Cross-Cultural Differences in Core Concepts of Humans as a Biological Species

An intuition that has been identified as a core concept in folkbiological thought (i.e., intuitive notions about the biological world) is the tendency to view humans as one biological species among many. Previous research has shown that in a category-based induction task, children tend to privilege humans as a basis for inferring that multiple species possess similar biological properties, but that culture and experience can affect the development of these anthropocentric tendencies. It has been assumed that anthropocentrism disappears before adulthood, though very little research has been conducted to test this assumption. In the present research, adults studying oriental medicine, western biology, or western psychology completed a category-based induction task as well as a ‘human patient’ task designed to measure cultural differences in concepts of biological processes. The results showed that anthropocentric reasoning still occurs in adulthood and that there are cultural differences in the likelihood to exhibit these tendencies.

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Folkbiology doesn't Come from Folkpsychology: Evidence from Yukatek Maya in Cross-Cultural Perspective

Journal of Cognition and Culture ◽

10.1163/156853701300063561 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. 3-42 ◽

Cited By ~ 71

Author(s):

Valentina Vapnarsky ◽

Edilberto Ucan Ek' ◽

Douglas Medin ◽

Elizabeth Lynch ◽

Scott Atran ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Psychological Research ◽

Biological Properties ◽

Biological Species ◽

Cultural Perspective ◽

Domain Specific ◽

The Face ◽

Biological World ◽

Biological Concepts ◽

American Children ◽

Initial Source

AbstractNearly all psychological research on basic cognitive processes of category formation and reasoning uses sample populations associated with large research institutions in technologically-advanced societies. Lopsided attention to a select participant pool risks biasing interpretation, no matter how large the sample or how statistically reliable the results. The experiments in this article address this limitation. Earlier research with urban-USA children suggests that biological concepts are (1) thoroughly enmeshed with their notions of naive psychology, and (2) strikingly human-centered. Thus, if children are to develop a causally appropriate model of biology, in which humans are seen as simply one animal among many, they must undergo fundamental conceptual change. Such change supposedly occurs between 7 and 10 years of age, when the human-centered view is discarded. The experiments reported here with Yukatek Maya speakers challenge the empirical generality and theoretical importance of these claims. Part 1 shows that young Maya children do not anthropocentrically interpret the biological world. The anthropocentric bias of American children appears to owe to a lack of cultural familiarity with non-human biological kinds, not to initial causal understanding of folkbiology as such. Part 2 shows that by age of 4-5 (the earliest age tested in this regard) Yukatek Maya children employ a concept of innate species potential or underlying essence much as urban American children seem to, namely, as an inferential framework for understanding the affiliation of an organism to a biological species, and for projecting known and unknown biological properties to organisms in the face of uncertainty. Together, these experiments indicate that folkpsychology cannot be the initial source of folkbiology. They also underscore the possibility of a species-wide and domain-specific basis for acquiring knowledge about the living world that is constrained and modified but not caused or created by prior non-biological thinking and subsequent cultural experience.

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Cognitive gadgets: A provocative but flawed manifesto

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x19001134 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 42 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Marco Del Giudice

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Cultural Differences ◽

Twin Studies ◽

Cross Cultural ◽

Evolutionary Approach ◽

Genetic Inheritance ◽

Double Standards ◽

Cross Cultural Differences ◽

Cherry Picking ◽

Dichotomous Thinking

Abstract The argument against innatism at the heart of Cognitive Gadgets is provocative but premature, and is vitiated by dichotomous thinking, interpretive double standards, and evidence cherry-picking. I illustrate my criticism by addressing the heritability of imitation and mindreading, the relevance of twin studies, and the meaning of cross-cultural differences in theory of mind development. Reaching an integrative understanding of genetic inheritance, plasticity, and learning is a formidable task that demands a more nuanced evolutionary approach.

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