Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

Two-Tier Moral Codes

1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Code ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.

scholarly journals Two Conceptions of Second Nature

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Activities ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
The One ◽  
First Nature

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.

scholarly journals DET ZOOFILE ÅRHUNDREDE

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Knudsen
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One ◽  
Point Of Departure

Anne Knudsen: The Century of Zoophilia Taking as her point of departure the protests against a dying child having his last wish fulfilled because his wish was to kill a bear, the author argues that animals have achieved a higher moral status than that of humans during the 20th century. The status of animals (and of “nature”) is seen as a consequence of their muteness which on the one hånd makes it impossible for animals to lie, and which on the other hånd allows humans to imagine what animals would say, if they spoke. The development toward zoophilia is explained as a a logical consequence of the cultural naturalisation of humans, and the author draws the conclusion that we may end up entirely without animals as a category. This hypothetical situation will lead to juridical as well as philosophical complications.

Filosofia, politica e società ai tempi della pandemia. Agamben e la «paranoia della ragione»

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 617-642
Author(s):  
Antonio Di Chiro
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Of Exception ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Giorgio Agamben ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Intimate Relations ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

In this essay we will try to analyze the thought of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the pandemic. The aim of the work is twofold. On the one hand, we will try to demonstrate that Agamben’s positions on the pandemic are not to be understood as mere extemporaneous statements, but as integral parts of his philosophy. On the other hand, we will try to show how these positions are based on a deeply paranoid and anti-scientific vision, since Agamben believes that the effects of the epidemic have been exaggerated by the centers of power in order to create a “state of exception” that allows to crumble social life and to use the fear of poverty as a tool to dominate society. We will try to demonstrate that it is precisely starting from the critique of Agamben’s positions that it is possible to rethink a philosophy and a politic to come and a new reorganization of social and intimate relations between human beings.

Païdeia et Sport

1998 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Leo-Paul Bordeleau
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Modern Education ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

Can sport claim to be an educative means, and what becomes of Greek paideia in the world of sport? The author intends to answer these questions through the use of a semantic and historical clarification of the notions of sport and education. Indeed, on the one hand, sport appears like a social practice not much propitious to education; on the other hand, modern education seems to have deviated from the Greek paideia’s trajectory. Therefore, to take into account this deviation and, by doing so, to make precise the idea of education, and then demonstrate that sport carries all characteristics of modern rationality which has produced it, will allow the author to conclude that sport could be considered one of the preferential means of human beings’ formation. Nevertheless its educative function more likely belongs to the nature of "poïèsis" than to the nature of "praxis."

Leibniz on Apperception and Animal Souls

Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
The One

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).

Aristotle's Wondering Children

Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-81
Author(s):  
Ioannis Alysandratos ◽  
Dimitra Balla ◽  
Despina Konstantinidi ◽  
Panagiotis Thanassas ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
Imperfect State ◽  
The One ◽  
Shed Light

Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today’s academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in wonder (θαυμάζειν), without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children’s education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings’ moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children’s moral status. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children’s souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher’s views on children’s special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being.

scholarly journals Under Darwin’s Cosh? Neo-Aristotelian Thinking in Environmental Ethics

2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 22-23
Author(s):  
Michael Wheeler
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
General Position ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Individual Human

As a first shot, one might say that environmental ethics is concerned distinctively with the moral relations that exist between, on the one hand, human beings and, on the other, the non-human natural environment. But this really is only a first shot. For example, one might be inclined to think that at least some components of the non-human natural environment (non-human animals, plants, species, forests, rivers, ecosystems, or whatever) have independent moral status, that is, are morally considerable in their own right, rather than being of moral interest only to the extent that they contribute to human well-being. If so, then one might be moved to claim that ethical matters involving the environment are best cashed out in terms of the dutes and responsibilities that human beings have to such components. If, however, one is inclined to deny independent moral status to the non-human natural environment or to any of its components, then one might be moved to claim that the ethical matters in question are exhaustively delineated by those moral relations existing between individual human beings, or between groups of human beings, in which the non-human natural environment figures. One key task for the environmental ethicist is to sort out which, if either, of these perspectives is the right one to adopt—as a general position or within particular contexts. I guess I don’t need to tell you that things get pretty complicated pretty quickly.

Loving Tolerance

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hussein Ganji ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Experience ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Epistemological Basis

The deepening and development of epistemological issues on the one hand, and the unpleasant historical experience on the other hand, made modern humanity after the Renaissance gradually became tolerant and recognized "the Other." The epistemological basis for tolerance is the obscurity and complexity of truth and difference in the understanding of human beings. Its moral basis is not to see oneself as above others and to endure the intricacies of practicing morality. Tolerance is rational for two reasons: one is the epistemological basis that hinders the dogma of possessing absolute truth, self-knowledge, and repudiating others; the other is the advantages of tolerance for collective living. This article seeks to show that Rumi, while paying attention to the moral and epistemological principles of tolerance, goes beyond the rational tolerance of calculating profits, losses, and trading. According to his mystical view, his tolerance is a “loving tolerance,” a tolerance which is based solely on love and compassion towards human beings, rather than being based on calculations of profit and loss, with no expectation for reward.

The Art of Misunderstanding Moral Bioenhancement

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
INGMAR PERSSON ◽  
JULIAN SAVULESCU
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Future ◽  
The One ◽  
Scientific Technology

Abstract:In our book Unfit for the Future and a number of papers, we have argued that there is a dangerous mismatch between, on the one hand, the tremendous power of scientific technology, which has created societies with millions of citizens, and, on the other hand, our moral capacities, which have been shaped by evolution for life in small, close-knit societies with primitive technology. To overcome this mismatch before it results in the downfall of human civilization, human beings stand in acute need of moral enhancement, not only by traditional means but also by biomedical means, should this turn out to be possible. After summarizing this argument, we respond to two critics, Michael Hauskeller and Robert Sparrow.

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