Criminal Accountability of Military Peacekeepers

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 287-296
Author(s):  
Rembert Boom

Several un Member States that have contributed military members to un peacekeeping operations have failed to hold them accountable for alleged criminal misconduct. The Secretary-General has proposed to secure criminal accountability through naming and shaming troop contributing Countries. Though already a compromise, uncertainty remains as to whether the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, composed of all the troop contributing Countries, will approve of this policy.

Author(s):  
Herman T. Salton

This chapter assesses the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the Rwanda genocide. It situates DPA within the Secretariat of the early 1990s, explains the importance given to it by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and analyses the department’s reaction to the crisis. The DPA’s role in monitoring the Arusha Peace Agreements and in providing the ‘political’ analysis of the Rwandan context is also reviewed, as is Boutros-Ghali’s desire for a powerful ‘political’ department to be juxtaposed to member states’ preference for peacekeeping and DPKO. The chapter also considers the leadership change of March 1994 when, a month before the genocide, Marrack Goulding took over the whole of DPA.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-360

The primary difficulty in the current question of the representation of Member States in die United Nations is that this question of representation has been linked up with the question of recognition by Member Governments.It will be shown here that this linkage is unfortunate from the practical standpoint, and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 458-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingvild Bode ◽  
John Karlsrud

Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.


Author(s):  
Alison Giffen

Two years and five months following the country’s independence from Sudan, a political crisis in South Sudan quickly devolved into a civil war marked by violence that could amount to atrocities. At the time, a United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNMISS, was the principal multinational intervention in South Sudan. UNMISS was explicitly mandated to assist the government of South Sudan to fulfil its responsibility to protect and was also authorized to protect civilians when the government was unable or unwilling to do so. Despite this role, UNMISS’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that no one could have predicted the scale or speed at which the violence unfolded. This chapter explores whether the atrocities could have been predicted by UNMISS, why UNMISS was unprepared, and what other peacekeeping operations can learn from UNMISS’s experience.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-131 ◽  

Secretary-General U Thant in his Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1962—15 June 1963 commented that the year under review had been marked by a number of developments which on the whole may be said to have brightened the international outlook and strengthened the UN as a result. According to the Secretary-General, the Cuban crisis provided the UN with the opportunity to help avert what appeared to be impending disaster. Proposals which he had been encouraged to make by a large number of Member States not directly involved in the crisis had the immediate effect of tending to ease the situation. In addition, the UN provided an opportunity, both through the Security Council and the Secretariat, for dialogues among the interested parties. The turn of the year also marked a sudden change for the better in the Congo. As a result the terms of the UN mandate in the Congo as far as the military force was concerned had now largely been fulfilled. External military interference in the Congo had ceased, the territorial integrity of the country had been secured, and law and order had generally been restored and were being maintained, although the situation in one or two areas still was giving some cause for concern.


Author(s):  
Ronny Patz ◽  
Klaus H. Goetz

Chapter 10 is an outlook to the ongoing reform of United Nations budgeting introduced by the new Secretary General António Guterres, in light of the theoretical and conceptual discussions as well as the empirical findings presented throughout the book. It shows how the theoretical dynamics and main topics identified throughout this book, and in particular in Chapter 5, affect reform discussions and reform dynamics. Whereas some reform is taking place, principal and agency complexity prevent a major overhaul of the system as the fragmentation of the UN system is hard to overcome, and because key member states or groups of member states are bound to lose influence, even if only over a few elements of micromanagement that have become part of the pathological budgeting dynamics in New York—a pathology that is much less driven by IO bureaucracy and much more by states and their complex, historically shaped interests.


Author(s):  
Kseniya Oksamytna ◽  
Vincenzo Bove ◽  
Magnus Lundgren

Abstract States covet leadership and staff positions in international organizations. The posts of civilian leaders and force commanders of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are attractive to member states. In selecting peacekeeping leaders, the UN Secretariat balances three considerations: satisfying powerful member states by appointing their nationals; recognizing member states’ contribution to the work of the organization; and ensuring that leaders have the necessary skill set. We investigate appointments of more than 200 civilian and military leaders in 24 UN missions, 1990–2017. We find that contributing troops to a specific mission increases the chances of securing a peacekeeping leadership position. Geographic proximity between the leaders’ country and the conflict country is also a favorable factor whose importance has increased over time. Civilian leaders of UN peacekeeping operations tend to hail from institutionally powerful countries, while military commanders come from major, long-standing troop contributing countries. Despite some role that skills play in the appointment process, the UN's dependence on troop contributors, together with its reliance on institutionally powerful states, can be a source of dysfunction if it prevents the organization from selecting effective peacekeeping leaders. This dynamic affects other international organizations that have significant power disparities among members or rely on voluntary contributions.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-361

During the period under review the activities of the Arab League and of its member states were concentrated on the Palestine dispute. Conversations were held in Cairo on February 14, 1949 between the Palestine Conciliation Commission and Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the League who later conferred with the Prime Minister of Egypt.


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