Taking Care Against the Computer

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Simon McKenzie ◽  
Eve Massingham
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Electromagnetic Spectrum ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Modern Life ◽  
Military Installations ◽  
Digital Infrastructure ◽  
The Status ◽  
Taking Care

Abstract The obligations of international humanitarian law are not limited to the attacker; the defender is also required to take steps to protect civilians from harm. The requirement to take precautions against the effects of attack requires the defender to minimize the risk that civilians and civilian objects will be harmed by enemy military operations. At its most basic, it obliges defenders to locate military installations away from civilians. Furthermore, where appropriate, the status of objects should be clearly marked. It is – somewhat counterintuitively – about making it easier for the attacker to select lawful targets by making visible the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. The increasing importance of digital infrastructure to modern life may make complying with these precautionary obligations more complicated. Maintaining separation between military and civilian networks is challenging as both operate using at least some of the same infrastructure, relying on the same cables, systems, and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the speed at which operations against digital infrastructure can occur increases the difficulty of complying with the obligation – particularly if such operations involve a degree of automation or the use of artificial intelligence (ai). This paper sets out the source and extent of the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations and considers how they might apply to digital infrastructure. As well as clarifying the extent of the obligation, it applies the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations to digital infrastructure, giving examples of where systems designers are taking these obligations into account, and other examples of where they must.

Business goes to war: private military/security companies and international humanitarian law

2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (863) ◽  
pp. 525-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Close Proximity ◽  
The Status ◽  
Military Security ◽  
The Law ◽  
Security Companies

AbstractRecent years have witnessed an increase in the number of private military and security companies (PMCs/PSCs) operating in situations of armed conflict, as well as a change in the nature of their activities, which are now increasingly close to the heart of military operations and which often put them in close proximity to persons protected by international humanitarian law. It is often asserted that there is a vacuum in the law when it comes to their operations. In situations of armed conflict, however, there is a body of law that regulates both the activities of the staff of PMCs/PSCs and the responsibilities of the states that hire them. Moreover, other states also have a role to play in promoting respect for international humanitarian law by such companies. This article examines the key legal issues raised by PMCs/PSCs operating in situations of armed conflict, including the status of the staff of these companies and their responsibilities under international humanitarian law; the responsibilities of the states that hire them; and those of the states in whose territory PMCs/PSCs are incorporated or operate.

scholarly journals Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák
Keyword(s):  
Customary Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Computer Data ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Military Objective ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Teleological Interpretation

This article presents the case for a progressive interpretation of the notion of military objectives in international humanitarian law (IHL), bringing computer data within the scope of this concept. The advent of cyber military operations has presented a dilemma as to the proper understanding of data in IHL. The emerging orthodoxy, represented by the 2013Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, advances the argument that the intangible nature of data renders it ineligible to be an object for the purposes of the rules on targeting in IHL. This article, on the contrary, argues that because of its susceptibility to alteration and destruction, the better view is that data is an object within the meaning of this term under IHL and thus it may qualify as a military objective. The article supports this conclusion by means of a textual, systematic and teleological interpretation of the definition of military objectives found in treaty and customary law. The upshot of the analysis presented here is that data that does not meet the criteria for qualification as a military objective must be considered a civilian object, with profound implications for the protection of civilian datasets in times of armed conflict.

Who Are Protected by the Fundamental Guarantees under International Humanitarian Law? Part 2: Breaking with the Control Requirement in Light of the icc Case Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-58
Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
General Control ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
The Status ◽  
Control Requirement ◽  
Specific Paper

