Greek Seers and Israelite-Jewish Prophets

2007 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-482
Author(s):  
Armin Lange
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Divine Revelation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Near Eastern ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Normal Human ◽  
The One

AbstractAncient Greek seers (manteis) and Ancient Near Eastern prophets have often been compared with each other. Although in rare cases Greek seers communicate a divine message to a wider audience and are thus comparable to Ancient Near Eastern prophets and Israelite-Jewish prophets in particular, Greek seers are distinctly different from Ancient Near Eastern prophets. In most cases Greek seers employ forms of deductive divination while the use of deductive divination is the exception with Israelite-Jewish prophets. If Greek seers use intuitive divination they do not rely on divine revelations but have special ability to perceive more than normal human beings. Although Ancient Near Eastern prophets and Greek manteis do thus not equate, the comparison of the two sheds better light on the characteristics of both. On the one hand, the Ancient Near Eastern understanding of the prophet emphasizes heavily his reliance on divine revelation. This is especially true for Israelite and Jewish prophets. On the other hand, the Greek mantis acts mostly as a diviner in his own right. His special insights and knowledge go back to his abilities.

The sovereignty of revelation: On Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics of revelation

2021 ◽  
pp. 000842982110448
Author(s):  
Balázs M Mezei
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Divine Revelation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Bible ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The One ◽  
Central Term

In this article I overview Paul Ricœur’s understanding of divine revelation on the basis of some of his relevant writings. I argue that Ricœur’s hermeneutics of revelation has two aspects: on the one hand Ricœur’s explains the complex ways of acquiring and interpreting divine revelation especially with respect to the Bible; on the other hand, he acknowledges that revelation, originating in God’s freedom, is immediately given. In Ricœur’s view, the understanding of this immediacy is tainted by the presence of evil in human understanding which hinders the realization of revelation itself. As a critique of this standpoint I argue that the immediate givenness of revelation is logically and phenomenologically presupposed in our interpretations. Any hermeneutics of revelation entails a phenomenology of revelation. This phenomenology contains both the self-founding of human beings and, at the same time, the recognition of the absoluteness of the divine. Husserl’s phenomenology offers a way to the understanding of the immediacy of revelation through his central term of Eigenheitlichkeit. Ricœur understands this term not as genuine reality but rather as appartenance, ‘belonging to’, and reshapes its meaning in line with a hermeneutical naturalism. This explains his difficulty to conceive properly the sovereignty of revelation and the importance of phenomenology in the understanding of its immediate character.

scholarly journals Two Conceptions of Second Nature

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Activities ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
The One ◽  
First Nature

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.

scholarly journals Mysticism and/in the Old Testament: Methodological orientation and a textual example

2015 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christo Lombaard
Keyword(s):  
Old Testament ◽  
Academic Discipline ◽  
Specific Aspect ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hellenistic Period ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Mission History ◽  
The One ◽  
Interpretative Framework

This contribution is the second in a series on methodology and Biblical Spirituality. In the first article, ‘Biblical spirituality and interdisciplinarity: The discipline at cross-methodological intersection’, the matter was explored in relationship to the broader academic discipline of Spirituality. In this contribution, the focus is narrowed to the more specific aspect of mysticism within Spirituality Studies. It is not rare for Old Testament texts to be understood in relationship to mystical contexts. One the one hand, when Old Testament texts are interpreted from a mystical perspective, the methods with which such interpretations are studied are familiar. The same holds true, on the other hand, if texts in the Old Testament, dating from the Hellenistic period, are identified as mystic. However, African mission history has taught us that the Western interpretative framework, based on ancient Greek philosophical suppositions (most directly the concepts rendered by Plato and Aristotle) and rhetorical orientations, is so strong that it transposes that which it encounters in other cultures into its terms, thus rendering the initial cultural understandings inaccessible. This is precisely the case too with Old Testament texts dating from pre-Hellenistic times, identified as mystic. What are the methodological parameters required to understand such texts on their own terms? In fact, is such an understanding even possible?

