The Dangerous Liaisons of the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 424-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Tardy

The parallel conceptual development and shared normative basis of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and civilian protection in peacekeeping operations have led to a rapprochement between the two emerging norms. In 2009, in his efforts to operationalize RtoP, the UN Secretary-General explicitly called for the mainstreaming of the goals relating to RtoP in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This article argues that the interdependence between RtoP and protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations should not be interpreted as being necessarily conducive to their parallel promotion or mutual strengthening. On the contrary, issue-linkage between them is likely to be counterproductive for three sets of reasons. First, RtoP is characterized by its exceptional nature and narrow agenda – in relation to the four threshold crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing – while the civilian protection in peacekeeping agenda is broad-ranging. Second, there are differences in the degrees of coercion that the two concepts can produce that make them sufficiently distinct not to be amalgamated in the conflict management toolbox. Third, the contentious nature of the two concepts, and in particular the coercive dimension of pillar three of RtoP, is such that a two obvious issue-linkage would be counterproductive as it would exacerbate the norm localisation challenge of two already resisted emerging norms.

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 201-221
Author(s):  
Thierry Tardy

The issue of civilian protection by international actors has gone through significant evolutions over the last decade, with a particular resonance in the African context. First, civilian protection by peacekeepers has become increasingly mainstreamed both in policy documents and in African peacekeeping operations’ mandates. In parallel, civilian protection lies at the core of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) adopted by the 2005 UN World Summit. This parallel conceptual development has led to a rapprochement between the two emerging norms. Issue-linkage between RtoP and civilian protection in peacekeeping operations has been observed in the broad policy development, while peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Côte d’Ivoire in particular have provided examples of such a rapprochement. Drawing on developments on the African continent, this article argues that issue-linkage between RtoP and civilian protection in peacekeeping is counterproductive. First, RtoP is characterized by its exceptional nature and narrow agenda – in relation to the four threshold crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing – while the civilian protection in peacekeeping agenda is broad-ranging. Second, the two concepts imply different degrees of use of force that should justify a conceptual caesura. Third, both RtoP and civilian protection in peacekeeping are emerging norms that are resisted because of a suspicion of norm-makers’ political agendas. The contentious nature of the two concepts, in particular the coercive dimension of RtoP, is such that issue-linkage is likely to exacerbate norms’ resistance rather than provide a mutually reinforcing environment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-74
Author(s):  
Nicholas Idris Erameh ◽  
Victor Ojakorotu

Existing studies on the Myanmar-Rohingyan crisis have explored the contending issues from a narrow perspective. This underscores the need for broader engagement by interrogating the veracity of the claims of mass atrocities against the Rohingyans, nonauthorization of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), and implications for consolidating and internalizing the RtoP norm. This study argues that, while the acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingyans satisfies four of the crimes upon which RtoP can be authorized, its nonauthorization suggests that in spite of its commitment to “Never Again,” the international community is yet to come to terms with issues bordering on mass atrocity and civilian protection. This inaction amidst widespread atrocities against the Rohingyans explains why the RtoP is not only contested, but also risks the chances of further nonutilization and institutionalization. Thus, the possibility that the RtoP would remain valuable depends on how the international criminal court and the global community prosecute those culpable of atrocities against the Rohingyans, adopt a clear rule of establishing when mass atrocity has been perpetuated and demand RtoP intervention, and ensure that these interventions are guided by the principle of Jus in Bellum and Jus ad Bello.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 312-331
Author(s):  
Daniel Jacob

The ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP) expresses the moral imperative to respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. So far, the debate on RtoP has focused almost exclusively on conflict resolution through institutional change. Various forms of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and military intervention have been discussed as means to address the institutional roots of violent conflict. What has too often been neglected, however, is the need for more immediate forms of civilian protection. This need emerges from the complexity and uncertainty of conflict resolution: successful conflict resolution takes time, and it is unfortunately rare. Therefore, it is necessary to complement efforts at conflict resolution with more immediate forms of protecting civilians. Traditionally, the right to asylum and humanitarian aid have been the two primary means to provide such protection. In the case of most intra-state conflicts, however, these means are insufficient. When a state engages in genocide, pursues campaigns of ethnic cleansing, or commits war crimes against its own population, it likely has no intention to let people seek the safety of asylum in other countries, or to allow for humanitarian aid. In response to such situations, the community of states has a moral obligation to establish safe areas and provide them with the legal mandate and military resources necessary to offer reliable protection.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Hubert ◽  
Ariela Blätter

In 2005 the UN’s World Summit endorsed the idea that its members have a responsibility to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Insufficient attention has been paid to clarifying how the definitions and evolving jurisprudence relating to these international crimes can provide clarity in identifying the unlawful acts that the Responsibility to Protect seeks to prevent and to halt. Specifically, an analysis of the elements of the crimes establishes the following parameters: attacks directed against any civilian population, committed in a widespread or systematic manner, in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, irrespective of the existence of discriminatory intent or an armed conflict. This conclusion makes reference to four ‘crimes’ redundant: crime against humanity alone provides an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Although analysts focused on international crimes tend to prioritize accountability, such an approach need not be reactive. The essence of the Responsibility to Protect is best characterized as international crimes prevention.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekkehard Strauss

This publication attempts to assist the ongoing discussion on the operationalization of the responsibility to protect by the United Nations. After summarizing the negotiation process towards the agreement in the Summit Outcome Document, the practice of the application of the responsibility to protect by United Nations organs and other bodies since September 2005 is presented, before providing elements for a comprehensive review of existing United Nations capacities to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Finally, the publication proposes elements for an immediate strategy of the Secretary-General and the United Nations departments, funds and agencies to facilitate the application of the responsibility to protect in practice in the immediate future.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 44-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara De Franco ◽  
Annemarie Peen Rodt

Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a “European practice of mass atrocity prevention” is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity—paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union’s approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.


Author(s):  
Taylor Seybolt

This chapter argues that the use of force can prevent or end the atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The historical record, however, shows both successes and failures, and points to certain factors—especially a coherent strategy—that improve the prospect of protecting civilians who are in imminent danger. There is broad diplomatic support among governments for military intervention in the context of the responsibility to protect (R2P) but that support has not resulted in a groundswell of interventions. In light of the risk and difficulty of military intervention, selective use of force is preferable to engaging in military intervention early and often. Caution ought to remain a guiding principle, balanced against the knowledge that R2P without the use of force is meaningless in the situations where it is needed the most.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 273-278
Author(s):  
Colette Rausch

The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” obliges all states to protect populations from “atrocity crimes”—namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—under three “pillars” of protection. Pillar One requires a state to protect its own population from atrocity crimes. Pillar Two obliges the international community to help states to exercise this responsibility through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means. When both of these approaches fail, states must pursue a “Pillar Three” strategy: the UN Security Council must “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner.”


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