Vietnam War in Hollywood Feature Films

Author(s):  
David Luhrssen

Vietnam was the focal point of a larger set of conflicts that broke out in Indo-China in 1945 and resulted by 1975 with Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam falling under the rule of various Communist parties. The first Vietnam War (1945–1954) pitted French colonists and their local allies against Vietnamese Communist rebels. It ended with the French withdrawal from Indo-China and the partition of Vietnam into two states, Communist North Vietnam and pro-Western South Vietnam. In the second Vietnam War (1955–1975), North Vietnam and Communist rebels in the south fought against the US-backed South Vietnamese regime. No conflict in American history since the Civil War was as divisive as Vietnam, yet the war was widely supported until US ground forces entered the fray (1965). Mounting casualties and the threat of conscription fueled a growing antiwar movement that forced Washington to find a way out of the war. After the United States withdrew in 1973, Communist forces overran South Vietnam and reunited the country under their rule in 1975. Films about the Vietnam War were produced in both North and South Vietnam, the Soviet Union (which armed the North) and South Korea and Australia (both dispatched troops to support the South). With few exceptions, many were seldom seen outside their lands of origin. With Hollywood’s dominance of movie markets in much of the world, American stories about the war dominated the imagination of moviegoers in the United States and most other countries. Hollywood took only slight interest in Vietnam during the war’s early years. The first major motion picture about American combat in Vietnam, John’s Wayne’s pro-war The Green Berets (1968), was a box-office hit but universally derided by critics. With the war’s increasing unpopularity and unsuccessful conclusion, the subject was deemed “box-office poison” by the studios for several years. By the late 1970s a rising generation of filmmakers embraced Vietnam as material for displaying American heroism, explaining the US defeat or exploring the ethical basis for war. The commercial breakthrough for Vietnam War movies was achieved by director Sidney Furie’s The Boys in Company C (1978), Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter (1978), and Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979). Each reflected in different ways America’s disillusionment and the physical and psychological toll charged to the men who served in the conflict. The theme continued with Platoon (1986), directed by a Vietnam combat veteran, Oliver Stone. A counter-trend appeared with Sylvester Stallone’s Rambo series (1982–2019), which amplified the resurgent nationalism that began under the Reagan administration. Providing a third perspective, Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987) presented the war unemotionally as a fact of history. In the 21st century, movies on the Vietnam War continue to be made, if in diminished number. Characteristic of recent films, We Were Soldiers (2002) validates the experience of US servicemen while honoring the heroism of the enemy.


Author(s):  
Robert Pietrygała ◽  
Zdzisław Cutter

The article focuses on the period of the Vietnam War, with particular emphasis on the role played by engineering troops (as a necessary component of individual tactical associations, and a guarantee of success of military operations conducted by the US army). The paper presents the engineering troops’ efforts to build military infrastructure, as well as the assistance provided to the South Vietnamese society. The article contains a list of all engineering units of the American army involved in the Vietnamese conflict, their organizational structure, personnel status, dislocation, as well as the scope of tasks assigned to them. In addition, it shows the cooperation between engineering units and civil contractors at the service of the army (especially in the period preceding the direct involvement of the United States in the war).



Author(s):  
Andrew J. Gawthorpe

From 1965 to 1973, the United States attempted to prevent the absorption of the non-Communist state of South Vietnam by Communist North Vietnam as part of its Cold War strategy of containment. In doing so, the United States had to battle both the North Vietnamese military and guerrillas indigenous to South Vietnam. The Johnson administration entered the war without a well-thought-out strategy for victory, and the United States quickly became bogged down in a bloody stalemate. A major Communist assault in 1968 known as the Tet Offensive convinced US leaders of the need to seek a negotiated solution. This task fell to the Nixon administration, which carried on peace talks while simultaneously seeking ways to escalate the conflict and force North Vietnam to make concessions. Eventually it was Washington that made major concessions, allowing North Vietnam to keep its forces in the South and leaving South Vietnam in an untenable position. US troops left in 1973 and Hanoi successfully invaded the South in 1975. The two Vietnams were formally unified in 1976. The war devastated much of Vietnam and came at a huge cost to the United States in terms of lives, resources, and political division at home. It gave birth to the largest mass movement against a war in US history, motivated by opposition both to conscription and to the damage that protesters perceived the war was doing to the United States. It also raised persistent questions about the wisdom of both military intervention and nation-building as tools of US foreign policy. The war has remained a touchstone for national debate and partisan division even as the United States and Vietnam moved to normalize diplomatic relations with the end of the Cold War.



