The War on Terror as a Business: Lessons from Kenya and the Somalia Interventions

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Horace G. Campbell
Keyword(s):  
War On Terror ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Failed States ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Us Imperialism ◽  
The Us ◽  
Break Up

Abstract The documented evidence of the Kenyan military collaborating with the so-called forces of terror in Somalia to maintain their accumulation of approximately $400 million every year hardly made the international headlines as the leaders of Kenya have been rehabilitated into the ranks of those allied to US imperialism in waging a war on terror. There is an examination of the links between the US intelligence forces and the Kenyan cartels in keeping alive the terror threat in Somalia. Very few scholars have followed up on the revelations of the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in funding those who matured into what is now called terror groups in Somalia through the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. The challenge for scholars for peace will be to penetrate the US Africa Command shibboleths on ‘failed states’ in order to work for a program of peace and reconstruction in Africa. In the conclusion, the paper will argue that the withdrawal of the Kenyan troops from Somalia and demilitarization of security will be a concrete step to break up the cartels that are in the business of terror.

scholarly journals Norm transformation and the institutionalization of targeted killing in the US

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Frankel Pratt
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Network Synthesis ◽  
Relational Sociology ◽  
Targeted Killing ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Means And Ends ◽  
The Us ◽  
Norm Change

This article explains the emergence and institutionalization of the US’s targeted killing practices as a case of norm transformation. I argue that international and domestic US prohibitions on assassination have not disappeared, but have changed as a result of practitioner-led changes in the conventions, technologies, and bureaucratic structures governing the use of force in counterterrorism activities. After discussing the limits of alternative explanations, and drawing inspiration from practice theory, pragmatist social theory, and relational sociology, I posit three causal mechanisms as responsible for the transformation: convention reorientation, which was the redefinition of targeted killing to distinguish it from assassination; technological revision, which was the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to bypass normative and strategic concerns over precision; and network synthesis, which was the support of the Bush administration and especially of the Obama administration, overruling dissenters from within the Central Intelligence Agency (who were often very highly placed). I trace the processes by which these mechanisms operated and interacted in simultaneous and mutually reinforcing ways from the start of the millennium until now. Finally, I discuss some of the ways in which this contributes to institutional analysis and the study of norm change more generally, and, in particular, how it considers the role of technology and the reciprocity of means and ends.

23. The ‘War on Terror’ and the War in Afghanistan

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Suicide Bombers ◽  
Means And Ends ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Terrorist Acts

This chapter focuses on the United States’s ‘war on terror’ and its involvement in the war in Afghanistan. In the later years of the twentieth century, Middle Eastern groups launched terrorist acts against Western targets. The advent of suicide bombers and groups like al-Qaeda changed the relationships between means and ends in the use of terror. The end of the Cold War severely undermined the effectiveness of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in gathering intelligence on terrorists. The chapter first provides an overview of terrorism prior to 9/11 before discussing George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’, the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the period 2001–2003 and its revival, and the problem of Pakistan. It concludes with an assessment of Barack Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan.

23. The ‘War on Terror’ and the War in Afghanistan

2020 ◽  
pp. 567-586
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Suicide Bombers ◽  
Means And Ends ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Terrorist Acts

This chapter focuses on the ‘war on terror’ of the US and its involvement in the war in Afghanistan. In the later years of the twentieth century, Middle Eastern groups launched terrorist acts against Western targets. The advent of suicide bombers and groups like al-Qaeda changed the relationships between means and ends in the use of terror. The end of the Cold War severely undermined the effectiveness of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in gathering intelligence on terrorists. The chapter first provides an overview of terrorism prior to 9/11, before discussing George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’, the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the period 2001–3 and its revival, and the problem of Pakistan. It concludes with an assessment of Barack Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan.

Deterrence and Democracy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falkenrath
Keyword(s):  
War On Terror ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Global War On Terror ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Us ◽  
Democratic Societies ◽  
Global War ◽  
Taking Action ◽  
The Given

This chapter examines strategy and deterrence and traces the shift from deterrence by ‘punishment’ to deterrence by ‘denial’ in Washington’s conduct of the Global War on Terror. The former rested on an assumption that the consequences of an action would serve as deterrents. The latter may carry messages of possible consequences, but these are delivered by taking action that removes the capabilities available to opponents – in the given context, the Islamist terrorists challenging the US. Both approaches rest on credibility, but are more complex in the realm of counter-terrorism, where the US authorities have no obvious ‘return to sender’ address and threats to punish have questionable credibility. In this context, denial offers a more realistic way of preventing terrorist attacks. Yet, the advanced means available to the US are deeply ethically problematic in liberal democratic societies. However, there would likely be even bigger questions if governments failed to act.

