The Immunity of Heads of States in US Courts after the Decision of the International Court of Justice

2003 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon de Smet

AbstractThis article investigates the law of Head of State immunity in the United States in light of the recent decision by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case (DRC v. Belgium). It does so by analyzing the U.S. law and comparing it with the customary international law on Head of State immunity as laid out by the world court. The article demonstrates that there are two competing strands in the recent jurisprudence of U.S. courts, neither of which is in conformity with international law. The reasons for this discrepancy are examined and explained in light of the underlying debate about the role of customary international law in the U.S. constitutional system. In conclusion, the author suggests that the best solution to the current dilemma is for the U.S. courts to apply the rules on Head of State immunity as explained by the world court and avoid as much as possible interference by the executive.

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Del Mar

Abstract The finding by the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State that Italy violated its obligation to respect Germany’s immunity from civil jurisdiction comes as no surprise. The anticipated conclusion of the Court is the outcome of the powerful tradition of framing State immunity as a rule to which an exercise of jurisdiction by a domestic court is an exception expressly established under customary international law. As technically faultless as this finding may appear, it sits uncomfortably with deeper, structural developments in international law that challenge the very application of the ‘rule-exceptions’ framework of State immunity. This article questions the underlying assumption upon which the Court’s judgment is premised: that State immunity operates as a predominant rule, to which only exceptions that are established under customary law can apply, and it proposes an alternative understanding of the doctrine of State immunity.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Yang

InArrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), decided on 14 February 2002, the International Court of Justice held that an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs was immune from criminal proceedings before a foreign domestic court, even if the charges involved crimes against humanity. Human rights advocates might well regard this decision as a serious setback. Decided against a widespread euphoria brought forth by, and largely due to a neglect of an important dictum in, the historic holding in Pinochet No. 3 [2000] 1 A.C. 147, the case serves further to clarify a crucial point of State immunity in current international law. The Pinochet case dealt with the immunity of a former, as opposed to a serving, Head of State. While the majority of the Law Lords only mentioned in passing that the immunity enjoyed by a serving Head of State ratione personae was absolute, the International Court of Justice stated, in unambiguous language, that: … in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASSIMO LANDO

AbstractIn 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-638
Author(s):  
Filippo Fontanelli

In August 2012, the First Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court or Court), the highest Italian domestic court, issued a judgment upholding Germany’s sovereign immunity from civil claims brought by Italian war crime victims against Paul Albers and eight others in the Italian courts (Albers). In so doing, the Court overruled its own earlier decisions and also reversed the judgment of April 20, 2011, by the Italian Military Court of Appeal (Military Court), which had upheld such claims relating to war crimes committed by German forces in Italy during World War II. With this ruling, the Court of Cassation put an end to its decade long effort to find an exception to the well-known rule of customary international law providing for sovereign immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction for actsjure imperii. Thisrevirementresulted from the Court’s decision to give effect to the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) inGermany v. Italy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-739
Author(s):  
Xuexia Liao

Abstract This article revisits the package deal nature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and its implications for determining customary international law. A survey of the case law illustrates that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not given particular weight to the fact that the LOSC was negotiated and accepted as a package deal. Nevertheless, the ICJ’s declaration that Article 121, paragraph 3 of the LOSC is a customary rule tends to be based on a ‘package deal approach’, which focuses on the textual and logical links between the paragraphs that manifest an ‘indivisible régime’. By exploring the difficulties of determining the customary status of Article 76(2)–(7) concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which may arise in the pending Nicaragua v. Colombia II case, this article calls for a cautious attitude towards determination of customary rules from the LOSC.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 764-765
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Stefan A. Riesenfeld

In Re Aquarone. 101 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 838 (1997).Conseil d'Etat (Assemblée), June 6, 1997.In this case, the French Council of State, sitting in its most authoritative formation, had to pass on a petition by Stanislav Aquarone for review of a judgment of the administrative court of appeal of Lyon, dismissing his request for annulment of die imposition by France of income taxes on his retirement pension for the years 1981-1986, paid by the United Nations. In a carefully crafted opinion, the highest administrative court of France rejected die petition and die claim of immunity from taxation of his retirement pay by Aquarone, a former Registrar of the International Court of Justice and an Australian national now living in Gordes, France.


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