2019 ◽  
pp. 154-177
Author(s):  
Xiaobing Li

Chapter 7 explains Mao’s Cold War theory, in which a clash between China and the United States would inevitably occur sooner or later. The Chinese military should thus have its priorities and preparations established prior to this inevitable conflict. After the Indochina Settlement was signed at Geneva in July 1954, China continued to provide weaponry, equipment, and military training to North Vietnam. This chapter points out that, in June 1965, China began to send its troops to the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1968, China sent twenty-three divisions to Vietnam, including ninety-five regiments, totaling some 320,000 troops. Beginning in 1968, China also sent 110,000 troops to Laos to provide air defense, construct and repair highways, and maintain transportation and communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Nevertheless, the Vietnam War seriously tested the limits of the Communist alliance. Rather than improving Sino-Soviet relations, aid to North Vietnam created a new competition as each superpower attempted to control Southeast Asian Communist movements.



2021 ◽  
pp. 113-150
Author(s):  
Ivo Maes

In 1951, Robert Triffin became a professor at Yale. By the end of the 1950s, Triffin became more and more worried about the international reserve position of the United States due to the country’s gold losses and the increase in dollar liabilities. In his view, the continued deterioration in the US net reserve position would undermine foreigners’ confidence in the dollar as a safe medium for reserve accumulation. So, the gold exchange standard was not sustainable, as argued in his famous dilemma. Triffin thus established his reputation as the Cassandra who predicted the end of Bretton Woods. However, he was an optimistic Cassandra. He sought a more international solution for the world liquidity problem, a true internationalization of the foreign exchange component of the world’s international reserves. This chapter also pays attention to life in Yale and Triffin’s reaction to the Vietnam War.



2020 ◽  
pp. 281-312
Author(s):  
Craig Jones

This concluding chapter places the US–Israel approach to targeting in international context and reflects on the limits, possibilities, and future of juridical warfare. It argues that while other NATO states employ military lawyers in targeting, notably in US-led military coalitions, they have generally taken a more restrictive interpretation of the laws of war than the United States or Israel. Juridification is an uneven process: not all states are equally invested in its language or practice. Drawing on the examples of Syria and Yemen, the chapter shows how juridification today (its presence and absence) is conditioned by the retreat of multilateralism. The chapter also reflects on controversies concerning lawfare and humanitarianism. In an era of ‘irresponsible politics’, it asks what the rehabilitation of war might mean for the revival of an antiwar politics (as opposed to single issue campaigns against drones or torture, for example) as was mobilized against the Vietnam War.



Author(s):  
Patit Paban Mishra

During the cold war period, the problem of Laos was exacerbated due to strategic location of Laos and national interest of external actors. The present paper would analyze various ramifications of the conflict in Laos. Beginning from First Indochina War (1946-1954), fate of Laos was linked very closely with that of Vietnam. With the escalation of conflict, a solution to problem of Laos was nowhere in sight. The Geneva Conference of 1954 did not solve the problem. The three major strands in Laos; Pathet Lao, neutralists and the rightists became a constant feature of Lao politics. Both the United States and North Vietnam came into conflict, as they were committed to help their respective allies in Laos, and regarded the other’s action in Laos as harmful to their interest in South Vietnam. An agreement on Laos became contingent upon ending the war in Vietnam. The net result of outside intervention was prolongation of conflict in Laos. A solution to Lao conflict was in sight after the Geneva accords of 1962. However, the gradual linkage of the country with the Vietnam War made the solution of dependent upon the outcome of conflict in Vietnam. Laos was going to be embroiled in the Vietnam War and there was no peace in sight unless a solution was there in Vietnam. Laos became a sideshow in Vietnam War.  



