Mauro Nobili, Sultan, Caliph, and the Renewer of the Faith: Aḥmad Lobbo, the Tārīkh al-fattāsh and the Making of an Islamic State in West Africa

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-260
Author(s):  
Madina Thiam
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
pp. 411-414
Author(s):  
Wilāyat Gharb Ifriqiyā

(2 JUNE 2015) [Trans.: Abdulbasit Kassim] Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/06/02/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-arrivals-of-the-soldiers-of-the-caliphate-in-west-africa-wilayat-gharb-ifriqiyyah/ A mark of the post-allegiance to ISIS period for Boko Haram is the lowered profile of Shekau, who ceases to be the major focus of its public image. In this video, the two speakers alluded to the escalation of the conflict between Boko Haram and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Benin. While mentioning the tensions and the context of distrust between Nigeria and her neighbors, the first speaker referred to the comment of the Chadian president, when he said that the fight against Boko Haram is being hampered by poor co-ordination between Chad and Nigeria. He also gave further information of the activities within the caliphate as well as detailed information concerning the soldiers killed in various clashes. This video should be understood within the context of Boko Haram’s display of resilience against the operations of the MNJTF...


2018 ◽  
pp. 433-434
Author(s):  
Wilāyat Gharb Ifriqiya

(14 OCTOBER 2015) [Trans.: Abdulbasit Kassim] Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/10/14/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-message-from-the-mujāhidīn-in-west-africa-to-the-mujāhidīn-in-somalia-wilayat-gharb-ifriqiyyah/ Swearing allegiance to the Islamic State meant that to some extent Boko Haram began to be utilized by Islamic State as a proxy to obtain the allegiance of other African Salafijihadi groups. Although elements of AQIM and other West African groups had proved to be open to swearing, al-Shabab in Somalia thus far have proved to be resistant (for the most part—several sections of al-Shabab have declared allegiance). Boko Haram in this video is trying to exert its influence on behalf of ISIS. The influence of this video will later yield a result for the Islamic State as Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qadir Mu‘min, Abu Nu‘man al-Yentari and other members of al-Shabab pledged allegiance on 22 October 2015 to the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, thus switching their allegiance from al-Shabab to the Islamic State...


2018 ◽  
pp. 397-402
Author(s):  
Michael Nwankpa

Part five of the book presents the current state of Boko Haram as the Islamic State’s official affiliate in West Africa, showing a clear trajectory in the transformation of Boko Haram leadership as Nigerian preachers to Islamic State’s franchise. The chapter reflects on Boko Haram’s journey especially whether its present state could have been avoided if the Nigerian state had responded differently. The reflective mode however shifts towards more realistic assessments that include an analysis of Boko Haram’s quest to regain its original motive and rebrand itself and the contestation between its local and global agenda. This is most visibly reflected in the internal criticisms against Shekau’s leadership style and unhinged attacks especially against Muslims and the recent leadership contest and infighting between the de facto leader, Abubakar Shekau and ISIS-backed al-Barnawi, the son of Boko Haram’s murdered founder, Muhammad Yusuf. The chapter offers prognosis that helps us understand the likely direction that Boko Haram may take and the possible outcomes.


Author(s):  
Jason Warner ◽  
Ellen Chapin

When referring to the terrorist group known as “Boko Haram,” observers are broadly pointing to a violent, Salafist-jihadist group (in its various incarnations and often encompassing its offshoots) based in northeastern Nigeria, which seeks to establish a caliphate ruled by sharia law in northeastern Nigeria and its environs. The group that served as its predecessor was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, Nigeria, by Mohammed Yusuf, and was named “Jama’atu Ahil as-Sunna li ad-Da’wa wa al-Jihad,” or “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (JAS). By the time that the group became violent in 2009—also the year that Yusuf died and the group was taken over by Abubakar Shekau—observers had begun to refer to the group as “Boko Haram,” broadly meaning “Western education is sinful” or “forbidden.” Even after the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015, and later faced the breakaway of a splinter group in 2016, observers have still referred to these iterations as “Boko Haram.” In other words, this article, which is ostensibly about “Boko Haram,” is more generally about the various incarnations of the above-referenced group, the nature of its violence, its cycles of leadership, its shifting global and regional affiliations, and the offshoot groups which it has engendered, all of which continue to be referred to by more casual observers as “Boko Haram,” even though none of the above iterations of the group referred to themselves as such, at least formally. While this article is one that seeks to provide an overview of the best literature available on the emergence, evolution, and current activities of the “Boko Haram” phenomenon, given the multi- and interdisciplinary study of the group—most commonly undertaken by scholars of political science, history, religion, and conflict and security—there is no singular, unifying intellectual framework by which to study the group. Instead, writings on Boko Haram have occurred across disciplines, and as we articulate in the subsections below, have been defined by two general approaches. On one hand, scholars of Boko Haram have often written comprehensive histories of the group, attempting to understand the organization writ large, while on the other, others have written about particular facets of the group relating to Boko Haram’s emergence, ideology, patterns of violence, treatment of gender and age, and interactions with global jihadist organizations, and impact on communities in which it operates. In the pages below, we detail what we view to be the most rigorous pieces written to date in each of these two broad categories, keeping in mind that given space restrictions, we were not able to include sections on every facet of the Boko Haram insurgency.


