Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: security and human rights

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (06) ◽  
pp. 49-3507-49-3507
Author(s):  
Richard Caplan

States – Western ones, at least – have given increased weight to human rights and humanitarian norms as matters of international concern, with the authorization of legally binding enforcement measures to tackle humanitarian crises under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These concerns were also developed outside the UN Security Council framework, following Tony Blair’s Chicago speech and the contemporaneous NATO action over Kosovo. This gave rise to international commissions and resulted, among other things, in the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. The adoption of this doctrine coincided with a period in which there appeared to be a general decline in mass atrocities. Yet R2P had little real effect – it cannot be shown to have caused the fall in mass atrocities, only to have echoed it. Thus, the promise of R2P and an age of humanitarianism failed to emerge, even if the way was paved for future development.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin

AbstractThis essay investigates the connection between humanitarian intervention and R2P within an historical, legal, and conceptual context. It challenges the widely held view that Africa lacks the capacity to intervene in areas of conflict and human rights violations, arguing instead that the continent possesses the will and instruments to protect human rights. The author notes that, while the UN Security Council retains the primary responsibility for promoting global peace and security, the R2P norm remains contested even within the UN. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were initially undertaken without UN approval, but were later sanctioned by the world body. These interventions undermined the idea of state sovereignty as independence from external interventions, which had previously constrained humanitarian missions in Africa. However, the essay argues that the R2P principle was boosted by the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 to prosecute persons suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide. In addition, the intervention clause in the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000 supports the R2P principle while prohibiting unilateral interventions. Notwithstanding these developments, the author notes that the AU and Africa's regional bodies still have a long way to go in translating the R2P doctrine into practice.


2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin

AbstractThis article examines the basis for humanitarian intervention (HI) in the United Nations Charter, the African Union (AU) Charter and in a number of African sub-regional institutions. It traces the historical development of HI and argues that, while the right to HI emerged more than 100 years ago, that right also emerges from the Genocide Convention. The article argues that this treaty connects HI to the developing norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and examines the extent to which R2P is garnering wider support around the world. It focuses on the UN, and the various AU and sub-regional institutions and instruments that sanction HI. It assesses whether intervention can be authorized even in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate and examines the principles, application and interrelationship of R2P and HI in the African context. It traces the use of these norms in Africa, including in the various sub-regional structures, and evaluates the AU's political will and capability to deal with conflict and human rights abuse.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 342-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Glanville

It is increasingly well understood that concepts of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ enjoy a long and rich history. Nevertheless, it is surprising how plainly the arguments offered by states seeking to justify intervention in Libya in 2011 echo those used by theologians, jurists, and philosophers to justify intervention in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Those advocating intervention in Libya drew not just on the language of ‘human rights,’ that emerged relatively recently, but on a wider and much older range of idioms and ideas to make their case. In this article, I identify three key arguments that were employed by states in support of the intervention and I demonstrate their parallels with three principal arguments that have been advanced to justify intervention in response to tyranny since the sixteenth century. The three arguments are: the need to protect ‘innocents’; the need to hold ‘tyrants’ to account; and the need to defend the will of a sovereign people. After exploring each argument, I conclude by noting that the claim often heard today, that intervention is under certain circumstances a responsibility rather than merely a right, also has deep roots in early modern thought.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle

AbstractThis Article explores three theories of humanitarian intervention that appear in, or are inspired by, the writings of Hugo Grotius. One theory asserts that natural law authorizes all states to punish violations of the law of nations, irrespective of where or against whom the violations occur, to preserve the integrity of international law. A second theory, which also appears in Grotius’s writings, proposes that states may intervene as temporary legal guardians for peoples who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the hands of their own state. Each of these theories has fallen out of fashion today based on skepticism about their natural law underpinnings and concerns about how they have facilitated Western colonialism. As an alternative, this Article outlines a third theory that builds upon Grotius’s account of humanitarian intervention as a fiduciary relationship, while updating Grotius’s account for the twenty-first century. According to this new fiduciary theory, when states intervene to protect human rights abroad they exercise an oppressed people’s right of self-defense on their behalf and may use force solely for the people’s benefit. As fiduciaries, intervening states bear obligations to consult with and honor the preferences of the people they seek to protect, and they must respect international human rights governing the use of force within the affected state. By clarifying the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and individual states for humanitarian intervention, the fiduciary theory also lends greater coherency to the international community’s “responsibility to protect” human rights.


