“China’s Military Assistance to North Vietnam Revisited”

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 226-256
Author(s):  
Chengzhi Yin

North Vietnam announced its intention to unify its country with armed struggle in 1959. Thereafter, Hanoi consistently requested military assistance from the People’s Republic of China (prc). However, Beijing did not grant Hanoi’s request until 1962. Why did the prc agree to provide military assistance to North Vietnam? This article argues that China did so because the United States greatly increased its military presence in South Vietnam in late 1961 and 1962. Therefore, Beijing provided military assistance to Hanoi to secure China’s southern border. Employing primary sources, this study traces changes in Beijing’s attitude toward its Vietnam policy from 1958 to 1962. It shows that when U.S. military presence was limited, Beijing paid more attention to the avoidance of war with the United States and maintaining a hospitable environment in neighboring Indochina. However, when the prc perceived the U.S. presence as a threat to its security, the objective of seeking security overwhelmed other objectives.

Author(s):  
Andrew J. Gawthorpe

From 1965 to 1973, the United States attempted to prevent the absorption of the non-Communist state of South Vietnam by Communist North Vietnam as part of its Cold War strategy of containment. In doing so, the United States had to battle both the North Vietnamese military and guerrillas indigenous to South Vietnam. The Johnson administration entered the war without a well-thought-out strategy for victory, and the United States quickly became bogged down in a bloody stalemate. A major Communist assault in 1968 known as the Tet Offensive convinced US leaders of the need to seek a negotiated solution. This task fell to the Nixon administration, which carried on peace talks while simultaneously seeking ways to escalate the conflict and force North Vietnam to make concessions. Eventually it was Washington that made major concessions, allowing North Vietnam to keep its forces in the South and leaving South Vietnam in an untenable position. US troops left in 1973 and Hanoi successfully invaded the South in 1975. The two Vietnams were formally unified in 1976. The war devastated much of Vietnam and came at a huge cost to the United States in terms of lives, resources, and political division at home. It gave birth to the largest mass movement against a war in US history, motivated by opposition both to conscription and to the damage that protesters perceived the war was doing to the United States. It also raised persistent questions about the wisdom of both military intervention and nation-building as tools of US foreign policy. The war has remained a touchstone for national debate and partisan division even as the United States and Vietnam moved to normalize diplomatic relations with the end of the Cold War.


1988 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-46
Author(s):  
Charles F. Howlett

For almost two decades prior to 1927 Nicaragua had been governed by Washington “more completely than the American Federal Government rules any state in the Union.” Such governance was justified by the State Department which raised the specter of the Monroe Doctrine not only to bolster America's economic ambitions in the region but also to protect the nation's national security — a fact which took on added importance due to the recent construction of the Panama Canal. From 1912 to 1925, a Legation Guard of United States Marines reminded the country of the overwhelming American dominance. For only a brief period did America's military presence abate. In 1926, however, a civil war broke out that threatened to destroy the political and economic stability the United States had come to rely on. American military assistance was requested and quickly rendered. What events led to U.S. military action in this Central American country?


Author(s):  
Richard A. Moss

Nixon considered canceling the Moscow summit even as Kissinger finalized plans to go on a secret trip to the Soviet Union in April 1972 to discuss Vietnam and the summit planning. Nixon was concerned with the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam, and he worried that the Soviets would cancel the summit in solidarity with their ally Hanoi after the United States responded with force against North Vietnam. However, the Nixon White House laid the groundwork to encourage the Soviets to consider détente separately from Vietnam, conveying a tacit modus vivendi via the confidential channel with Dobrynin. While Nixon pondered the possibility of canceling the summit, the administration also used back channels to read Soviet intentions. Ultimately, Treasury Secretary John Connally convinced Nixon to leave the onus of any cancellation or postponement of the summit to the Soviets. Domestic opinion polls buttressed the president’s decision since the American public did not see the Moscow summit as interrelated to the situation in Vietnam. In the Kremlin, Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Kosygin blocked hard-liners’ attempts and consolidated control in favor of the summit while rhetorically condemning the American bombing-mining campaign against North Vietnam. The summit thus became the successful product of U.S.-Soviet back-channel diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines how Sino-Soviet tensions served the United States' regional and global interests and facilitated rapprochement between Washington and Beijing during the period 1964–1972. The competition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for the loyalties of the Vietnamese communists would begin in earnest following U.S. escalation in the Vietnam War from late 1964 to early 1965. Ho Chi Minh was able to exploit Chinese and Soviet jealousies of one another to gain maximum support for his revolutionary goals in South Vietnam. From 1965 until early 1968 the rivalry between Beijing and Moscow also served to scuttle multiple Soviet-inspired proposals for peace talks between the Vietnamese communists and the United States. The chapter shows how the intensifying disillusionment and competition between the Soviets and the Chinese rendered the containment of communism through coercive diplomacy more difficult for the United States, particularly in Indochina.


