Vandenberg Vanished: US Congress and the Politicisation of Military Interventions

This article examines the extent and patterns of politicisation in the field of military interventions for the USA after the end of the Cold War. The analysis shows that key votes on war and peace in the US Congress are contested to a higher degree than in the European parliaments. It finds that Republican members of Congress (MoC) are in general more supportive of military interventions than Democrats. At the same time, party loyalty towards the president influences the level of support. Furthermore, an original content analysis of congressional debates reveals that MoC use specific argumentative frames in line with partisan ideology. Both parts of the analysis point to the relevance of partisanship and partisan ideology for understanding the politicisation of military interventions policies. Thus, the traditional bipartisan spirit, paradigmatically invoked by US Senator Arthur Vandenberg during the Cold War, has almost vanished.

When evidence does not matter: The barriers to learning from science in two cases of environmental policy change in Brazil

It is generally accepted in public policy debate that expert knowledge tends to contribute to more effective formulation and implementation of policy. Most of the literature, however, has tended to be exclusively focused on the science–policy interface, ignoring the necessary pre-conditions of the broader national and institutional context for the effective use of scientific evidence. This shortcoming becomes particularly pronounced in analysis of developing in less pluralist countries. This article analyses two cases of Brazilian environmental policy-making and discusses the institutional pre-conditions for learning from science. By textually coding instances of direct and indirect participation of scientists in congressional debates and assessing the extent of their influence in final decisions, this article shows that despite being largely consensual to the scientific community, clearly communicated, and relevant, scientific information had no influence on the policy-decisions taken in two highly-technical areas of environmental policy in Brazil: forestry and pesticides. This article engages with the literature on the necessary institutional structures for learning from science and provides support for the hypothesis that countries with lower levels of political openness, and medium-to-low consensus requirements for decision-making, will tend to have considerable barriers to effectively producing evidence-based policy-making.

When evidence does not matter: The barriers to learning from science in two cases of environmental policy change in Brazil

It is generally accepted in public policy debate that expert knowledge tends to contribute to more effective formulation and implementation of policy. Most of the literature, however, has tended to be exclusively focused on the science–policy interface, ignoring the necessary pre-conditions of the broader national and institutional context for the effective use of scientific evidence. This shortcoming becomes particularly pronounced in analysis of developing in less pluralist countries. This article analyses two cases of Brazilian environmental policy-making and discusses the institutional pre-conditions for learning from science. By textually coding instances of direct and indirect participation of scientists in congressional debates and assessing the extent of their influence in final decisions, this article shows that despite being largely consensual to the scientific community, clearly communicated, and relevant, scientific information had no influence on the policy-decisions taken in two highly-technical areas of environmental policy in Brazil: forestry and pesticides. This article engages with the literature on the necessary institutional structures for learning from science and provides support for the hypothesis that countries with lower levels of political openness, and medium-to-low consensus requirements for decision-making, will tend to have considerable barriers to effectively producing evidence-based policy-making.

When evidence does not matter: The barriers to learning from science in two cases of environmental policy change in Brazil

It is generally accepted in public policy debate that expert knowledge tends to contribute to more effective formulation and implementation of policy. Most of the literature, however, has tended to be exclusively focused on the science–policy interface, ignoring the necessary pre-conditions of the broader national and institutional context for the effective use of scientific evidence. This shortcoming becomes particularly pronounced in analysis of developing in less pluralist countries. This article analyses two cases of Brazilian environmental policy-making and discusses the institutional pre-conditions for learning from science. By textually coding instances of direct and indirect participation of scientists in congressional debates and assessing the extent of their influence in final decisions, this article shows that despite being largely consensual to the scientific community, clearly communicated, and relevant, scientific information had no influence on the policy-decisions taken in two highly-technical areas of environmental policy in Brazil: forestry and pesticides. This article engages with the literature on the necessary institutional structures for learning from science and provides support for the hypothesis that countries with lower levels of political openness, and medium-to-low consensus requirements for decision-making, will tend to have considerable barriers to effectively producing evidence-based policy-making.

Compromise in an Age of Party Polarization

Congressional debates are increasingly defined by gridlock and stalemate, with partisan showdowns that lead to government shutdowns. Compromise in Congress seems hard to reach. But do politicians deserve all the blame? Legislators who resist concessions and stand firm to their convictions might be doing just what voters want them to do. If this is true, however, then citizens must shoulder some of the responsibility for gridlock in Congress. This book challenges this wisdom and argues that Americans value compromise as a way to resolve differences in times of partisan division. Using evidence from a variety of surveys and innovative experiments, the book demonstrates that citizens want more from politics than just ideological representation—they also care about the processes by which disagreements are settled. Americans believe that compromise is a virtuous way to resolve political disputes. Because people’s desire for compromise is deeply rooted in socialized support for democratic values, principled beliefs about compromise can serve as a check on partisan thinking. Across a range of settings, people’s support for compromise persists even when it comes at the cost of partisan goals and policy objectives. People give warmer evaluations to members of Congress who are willing to compromise and view compromise legislation as more legitimate. People care about not just outcomes, but also the way decisions are reached. Winning isn’t everything in politics. People also value the democratic principle of compromise.