Author(s):  
Jessica M. Chapman

The origins of the Vietnam War can be traced to France’s colonization of Indochina in the late 1880s. The Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, emerged as the dominant anti-colonial movement by the end of World War II, though Viet Minh leaders encountered difficulties as they tried to consolidate their power on the eve of the First Indochina War against France. While that war was, initially, a war of decolonization, it became a central battleground of the Cold War by 1950. The lines of future conflict were drawn that year when the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union recognized and provided aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, followed almost immediately by Washington’s recognition of the State of Vietnam in Saigon. From that point on, American involvement in Vietnam was most often explained in terms of the Domino Theory, articulated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on the eve of the Geneva Conference of 1954. The Franco-Viet Minh ceasefire reached at Geneva divided Vietnam in two at the 17th parallel, with countrywide reunification elections slated for the summer of 1956. However, the United States and its client, Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to participate in talks preparatory to those elections, preferring instead to build South Vietnam as a non-communist bastion. While the Vietnamese communist party, known as the Vietnam Worker’s Party in Hanoi, initially hoped to reunify the country by peaceful means, it reached the conclusion by 1959 that violent revolution would be necessary to bring down the “American imperialists and their lackeys.” In 1960, the party formed the National Liberation Front for Vietnam and, following Diem’s assassination in 1963, passed a resolution to wage all-out war in the south in an effort to claim victory before the United States committed combat troops. After President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he responded to deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam by militarizing the American commitment, though he stopped short of introducing dedicated ground troops. After Diem and Kennedy were assassinated in quick succession in November 1963, Lyndon Baines Johnson took office determined to avoid defeat in Vietnam, but hoping to prevent the issue from interfering with his domestic political agenda. As the situation in South Vietnam became more dire, LBJ found himself unable to maintain the middle-of-the-road approach that Kennedy had pursued. Forced to choose between escalation and withdrawal, he chose the former in March 1965 by launching a sustained campaign of aerial bombardment, coupled with the introduction of the first officially designated U.S. combat forces to Vietnam.



2005 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER T. FISHER

The literature on U.S. participation in the Vietnam War has recently undergone a quiet revolution due to use of the concept of nation building. Since the early 1950s nation building has been the subtext, if not the excuse, for U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, but in the last ten years it has also become useful as a method of inquiry. This article contends that new insights regarding the signi�cance of ideologies and paradigms, particularly modernization theory, enabled the transformation. Understanding modernization theory as an ideology broke with the tradition among diplomatic historians that minimized the role of ideas in policy decisions. It also settled longstanding questions about the nature of paci�cation as either development or counterinsurgency: Counterinsurgency and development were simply different expressions of the same impulse for the United States and the South Vietnamese.



Author(s):  
Baturay Yurtbay

The Vietnam War killed and wounded many soldiers and civilians. US foreign policy began to shift after the War’s, end including discussions on the level of power to be used for future wars or conflicts. The United States experienced considerable anxiety over its failures in Vietnam, which was coined the Vietnam Syndrome by the media and various political sciences scholars. The Gulf War, the first serious use of US military power after the Vietnam War, began with discussions about the suitable use of force and how the Vietnam War Syndrome could be overcome. While the Vietnam War was a huge failure for the United States, it also paved the way for new discussions on US foreign policy dealing with appropriate use of force, including last resort uses and US vital interests. These discussions are considered as the corner stone for the US success in the Gulf War. This study will briefly explain the effects and consequences of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War as well as analyse US foreign policy discussions between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. While examining US foreign policy and the US intervention in the Gulf War, this research will mainly focus on the Shultz doctrine and the Weinberger doctrine. This study will show that the Vietnam War started many discussions on  the use of  force and its application in future wars that were part of the US Gulf War military strategy. Even though the United States experienced failure in the Vietnam War, the lessons taken helped to govern future conflicts and the most important clues were seen in the Gulf War.



1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 13-16
Author(s):  
R. Steven Daniels ◽  
Carolyn L. Clarke-Daniels

The study of the politics of the Vietnam War raises some interesting dilemmas for both teachers and students. Opinions differ about the importance of the war to the politics and history of the United States. Many books are available concerning the American involvement in the Vietnam war, but most accounts differ from book to book. The relevance of the Vietnam experience needs to be discussed in a broader perspective. Certainly, the Vietnam war was different than any war fought previously by the United States of America.Recently, a professor at a southern university defined war as having winners and losers (c.f. Emerson, 1976). She then asked her 150-student American government class to identify the winner of the Vietnam war. Because no one could provide an answer, her second question concerned the last time American troops were used in a foreign country. The answer the professor was expecting was the Christmas 1989 invasion of Panama. No one made the correct identification. The only student who hazarded a response suggested that the last use of troops was in Nicaragua! If students have difficulty remembering what happened a few months in the past, they are likely to conceive of the Vietnam war as ancient history. Yet, the war provides lessons that future decision makers need to learn.One dilemma for teachers is choice among subject matter. American policies are important, but other factors need examination as well. Should a combination of both American and Vietnamese politics (North and South) be considered? What about those who stayed home, protested, or went to Canada? The material can be overwhelming.



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