Author(s):  
David Luhrssen

Vietnam was the focal point of a larger set of conflicts that broke out in Indo-China in 1945 and resulted by 1975 with Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam falling under the rule of various Communist parties. The first Vietnam War (1945–1954) pitted French colonists and their local allies against Vietnamese Communist rebels. It ended with the French withdrawal from Indo-China and the partition of Vietnam into two states, Communist North Vietnam and pro-Western South Vietnam. In the second Vietnam War (1955–1975), North Vietnam and Communist rebels in the south fought against the US-backed South Vietnamese regime. No conflict in American history since the Civil War was as divisive as Vietnam, yet the war was widely supported until US ground forces entered the fray (1965). Mounting casualties and the threat of conscription fueled a growing antiwar movement that forced Washington to find a way out of the war. After the United States withdrew in 1973, Communist forces overran South Vietnam and reunited the country under their rule in 1975. Films about the Vietnam War were produced in both North and South Vietnam, the Soviet Union (which armed the North) and South Korea and Australia (both dispatched troops to support the South). With few exceptions, many were seldom seen outside their lands of origin. With Hollywood’s dominance of movie markets in much of the world, American stories about the war dominated the imagination of moviegoers in the United States and most other countries. Hollywood took only slight interest in Vietnam during the war’s early years. The first major motion picture about American combat in Vietnam, John’s Wayne’s pro-war The Green Berets (1968), was a box-office hit but universally derided by critics. With the war’s increasing unpopularity and unsuccessful conclusion, the subject was deemed “box-office poison” by the studios for several years. By the late 1970s a rising generation of filmmakers embraced Vietnam as material for displaying American heroism, explaining the US defeat or exploring the ethical basis for war. The commercial breakthrough for Vietnam War movies was achieved by director Sidney Furie’s The Boys in Company C (1978), Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter (1978), and Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979). Each reflected in different ways America’s disillusionment and the physical and psychological toll charged to the men who served in the conflict. The theme continued with Platoon (1986), directed by a Vietnam combat veteran, Oliver Stone. A counter-trend appeared with Sylvester Stallone’s Rambo series (1982–2019), which amplified the resurgent nationalism that began under the Reagan administration. Providing a third perspective, Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987) presented the war unemotionally as a fact of history. In the 21st century, movies on the Vietnam War continue to be made, if in diminished number. Characteristic of recent films, We Were Soldiers (2002) validates the experience of US servicemen while honoring the heroism of the enemy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao Wang

Based on declassified documents from the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, and the former Soviet Union, this essay examines China's policy toward the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina in relation to the United States. The article shows that Chinese leaders wanted to neutralize Indochina in order to forestall U.S. military intervention in the conflict, which, if it occurred, would directly threaten the PRC's southern flank. In pursuit of this objective, Chinese officials sought to exploit differences between the United States and its two main allies, Britain and France, and thereby induce U.S. policymakers to agree to end the first Indochina War between France and Vietnam. Because Chinese leaders worried that the United States might respond by trying to foment splits within the Communist camp, they worked to build a united front with the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, both of which shared Beijing's anxiety about U.S. intervention, and to convince the Viet Minh guerrilla leaders to make necessary concessions for a negotiated settlement at Geneva.


1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-31
Author(s):  
Will C. Van Den Hoonaard

This paper addresses the need for a Bahá’í encyclopedia and describes the nature, organization, and editing of the multi-volume Bahá’í encyclopedic dictionary project endorsed in 1984 by the United States Bahá’í community. The encyclopedia will serve both Bahá’í and non-Bahá’í researchers arid scholars, the general reader; and university and public libraries. This paper considers the significance of the encyclopedia in terms of other Bahá’í encyclopedic works and in terms of the current stage in the development of the Bahá’í community. However desirable such a project may be, a number of dilemmas accompany its undertaking. These dilemmas relate to the present status of Bahá’í scholarship, the embryonic nature of primary sources, the high standard of scholarship exemplified by the works of Shoghi Effendi, and the relative newness of the Bahá’í religion. The prospects of the encyclopedic undertaking are expected to generate considerable scholarship and to provide intellectual vigor to issues raised by Bahá’ís and their critics.


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