Abstract International humanitarian law provides for fundamental guarantees, the content of which is similar irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict and which apply to individuals even if they do not fall into the categories of specifically protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. Those guarantees, all of which derive from the general requirement of human treatment, include prohibitions of specific conduct against persons, such as murder, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, or against property, such as pillaging. However, it is traditionally held that the entitlement to those guarantees depends upon two requirements: the ‘status requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons must not or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, and the ‘control requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons or properties must be under the control of a party to the armed conflict. This study argues in favour of breaking with these two requirements in light of the existing icc case law. That study is divided into two parts, with each part devoted to one requirement and made the object of a specific paper. The two papers follow the same structure. They start with general observations on the requirement concerned, examine the relevant icc case law and put forward several arguments in favour of an extensive approach to the personal scope of the fundamental guarantees. The first paper, which was published in the previous issue of this journal, dealt with the status requirement. It especially delved into the icc decisions in the Ntaganda case with respect to the issue of protection against intra-party violence. It advocated the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in such a context by rejecting the requirement of a legal status, on the basis of several arguments. Those arguments relied on ihl provisions protecting specific persons as well as on the potential for humanizing ihl on the matter and also on the approach making the status requirement relevant only when the fundamental guarantees apply in the conduct of hostilities. The second paper, which is published here, deals with the control requirement. It examines several icc cases in detail, including the Katanga and Ntaganda cases, in relation to the issue of the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in the conduct of hostilities. It is argued that the entitlement to those guarantees is not dependent upon any general control requirement, and that, as a result, some of these guarantees may apply in the conduct of hostilities. This concerns mainly those guarantees whose application or constitutive elements do not imply any physical control over the concerned persons or properties.

14. The law of armed conflict

2019 ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted—jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies and Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 concerns belligerent occupation and Section 14.7. deals with the regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.8 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.

14. The law of armed conflict

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted — jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies. Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 deals with the issue of regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.7 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.

scholarly journals Wired warfare 3.0: Protecting the civilian population during cyber operations

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Degree Of Protection ◽  
Precise Degree

AbstractAs a general matter, international humanitarian law is up to the task of providing the legal framework for cyber operations during an armed conflict. However, two debates persist in this regard, the resolution of which will determine the precise degree of protection the civilian population will enjoy during cyber operations. The first revolves around the meaning of the term “attack” in various conduct of hostilities rules, while the second addresses the issue of whether data may be considered an object such that operations destroying or altering it are subject to the prohibition on attacking civilian objects and that their effects need be considered when considering proportionality and the taking of precautions in attack. Even if these debates were to be resolved, the civilian population would still face risks from the unique capabilities of cyber operations. This article proposes two policies that parties to a conflict should consider adopting in order to ameliorate such risks. They are both based on the premise that military operations must reflect a balance between military concerns and the interest of States in prevailing in the conflict.

3 Components of the International Law of Weaponry

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boothby William H
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The Status ◽  
General Principles Of Law ◽  
The Law

This chapter considers the sources of the law of weaponry and discusses matters critical to understanding it. Taking the traditional approach, in addition to general principles of law recognized by nations, the sources of the law consist of customary law and of treaty law, the latter referred to as ‘conventional law’. The chapter looks at customary law, which is, according to Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the law applied by the court as including ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. The chapter discusses what does, and respectively does not, comprise state practice and then looks at treaties, how they are made and interpreted, how states explain their understandings of them and related matters. Individual sections then address the status at law of the ICRC Study of Customary International Humanitarian Law and of the UN Secretary General’s Bulletin.

Categorization and legality of autonomous and remote weapons systems

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 627-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hin-Yan Liu
Keyword(s):  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
The Status ◽  
Military Systems ◽  
Potential Challenge ◽  
Weapons Systems

AbstractThis article reconsiders the status and legality of both autonomous and remote weapons systems under international humanitarian law. Technologically advanced unmanned military systems are being introduced into the modern battlespace with insufficient recognition of their potential challenge to international humanitarian law. The article questions the understanding of both autonomous and remote weapons systems as ‘weapons’ and seeks to consider how their use may impact existing legal categories. Their use is then specifically situated to consider the legality of their deployment in certain contexts. Finally, the article raises the question of impunity for the use of both autonomous and remote weapons systems that arise from the inability to attribute responsibility for the harm they cause. It is imperative that law and policy are developed to govern the development and deployment of these advanced weapons systems to forestall these likely situations of impunity.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document