. They suggested that Easterners deal with contradiction in a dialectical manner, trying to reconcile opposite points of view and seeking a middle-way. Westerners, by contrast, would follow the law of excluded middle, judging one side of the contradiction to be right and the other to be wrong. However, their work has already been questioned, both in terms of replicability and external validity. Here we test alternative interpretations of two of Peng and Nisbett’s experiments and conduct a new test of their theory in a third experiment. Overall, the Eastern (Chinese) and Western (French) participants behaved similarly, failing to exhibit the cross-cultural differences observed by Peng and Nisbett. Several interpretations of these failed replications and this failed new test are suggested. Together with previous failed replications, the present results raise questions about the breadth of Peng and Nisbett’s interpretation of cross-cultural differences in dealing with contradiction.

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