When evidence does not matter: The barriers to learning from science in two cases of environmental policy change in Brazil

It is generally accepted in public policy debate that expert knowledge tends to contribute to more effective formulation and implementation of policy. Most of the literature, however, has tended to be exclusively focused on the science–policy interface, ignoring the necessary pre-conditions of the broader national and institutional context for the effective use of scientific evidence. This shortcoming becomes particularly pronounced in analysis of developing in less pluralist countries. This article analyses two cases of Brazilian environmental policy-making and discusses the institutional pre-conditions for learning from science. By textually coding instances of direct and indirect participation of scientists in congressional debates and assessing the extent of their influence in final decisions, this article shows that despite being largely consensual to the scientific community, clearly communicated, and relevant, scientific information had no influence on the policy-decisions taken in two highly-technical areas of environmental policy in Brazil: forestry and pesticides. This article engages with the literature on the necessary institutional structures for learning from science and provides support for the hypothesis that countries with lower levels of political openness, and medium-to-low consensus requirements for decision-making, will tend to have considerable barriers to effectively producing evidence-based policy-making.

Guns for the Government: Ordnance, the Military “Peacetime Establishment,” and Executive Governance in the Early Republic

During the 1810s and 1820, officials in the War Department engaged in military state building, which transcended partisanship and contributed to the development of executive autonomy. The process revealed the ability of the executive to shape national security, while also foreshadowing Progressive Era trends toward expertise-based bureaucratic autonomy. The activities of the Ordnance Department suggest that the connection between war and early American state building was forged in the efforts to bolster the armaments industry. Ordnance officers established autonomy partly through arms expertise, and they were not necessarily coalition builders like the late nineteenth-century Post Office and Department of Agriculture bureaucrats, especially because they generated more hostility. Thus, there were different routes by which autonomy was and is established, but in the first decades of the nineteenth century, this autonomy depended on national security and war preparations. This article uses War Department papers, armory records, and congressional debates to show how certain bureaucrats developed the ability to work against congressional limits to their functionality. Ordnance ultimately succeeded because its leaders executed a nonpartisan military agenda and demonstrated an ability to effectively manage the nation's security apparatus, especially in times of peace.

The Electoral College of 1803

The congressional debates in 1803 that led to the adoption of the redesigned Electoral College in the Twelfth Amendment were far more extensive than the debates on the Electoral College in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The 1803 debates were also deeply philosophical, rethinking the appropriate nature of republicanism and federalism in America after a dozen years of experience, including the development of intense two-party electoral competition. The debates unambiguously show that the Jeffersonians, who controlled both chambers of Congress with over two-thirds supermajorities, wanted the redesigned Electoral College to be premised on majority rule. The version of majority rule reflected in the redesigned Electoral College is a compound majority-of-majorities, the idea being that presidents would win a majority of Electoral College votes based on support from majorities within the states providing those electoral votes. Leading Jeffersonians participating in these debates included Senator John Taylor of Virginia.

No Blank Check

Much of the academic debate surrounding the War on Terror focuses on presidential power after 9/11. In this context, the role of the US Congress in directing the outcome of national security policies is often overlooked. This book illustrates how Congress played a key role in the War on Terror during Barack Obama’s presidency. Instead of arguing that Congress was a compliant bystander and incapable of making successful counterterrorism policy, the legislative branch did more than hand the president a blank check. In using an innovative data set on congressional debates and policymaking, the book shows that the interaction between congressional entrepreneurs and senior committee/party leaders determined the outcome of controversial policies, including drone warfare, Guantanamo and the NSA’s mass surveillance activities.

Contraception Coverage Policy in Congress

Chapter 4 traces the trajectory of competing policy frames in congressional debates over the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Although the ACA was not the first attempt to ensure contraceptive coverage, it was easily the most visible, sweeping, and significant. Utilizing content analysis and in-depth interviews with policymakers, this chapter shows that the debate over contraceptive regulation in the ACA shifted course over time—from being predominantly about health care at the start to being predominantly about religious freedom after the law’s passage. Additionally, the analyses presented in this chapter suggest that a policymaker’s gender was far more important than their partisanship in shaping how they chose to frame issues related to contraception under the ACA. Taken together, these findings reveal the dramatic extent to which rhetoric about the ACA’s contraception requirements was dynamic (rather than static) and shaped by gender.