Jews and Judaism in Classical Sufi Literature

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Elisha Russ-Fishbane
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Near Eastern ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Historical Role ◽  
The One ◽  
The Demonic

Abstract This paper addresses a paradox at the heart of the classical Sufi tradition. On the one hand, key Sufi writers express a radical universalism or ‘transconfessionalism’ in their mystical verse. This has led a variety of modern scholars to identify Sufism as an ecumenical and non-dogmatic tradition. On the other hand, in other writings the selfsame authors conduct a vigorous literary polemic and celebrate missionary efforts against unbelievers of all stripes, yet with a notable emphasis on Jewish unbelievers. This article examines the image of Jews and Judaism in key Sufi texts in both Arabic and Persian between the tenth and thirteenth centuries through a variety of motifs, including the construction of the Jew as embodiment of the demonic and as archetypal unbeliever. These images become critical to the literary function of the Jew in classical Sufi texts with little connection to their historical role in Near Eastern societies.

scholarly journals Mytens tvang

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Albinus
Keyword(s):  
Blind Spot ◽  
The Other ◽  
Instrumental Reason ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Negative Dialectics ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One

The purpose of the article is to show how the negative dialectics of Adorno gets involved with a concept of myth that is questionable in several respects. First of all, Adorno tries to combine, but rather conflates, two understandings of myth. On the one hand, the concept of myth is defined as the ancient Greek mythos, in which the subject of man is projected on to nature; on the other hand, myth is defined as the backfire of enlightenment, in which self-reflection becomes the blind spot of instrumental reason. Along these lines of argument, Adorno’s interpretation of Homer, which, at any rate, is highly inspiring, attempts to demonstrate that Odysseus is already enlightened in that he keeps the myth at bay in order to gain his self. The point is, as a matter of dialectic necessity, that he just ends up in myth once again, albeit in the second sense, namely by being a victim of his own self-denial. A question that seems to remain unanswered, though, is how the two kinds of myth are related. Further, Adorno draws on a problematic distinction between myth and literature in order to claim that Homer separates himself from the realm of myth. By adopting Adorno’s own game of interpretation, however, it is possible to regard myth as such, including the Homeric one, as being contingently open-ended rather than just a matter of dialectic determination.

Filosofia, politica e società ai tempi della pandemia. Agamben e la «paranoia della ragione»

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 617-642
Author(s):  
Antonio Di Chiro
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Of Exception ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Giorgio Agamben ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Intimate Relations ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

In this essay we will try to analyze the thought of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the pandemic. The aim of the work is twofold. On the one hand, we will try to demonstrate that Agamben’s positions on the pandemic are not to be understood as mere extemporaneous statements, but as integral parts of his philosophy. On the other hand, we will try to show how these positions are based on a deeply paranoid and anti-scientific vision, since Agamben believes that the effects of the epidemic have been exaggerated by the centers of power in order to create a “state of exception” that allows to crumble social life and to use the fear of poverty as a tool to dominate society. We will try to demonstrate that it is precisely starting from the critique of Agamben’s positions that it is possible to rethink a philosophy and a politic to come and a new reorganization of social and intimate relations between human beings.

scholarly journals Algemeen of bijzonder Christelijke ethiek in een moderne cultuur

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
W. H. Velema
Keyword(s):  
World View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Christian Faith ◽  
Divine Revelation ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

In this article the author investigates the relation between faith/revelation on the one hand and ethics on the other; the relation between the "particular” and the “general”. It is argued that Rendtorff and Pannen­berg are basically in agreement that ethics does not depend on Christian faith and divine revelation, although there is a connection between the two. On the other hand, the author of this article (in agreement with Douma) relates faith/revelation and ethics very closely: ethics is directed by a life and world view - a stance illustrated by a discussion on abortion and euthanasia. The issue of consensus on moral issues between Christians and non-Christians should be resolved from the perspective of the general goodness of God and his law, given to all men.

Païdeia et Sport

1998 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Leo-Paul Bordeleau
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Modern Education ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

Can sport claim to be an educative means, and what becomes of Greek paideia in the world of sport? The author intends to answer these questions through the use of a semantic and historical clarification of the notions of sport and education. Indeed, on the one hand, sport appears like a social practice not much propitious to education; on the other hand, modern education seems to have deviated from the Greek paideia’s trajectory. Therefore, to take into account this deviation and, by doing so, to make precise the idea of education, and then demonstrate that sport carries all characteristics of modern rationality which has produced it, will allow the author to conclude that sport could be considered one of the preferential means of human beings’ formation. Nevertheless its educative function more likely belongs to the nature of "poïèsis" than to the nature of "praxis."

Leibniz on Apperception and Animal Souls

Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
The One

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).

Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

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