An unfinished battle: George C. Marshall and intelligence in the early Cold War

2021 ◽  
pp. 096834452110179
Author(s):  
Raphaël Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Truman Administration ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Covert Action ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Second World

This article deals with the influence of Gen. George C. Marshall on the foundation of the US intelligence community after the Second World War. It argues that his uneven achievements demonstrate how the ceaseless wrangling within the Truman administration undermined the crafting of a coherent intelligence policy. Despite his bureaucratic skills and prominent positions, Marshall struggled to achieve his ends on matters like signals intelligence, covert action, or relations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet he crafted an enduring vision of how intelligence should supplement US national security policy that remained potent throughout the Cold War and beyond.

Secrecy, State-Private Networks and Operational Effectiveness in Cold War Europe

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-560
Author(s):  
ERIC PULLIN
Keyword(s):  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
Operational Effectiveness ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Us ◽  
Long Time ◽  
To Come ◽  
Us Senate

Secrecy has unintended consequences. The release on 9 December 2014 of the US Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the torture of terrorism detainees focused public attention on the secret activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Regrettably, lost amidst debate over justifying or condemning state-sponsored torture is a more basic concern, the issue of state secrecy, which underlies the discussion of how governments promote national ends. Only two days after the issuance of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report, the US House of Representatives adjourned without taking action on the Freedom of Information Act reform bill – despite receiving unanimous approval in both houses. This bill would not have required complete openness, but it would have eliminated many of the arbitrary mechanisms that enable the CIA and other governmental agencies to suppress requests for information. Although the House Republican leadership failed to put the act on the legislative calendar, the Obama administration's Department of Justice also deserves opprobrium for surreptitiously opposing the act behind the scenes. The US government's disregard for establishing reasonable rules of transparency virtually guarantees that the CIA will continue to suppress its records, and thus public scrutiny of its unchecked activities, for a very long time to come.

Midterm Election in Kerala in 1960 and the American Government

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-220
Author(s):  
Ajayan T.
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
American Government ◽  
Main Attention ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Food Scarcity ◽  
Congress Party ◽  
The Us ◽  
1960 Election

After toppling the first Communist ministry in Kerala the main attention of the US agencies—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US Embassy in India—was to install a non-communist stable government in Kerala to meet the dangers of communism in Asia. The US agencies adopted two ways to realise these objectives. First of all, they extended all out support to the triple alliance composed of the Congress Party, Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the Muslim League against the Communist Party in 1960 election. The election campaign of the triple alliance was much funded by the CIA. However the triple alliance won the election, the Communist Party got more votes than in 1957 and it intensified the US agencies to beef up its anti-Communist operations in Kerala and outside. It led to the adoption of second method of anti-Communist activities that the US agencies began to give wide publicity in India and outside that the first Communist ministry in Kerala could not make any economic advancement in Kerala during their tenure nor could they redress the chronic problems of unemployment and food scarcity and if Communists were voted to power in other parts of Asia, they would follow the same trend and fall.

From Complicity to Impunity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard S. Rubenstein
Keyword(s):  
Health Professionals ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Us ◽  
Legal Opinions ◽  
Convention Against Torture ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Enhanced Interrogation ◽  
Detention Facilities

As the “enhanced interrogation” program of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at secret detention facilities developed, health professionals came to play a gradually increasing role in accommodating, facilitating, and finally, rationalizing torture. Ultimately, they contributed substantially to a redefinition that, although contrary to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, was adopted by the US Department of Justice and focused on whether interrogation methods were “safe,” by which was meant not resulting in death or permanent physical injury. This role evolved in stages: CIA health professionals accommodated the use of torture by their role in keeping it “safe”; participated directly in the infliction of torture; imposed purported “limitations” on enhanced methods consistent with the “safety” definition; and by 2005, provided the foundation for US Department of Justice legal opinions purporting to justify the use of methods of torture. In doing so, they rationalized their complicity in and culpability for torture.

No Blank Check

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Müller
Keyword(s):  
War On Terror ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Congressional Debates ◽  
Us Congress ◽  
The Us ◽  
Legislative Branch ◽  
Drone Warfare ◽  
Counterterrorism Policy

Much of the academic debate surrounding the War on Terror focuses on presidential power after 9/11. In this context, the role of the US Congress in directing the outcome of national security policies is often overlooked. This book illustrates how Congress played a key role in the War on Terror during Barack Obama’s presidency. Instead of arguing that Congress was a compliant bystander and incapable of making successful counterterrorism policy, the legislative branch did more than hand the president a blank check. In using an innovative data set on congressional debates and policymaking, the book shows that the interaction between congressional entrepreneurs and senior committee/party leaders determined the outcome of controversial policies, including drone warfare, Guantanamo and the NSA’s mass surveillance activities.

scholarly journals HMONG. THE SECRET ARMY

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (72) ◽  
pp. 356-364
Author(s):  
George BIZADEA
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency

This article aims to analyze the role of the Hmong population in the Indochina conflict. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered Laos a buffer state according to theDominion Theory and as such much more strategically important than Vietnam. To avoid the fall of Laos under communism and thus the spread of communism in the region, Eisenhower turned to the services of the C.I.A., because he could not intervene officially in Laos without violating the Geneva Convention.Keywords: Indochina; Laos; Vietnam; war; United States of America; Hmong, Central Intelligence Agency.

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