Author(s):  
Kurt Mills ◽  
Cian O’Driscoll

In contrast with humanitarian access or the provision of humanitarian assistance, humanitarian intervention is commonly defined as the threat or use of force by a state to prevent or end widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. In support of their cause, advocates of humanitarian intervention often draw upon and reference the authority of the notional “just war.” The four main ways by which humanitarian intervention has been connected to the idea of the just war relate to the ideals of self-determination, punishment, responsibility, and conditional sovereignty. For a humanitarian intervention to be considered legitimate, there must be a just cause for intervention; the use of force must be a last resort; it must meet the standard of proportionality; and there must be a good likelihood that the use of force will contribute to a positive humanitarian outcome. The historical practice of humanitarian intervention can be traced from the nineteenth century to the recognition of the Responsibility to Protect by the World Summit in 2005 and its application in Darfur. Major conceptual debates surrounding humanitarian intervention include the problematic relation between sovereignty and human rights, the legal status of intervention, the issue of multilateralism versus unilateralism, and the quest for criteria for intervention.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (56) ◽  
pp. 193-209
Author(s):  
Jakub Kościółek

The article presents the evolution of the approach to humanitarian intervention that in the 21st century had been framed in the concept of Responsibility to Protect. The article focuses particularly on the possibility of adopting R2P rule in Africa, especially second and third pillar of this mechanism Various cases of conflict in Africa and other types of security threats are discussed herein; those which were actually implemented and situations where they were had to be foregone. This description serves the purpose of defining situations when the R2P mechanism is found useful in continental security measures as well as indicating the factors needed to implement it in practice, regardless of pure declarations from regional states and organizations.


2009 ◽  
Vol 61 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-35
Author(s):  
Isiaka Badmus

The author interrogates the critical question of whether forcible humanitarian intervention be legitimised in spite of clear contradiction to the classical norms of inter-state relations. Classical approach puts emphasize on the principle of sovereignty when governments become the perpetrators of human rights abuses of their citizens, or if states have collapsed into civil war, chaos, and disorder. The author examines this security debate by juxtaposing the age-old doctrine of humanitarian intervention vis-?-vis the imperatives of the concept of ' Responsibility to Protect'. The author argues that humanitarian intervention, due to the ambiguities and controversies surrounding its application, has become an anachronism, which ultimately led to the conceptualisation of Responsibility to Protect vulnerable populations. This approach is based on its concerns with human security as against that of the state and its relevance as arbiter to the longstanding discord between sovereignty and intervention.


2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan J. Kuperman

NATO's 2011 humanitarian military intervention in Libya has been hailed as a model for implementing the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P), on grounds that it prevented an impending bloodbath in Benghazi and facilitated the ouster of Libya's oppressive ruler, Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had targeted peaceful civilian protesters. Before the international community embraces such conclusions, however, a more rigorous assessment of the net humanitarian impact of NATO intervention in Libya is warranted. The conventional narrative is flawed in its portrayal of both the nature of the violence in Libya prior to the intervention and NATO's eventual objective of regime change. An examination of the course of violence in Libya before and after NATO's action shows that the intervention backfired. The intervention extended the war's duration about sixfold; increased its death toll approximately seven to ten times; and exacerbated human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If it is a “model intervention,” as senior NATO officials claim, it is a model of failure. Implementation of R2P must be reformed to address these unintended negative consequences and the dynamics underlying them. Only then will R2P be able to achieve its noble objectives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Irawati Handayani