Significance Previously, there was accommodation and even cooperation between them. Global rivalries between al-Qaida and the Islamic State do not explain the shifts in the Sahara-Sahel. Rather, it concerns local political calculations and territorial control. Impacts The JNIM-ISGS clashes contribute to surging displacements of civilians in the Sahel, especially in northern Burkina Faso and central Mali. If ISGS loses, it will thwart the ambition to connect ISGS to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad basin. France will likely redouble its efforts to kill ISGS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.


Subject Jihadist terrorism in the past year. Significance Developments in terrorist groups in the past year were marked by Islamic State (IS)’s military 'defeat' in Syria and, in parallel, expansion into South-east Asia and West Africa via the emergence of new ‘provinces’; al-Qaida (AQ)’s consolidation and growing capabilities via opportunistic local collaborations; and concerns over Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s resurgence in Indonesia. Impacts Targeting of places of worship in South-east Asia may become an entrenched trend. AQIM will keep trying to exploit socio-political grievances in the Maghreb region and Mali. Despite its losses, IS has more money, better media profile and more combat experience than AQ.


Significance This follows the death of longtime Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May at the hands of his rivals in the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroonian authorities are also reporting a surge in defections. Though the numbers may be exaggerated, this represents a significant new development in the ongoing struggle against jihadist insurgency. Impacts Shekau’s death will allow ISWAP to consolidate its control in the Lake Chad basin by removing a major rival. ISWAP’s overall fighting strength may not substantially increase as many former Boko Haram fighters may defect rather than join ISWAP. The Nigerian military’s use of indiscriminate airstrikes may deter future defections and fuel recruitment into ISWAP.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 153-168
Author(s):  
Victor Osae Ihidero

Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia are few of the countries in Africa faced with terrorism and militancy. The rise and expansion of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Niger-Delta Volunteer Force, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and recently, the Avengers, has risen to vent terror on the peoples of Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia. Whilst each of these countries has its own distinct challenges that led to the formation of such terrorist groups, the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria remains complex. One of the ways an explicit explanation has been given to these complexes in Nigeria is through thriller fiction. Nollywood as well as other film industries in Africa has produced several thriller fictions that attempt to explicate the reasons behind militancy and terrorism in Africa. October 1 and Eye in the Sky are two examples of African cinema that have attempted to film the recent rise of terrorism in Nigeria and Kenya. Within the lens of October 1, terrorism in Nigeria, and by extension Africa, is rooted on ethnic and religious divide fuelled by external contact with other cultures; in this case, the culture of imperial England. This study, using the premise of postcolonial reading, examined Kunle Afolayan's award winning terror thriller, October 1 and attempted to bring out the powercultural interplay that bred terrorism in Nigeria. The study found out that the ideology of Boko Haram ("Western education is a sin") terrorist group, as bad as it seems, is a postcolonial stance against [neo]colonialism. However, the ideology lost its steam because it failed to reassert the Nigerian humanity or show any humanist tendencies to reclaiming the African glorious past. Keywords: Terror thriller, Traditionality, African cinema, Postcoloniality, Terrorism


1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-112
Author(s):  
Yushau Sodiq

Without doubt, Gomez has made a great contribution to the understandingof Islam in Bundu. Although a few works have been published onIslam in West Africa, Gomez’s work is a valuable addition. The authorbegins by locating Bundu on the map of West Africa and explaining thescope of his research and the sources upon which he relies. Gomez attributesthe success of Bundu as a state to its pragmatic policies, which, healleges, were predetermined by its founders. By pragmatism he means:a policy in which the pursuit of commercial and agriculturaladvantage supersedes all other considerations, to the extent thatalliances and rivalries with both neighboring polities andEuropean powers are determined by economic expediency, andare subject to rapid and frequent realignment. (p. 2)Compliance with this policy implies that the foreign and domesticaffairs are not based on advancing the claims of Islam, but rather on promotingpeaceful coexistence among all groups, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, in Bundu.This book is designed for general readers. The author discusses majorissues in Bundu and Senegambia before the imposition of colonial rule andadministration. He analyzes critically the significant roles played by Almaamis(the imams) Malik Sy, Buba Malik, Maka Jiba, Amadi Gai, BokarSaada, and Mamadu Lamine and provides a clear explanation of the Bundustate’s gradual development from the sixteenth century until 1902. He alsoshows the French administration’s insidious politics of divide and rule in St.Louis, Bakel, and Senegal, which was designed to weaken Bundu by instigatingconflict between one imam and another and to control the trade inthis area (pp. 95-97). Throughout his analysis, Gomez reiterates cautiouslyhis thesis that Bundu’s leaders were never interested in advancing Islam orestablishing a strong Islamic state. Rather, they were “essentially concernedwith preservation and commercial expansion of the state” (p. 99).Toward the end of the book, he deals more with the leadership ofBokar Saada, who reigned for a long time despite the lack of popular support. Bokar Saada was a leader forced on Bundu by French administrators ...


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