AbstractHuman rights issues have become a common topic that continuously being discussed around the world. The major concern of international community on the protection of basic human rights leads to a challenge for the nation state to fulfill its commitment to protect the basic rights of their people from the possibility of harm that comes from internally or externally. Meanwhile, the principle of mutual understanding and respect among states and non-interference to domestic affairs of particular state has been generally recognized as the main principle in international law. Sometimes, a conflict that occurred inside a state, which is theoretically becomes a domestic issue, could be escalated and become a mutual concern of international society. When a human right violation occurred inside a state, ideally international community can not only ‘sit and watch’. Especially when the violations are classified as grave breaches of human rights. The world community has a moral obligation to offer an assistance and search a solution to end that violations.It is cleary noted that Article 2 (4) and Article 2 (7) United Nations (UN) Charter should not be regarded as an absolute prohibition of interference. Those articles are the limitation so that the intervention should not endangered territorial integrity, political independence and not contrary to the purposes of UN. However, the territorial integrity would be broken if the state lose their territory permanently, and in the context of humanitarian intervention there is no taking over a territory, since the main purpose is only to restore the condition as a result of human rights violation that occurred. Based on this assumption so intervention not contrary to UN Charter. One thing should be emphasized is that the requirements for intervention have to be very clear.Following an unsettled debate on criterion of humanitarian intervention, a few years ago there were a new concept which is believed as an improvement or a ‘new face’ from humanitarian intervention. It called the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. Generally, both of these concepts have similarity, especially with the main purpose on guarantee basic human rights and provide such protection when the authorized government is unable and unwilling to do so. However, the RtoP doctrine can not also avoid its controversy. The main discussion on this doctrine particularly questioning the legal status of this doctrine in international law and whether RtoP is only a new form of humanitarian intervention.Keywords: humanitarian internvention, responsibility to Protect (R2P), duty to protect, non intervention, customary international law.AbstrakIsu mengenai HAM telah menjadi topik umum yang terus menerus didiskusikan diseluruh dunia. Perhatian utama dari komunitas internasional dalam hal perlindungan mendasar HAM selanjutnya menantang negara-negara untuk melakukan pemenuhan komitmen mereka agar melakukan perlindungan hak-hak mendasar dan tindakan yang dapat mengancam baik secara internal maupun secara eksternal. Sementara itu prinsip salaing pengertian dan penghargaan antar negara, prinsip non-intervensi dalam hubungan domestik telah diakui sebagai prinsip utama dalam hukum internasional. Kadang, konflik yang lahir di dalam negeri, yang secara teori adalah konflik domestik, dapat menjadi perhatian bersama masyarakat internasional. Pada saat terjadi pelanggaran HAM didalam suatu negara, seharusnya komunitas internasional tidak hanya ‘duduk dan melihat’. Khususnya pada saat terjadi pelanggaran yang dikategorikan sebagai pelanggaran berat terhadap HAM. Komunitas negara mempunyai kewajiban moral untuk menawarkan bantuan dan mencari solusi untuk mengakhiri pelanggaran tersebut.Seperti yang dijelaskan dalam Pasal 2 (4) dan Pasal 2 (7) Piagam PBB, pasal-pasal ini tidak dapat diangap sebagai larangan absolut interfensi. Pasal-pasal tersebut adalah pembatasan sehingga intervensi tidak membahayakan inegritas wilayah, indpendensi politik dan tidak bertentangan dengan tuujuan PBB. Meskipun demikian, integritas wilayah dapat hilang apabila negara kehilangan wilayahnya secara permanen, dan dalam konteks intervensi kemanusiaan tidak ada pengambil alihan wilayah, karena tujuan utamanya hanya untuk mengembalikan kedaaan pada saat terjadinya pelanggaran HAM. Berdasarkan asumsi tersebut, maka intervensi tidak bertentangan dengan Piagam PBB. Hal lain yang harus diperjelas bahwa alasan intervensi haruslah jelas.Mengikuti perdebatan yang tidak kunjung sellesai tentang kriteria intervensi kemanusiaan, beberapa tahun yang lalu dibuatlah suatu konsep yang dianggap sebagai wajah baru dari intervensi kemanusiaan. Secara umum, kedua konsep ini mempunyai kesamaan, terutama dengan tujuan utama dalam menjamin HAM dan menyediakan sejumlah perlindungan pada saat pemerintah yang berwenang tidak mampu dan tidak dapat memberikan jaminan HAM. Meskipun demikian, Doktin RtoP tidak dapat terhindar dari kontroversi. Diskusi utama dari doktrin ini adalah pertanyaan tentang status hukum dari doktrin hukum internasional dan apakah RtoP merupakan bentuk lain dari intervensi kemanusiaaan. Kata kunci: intervensi kemanusiaan, tanggung jawab untuk melindungi (R2P), kewajiban perlindungan, non intervensi ̧ hukum kebiasaan internasional.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document